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Trade dynamics are inseparable from the influence of policies, prices, and the role of 
traders themselves. Trade policies differ between exporting and importing countries (Reed, 
2001), with many trade policies supporting domestic markets while simultaneously 
threatening the foreign markets with whom they are engaged in trade. The impact of the 
importing countries’ policies can be detrimental to the domestic trade sector of the exporting 
countries and vice versa; one common example is import tariffs created by the importing 
country to protect its domestic industries which subsequently limit the import quantities 
produced by exporting countries (Reed, 2001). This impact can usually be observed through 
changes in domestic price trends due to the emergence of a policy, so research aiming to 
predict the effects of these policies and subsequent price trends on domestic markets can 
help governments to be better prepared in facing challenges which will inevitably emerge.   
Furthermore, changes in price trends can affect the decisions of traders to remain in 
or exit a market, and ultimately change the structure of the market itself.  Due to increased 
market competition, higher numbers of traders typically result in more favourable the market 
conditions, while lower numbers of traders typically mean a higher potential for 
disproportionate market power (Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, 1995). In the agricultural 
sector of developing countries, traders are able to bridge the gap between factories and 
farmers due to farmers’ lack of capital, information and knowledge (Kopp, Alamsyah, 
Fatricia, & Brümmer, 2014; Zúñiga-Arias, 2007). Understanding traders’ behavior is 
relevant for policy makers in suitably anticipating market structure changes and can help 
protect farmers by maintaining their market power. 
Additionally, as we show in chapter 3, another factor affecting traders’ behavior to 
remain in or exit a market is credit provision. In the agricultural sector, it is a common 
practice to provide credit for suppliers or farmers, since they still depend on loans,  not only 
for farming activities but also for their daily needs. Carranza and Niles (2019) found that 
food, agricultural and livestock inputs, and medical expenses are the main loan-dependent 
expenses among smallholder farmer households. Money lenders certainly carry the risk of 
losing their money to suppliers who default on their debt, especially when price trends are 
declining. This may affect traders’ decision in determining a price. Observing the effects of 
individual loan quantities on price determination then becomes very compelling.  
To achieve these objectives, we study the case of oil palm and rubber traders in Jambi 
province, Indonesia. Indonesia represents a largely agricultural country, with an agricultural 
sector that accounted for nearly 13% of total Gross Domestic Product in 2018 (Statistics 
Indonesia, 2019). Among its agricultural outputs, Indonesia’s oil palm and rubber trade 
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provide a large contribution to the country's foreign exchange (Directorate General of Estate 
Crops, 2017a, 2017b). Plantation land area in Jambi province, located on Sumatra island, 
has rapidly expanded, bringing with it many indirect land use change issues (Directorate 
General of Estate Crops, 2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b). However, all stakeholders 
related are benefiting from the sector due to higher income (Bou Dib, Krishna, Alamsyah, 
& Qaim, 2018). Moreover, the Indonesian palm oil and rubber industries have resulted in 
many new domestic employment opportunities. Labor usage within the Palm Oil and Rubber 
industries increased by about 36 % and 7 %,  respectively, from 2013 to 2018 (Directorate 
General of Estate Crops, 2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b). The contrasting trajectories of 
these two valuable industries makes studies related to palm oil and rubber of particular 
interest to policy makers and national governments. 
The research objectives of this study are therefore to: 
a. Observe the effects of an importing country’s trade policy on price in a targeted exporting 
country  
b. Analyse factors affecting local traders’ decisions to remain in or exit the market 
c. Investigate the influence of farmer’s debt on local traders’ buying choices and price 
determination  
We pursue these research objectives through three separate papers, summarized below: 
 
Paper 1 
The European Union’s Biodiesel Antidumping Duty (AD) is one of the most hotly 
debated international biodiesel trade policies in existence today. In 2013, the EU imposed a 
biodiesel AD on exporting countries known to engage in biodiesel dumping, and Indonesia 
was one of the main countries affected The EU accused Indonesian biodiesel producers of 
charging artificially lower prices than the world market in the purchasing of raw materials 
(CPO), which was said to affect the performance of EU biodiesel producers. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study specifically focusing on the price effects of the EU ADs 
in countries targeted by the duties. The study aims to observe the effects of the AD on 
Indonesian exports and local CPO prices by applying a Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM) approach to time series data. Result shows that the implementation of the AD has 






Traders play a significant and often underestimated role in agricultural trading 
activities. Having more traders in the market is favorable for competition, as farmers have 
more choices as to whom they may sell their products and can choose their most preferred 
trader. Understanding this role is crucial in understanding the trader’s behavior in the market. 
Some may remain, and some may exit the market, which can then in turn alter the market 
structure. Therefore, this study focuses on traders’ decisions to remain in or exit the market, 
and the factors influencing this decision. To analyse the probability they remain in the 
market, we employ a binary logistic regression method to key variables obtained from a 3-
round data collection process in Jambi. We find clear evidence that human capital (education 
and experience), trading structure (traded product, credit provision, land area, operational 
vehicle ownership, and trader status), structural environment (number of competitors), and 
socioeconomic (trading revenue) factors all affect the decision of traders to remain in or exit 
the market. 
Paper 3 
In the Jambi rubber trade, it is a common practice to reduce the price of rubber to 
compensate for a contaminated product. However, a farmer’s dependence on loans offered 
by traders may also have an influence on this price reduction.  This study aims to observe to 
what extent, if any, price reduction, rubber quality, and farmers’ debt influence rubber 
traders’ preferences in buying rubber, and to estimate how much of a price reduction traders 
will charge to obtain higher quality rubber or lower farmer’s debt. Using data from 210 
rubber traders in Jambi Province, Indonesia, we apply a Discrete Choice Experiment and a 
willingness-to-pay measurement approach to observe this phenomenon. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no study implementing this method to capture agricultural traders’ or 
middlemen’s behavior in sourcing product and using price reduction as a replacement for 
willingness to pay; therefore, the methods applied in this study are novel. Result shows that 
price reduction, rubber quality, and farmer’s debt influence traders’ preferences in buying 
rubber, whereas higher price reduction, higher rubber quality, and lower farmer’s debt will 
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In 2003, the European Union (EU) issued a directive advising member states to 
increase the use of biofuels and other renewable fuels in the transport sector (European 
Commission, 2003) in an effort to reduce CO2 emission in transportation. Biodiesel1 is the 
most widely used type of biofuel in the EU, with a share of 80.7 % of the market in 2017 
(Tiseo, 2019). A study performed by (Sheehan, Camobreco, Duffield, Graboski, & Shapori, 
1998) reported that blending higher amounts of biodiesel into petroleum diesel leads to a 
lower amount of net CO2 life cycle emissions overall2 (Figure 2. 1).  
 
Source: Own production based on data from (Sheehan et al., 1998). 
Figure 2. 1 Net CO2 Life Cycle Emissions3 of Petroleum Diesel and Biodiesel Blends4 
The directives aim for new renewable energies to account for at least 32% of total 
energy needs in the EU by 2030  (European Commission, 2018). The directives have been 
further expanded a number of times. One of these changes, issued in 2009, requires that 
renewable fuel be applied not only to motor vehicles, but also to machinery (Bourguignon, 
2015). The directives have caused both an increase in the consumption of biofuels and an 
expansion of the domestic biodiesel industry; however, this growth in domestic consumption 
has not entirely translated into  production increases, and as of 2011 production quantity was 
still 21.5% lower than consumption (Flach, Lieberz, Lappin, & Bolla, 2018) (Figure 2. 2). 
The remaining domestic demand was met through imports.  
 
1 Biodiesel is a renewable diesel fuel substitute made from natural oil or fat mixed chemically with alcohol 
(Sheehan et al., 1998). 
2 Net CO2 was calculated by setting biomass CO2 emissions from the tailpipe to zero (Sheehan et al., 1998). 
3 The value is expressed in grams per brake horsepower-hour (g/bhp-h) which is the standards for heavy duty 
engines (Sheehan et al., 1998). 





Source: Own production based on Flach et al. (2018) and Flach, Lieberz, Rondon, Williams, & Wilson (2016). 
Figure 2. 2 Biodiesel and Renewable Diesel (HVO5) in the European Union 
 Opening international trade channels for biodiesel commodities put the European 
producers under competitive pressure from foreign imports. Indonesia is one of the world’s 
leading biodiesel exporters, contributing to around 30% of total biodiesel imported by the 
EU in 2012 (Flach et al., 2018; UFOP, 2017). Biodiesel prices charged by Indonesia are very 
competitive, since it has a competitive advantage in sourcing Crude Palm Oil (CPO), one of 
the main raw materials used in producing biodiesel 
 To confront such a challenge, the EU may enforce certain trade barriers to protect 
domestic producers. According to Reed (2001), there are four reasons a country or region 
may have such barriers. First, the government may seek to gain more income by charging 
tariffs to exporters, which are easier to implement and more discrete than raising income 
taxes outright. Second, the government may attempt to protect certain products, such as 
staple foods, to achieve self-sufficiency, and price distortions through trade barriers can be 
a viable option to this end. Third, the government may attempt to politically protect domestic 
producers from international rivalry in order to obtain higher subsequent bargaining power 
in the international market. Lastly, very large importing countries may take advantage of 
their high market power by restricting imports of certain products to reduce the world price; 
thereby increasing their welfare. 
 One of the most debated international biodiesel trade policies created by the EU is 
the Biodiesel EU Antidumping Duty (AD) created in late 2013 (European Commission, 
2013a). The EU imposed a biodiesel AD on exporting countries known to engage in 
biodiesel dumping, with Indonesia being one of the main targets of the policy. The country 
 
5 Hydrogenated Vegetable Oil 
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was accused of having set export prices below the competitive market price, which 
negatively affected domestic producers’ performance. 
 This presumption was based on a 2012 study  conducted by the EU, which found that 
Indonesian biodiesel producers were charged far below the world market price in the 
purchasing of raw materials from Indonesian CPO producers (European Commission, 2012). 
The price difference was developed by imposing high-value export tariffs on Indonesian 
CPO inputs, while maintaining very low export tariffs for the output product of Indonesian 
biodiesel. The margins generated on dumping were revealed to be between 8.8% and 23.3% 
(European Commission, 2013b).  
 In response, Indonesia made an appeal against the policy at the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in 2015, as its discussions with the 
EU had failed to reach a resolution (World Trade Organization, 2018). The court ruled in 
favor of Indonesia, arguing that the EU failed in their assessment of the situation through 
inaccurate estimation of production costs, improper formulation of an export price, and 
insufficient evidence for the existence of a price undercutting scheme. The policy was 
terminated by the end of 2018, and as of today there are no more  ADs imposed by the EU 
on Indonesian biodiesel (European Union External Action, 2018).  
The implementation of trade duties can have important and long-lasting economic 
effects on stakeholders in target countries. Measuring the effects of the biodiesel AD on the 
Indonesian CPO industry can provide an important analysis into the economic impacts of 
trade duties and allow for a quantitative assessment of the effects of ADs on agricultural 
markets, particularly in developing economies. To the best of our knowledge, there are few 
studies focusing on the effects of AD’s, especially those imposed by the EU, on target 
countries (Cheong, 2007; Cuyvers & Dumont, 2005; Jabbour, Tao, Vanino, & Zhang, 2009).  
Most studies focus on the effects of AD’s in home countries (Asche, 2001; Avşar, 2013; 
Konings & Vandenbussche, 2013; Pierce, 2011), with a primary focus on trade destruction 
and diversion as a result of duty implementation. 
The preceding studies (Cheong, 2007; Cuyvers & Dumont, 2005; Jabbour et al., 
2009) applied Ordinary Least Square (OLS) or Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to identify 
the EU AD’s effects on target countries’ export growth by measuring  export value and 
volume. Other studies (Brambilla, Porto, & Tarozzi, 2012; Chandra & Long, 2013; Lu, Tao, 
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& Zhang, 2013) concentrated on the effects of United States AD’s on income and labor 
productivity in target countries by applying Cross-section and Panel Regression Models.  
Even though biodiesel usage may lead to decreased CO2 emissions, the expansion of 
palm oil production land for the biodiesel industry may have detrimental environmental 
effects, such as biodiversity loss and indirect land use change (Croezen, Bergsma, Otten, & 
van Valkengoed, 2010; Matsuda & Takeuchi, 2018). Indirect land use change involves the 
conversion of land from its initial purpose, such as protected forest, grassland,  pasture, or 
agricultural land, into arable land used for biofuel feedstock cultivation, which results in an 
increase in emissions (Croezen et al., 2010). This indirect increase in emissions is one of the 
reasons why biodiesel made from palm oil is currently considered unsustainable by the EU6. 
(European Commission, 2019).  
On the positive side, the Indonesian palm oil industry has provided many 
employment opportunities in the national economy. There was a massive increase in labor 
usage in the palm oil production sector of about 78% from 2012-2014 (Directorate General 
of Estate Crops, 2016a). Furthermore, the industry has boosted the Indonesian national 
income. The value of Indonesian biodiesel exports reached around 1.1 billion USD in 2014, 
a 17% increase from  2012 (UN Comtrade, 2019).  
This contrast between potential environmental benefits and ecological harm make 
any study of the palm oil industry both interesting and complex. This study differs from 
previous literatures in its aim to observe the effects of the EU AD on Indonesian exports and 
local CPO prices by employing time series data to a Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM). By comparing Johansen and Gregory-Hansen tests in our model specification, we 
can prove whether there is a structural break representing the AD duty implementation which 
captures the effect of the policy implementation on both Indonesian CPO prices and local 
prices 
The study is structured as follows: the subsequent section provides an overview of 
the alleged dumping occurring in Indonesia and subsequent EU response to the situation. 
The model specification section describes the methodology implemented and is followed by 
a description of the data used in the study. We discuss the results before summarizing our 
study in the conclusion section. 
 
6 The EU stated that 45% of the oil palm area expansion caused forest devastation; in contrast, that the case 
for only 8% and less for other biodiesel sources (European Commission, 2019). 
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2.2. Background: dumping and retaliation 
2.2.1 Dumping 
The implementation agreement of Article VI of the 1994 General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade expressed an opposition to the practice of dumping (World Trade 
Organization, 1994). However, many countries still engage in the practice with various 
products (Figure 2. 3). From an international trade perspective, dumping is associated with 
a form of price discrimination wherein exporting countries charge a lower price on the world 
market than they do domestically, or evaluate a product at a value lower than the product’s 
average cost (Feenstra & Taylor, 2014).  
 
Source: Own production based on data from World Trade Organization (2019). 
Figure 2. 3 AD Initiations between 1995-2018. 
However, Lindsey and Ikenson (2003) argue that a country can be accused of 
dumping even when charging equal prices on both the world market and the domestic 
market; or even a higher world price than domestic price. According to the authors, reasons 
for this include the effect of fluctuation, the asymmetric treatment of indirect selling 
expenses, and the exclusion of below-cost sales which are able to influence the value of 
dumping margins.  
 To illustrate the general dumping situation, we assume a condition called Foreign 
Discriminating Monopoly (Feenstra & Taylor, 2014) as shown in Figure 2. 4. The firm is 
assumed to be in perfect competition on the world market and exercises monopolistic market 
power on the domestic market. It sets Marginal Cost (MC) equal to Marginal Revenue (MR) 
to maximize profits. Also, it discriminates between prices set on the local market and those 
of export markets. To maximize profit, it produces QE, where its local MC meets export 
11 
 
market MRE at point O. However, it sells only at QD to its local market, where MRD meets 
MRE at point N. The difference between QE and QD is the quantity to be exported.  
 
Source: Own production based on data from Feenstra and Taylor (2014). 
Figure 2. 4 Dumping Illustration 
Additionally, it charges a price PD on the domestic market, while PE is charged on 
the export market. In this case, PE is lower than PD, even lower than the local Average Cost 
(AC). This price discrimination is called dumping. In such a condition, nevertheless, the firm 
still profits. Feenstra and Taylor (2014) mentioned that, even though the export price value 
is lower than that of average cost (AC), the firm, or the foreign monopoly producer, still 
benefits from this condition if the export price value is higher than the MC7.  
However, the alleged dumping scheme exercised by Indonesia is a more complex 
case. The EU claimed that CPO, the raw material for Indonesian biodiesel, is sold at 
artificially cheaper prices domestically than internationally (European Commission, 2013b). 
This reduces Indonesian biodiesel manufacturers costs below the costs of outside CPO 
manufacturers, which rely on CPO from Indonesia as an input. The EU further claims that 
this was caused by a large difference between the value of export tariffs between CPO and 
biodiesel, where dumping margin arises (European Commission, 2013b). This situation, 
where there is a difference in the value of export tariffs between input and output products 
is known as an export tariff escalation (Nogués, 2011).   
The objective of imposing an export tariff escalation is to protect the processing 
industries in the exporting countries (Nogués, 2011). Consequently, the tariff escalation is 
visible when the raw material export tariff is higher than that of processed product (Corzine, 
 
7 Every unit exported raises profit by the discrepancy between price and MC 
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2008; Nogués, 2011). Thus, it will encourage the domestic processing industries to grow and 
increase their competitiveness. 
𝑇𝑊 = 𝑇 − 𝑡 (1)  
TW = Normal tariff wedge 
T = Tariff in ad valorem equivalent of the output commodity 
t = Tariff in ad valorem equivalent of the input commodity 
There is a measurement of tariff escalation, called tariff wedge (TW)8 (Elamin & 
Khaira, 2003), which is defined as the discrepancy between output and input commodity 
tariff values (eq. 1). It is more often applied to calculate import than export tariff wedge. 
Thus, the interpretation of TW should be reversed, where export tariff escalation appears 
when TW<0. Meanwhile, export tariff de-escalation occurs when tariff wedge is higher than 
zero. Another condition called export tariff parity happens when TW=0.  
 
Source: Own calculation based on data from Minister of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia (2019) and 
Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia (2019). 
Figure 2. 5 Value of Export Tariff (USD/ton) of Indonesian CPO and Biodiesel9 
Figure 2. 5 depicts the deviation of export tariff values10 of Indonesian CPO and 
biodiesel. Since the export tariff value of Indonesian CPO is mostly higher than that of 
 
8 Another measurement, called Effective Rate of Protection, is applied to avoid issue caused by the presence 
of multiple input and/or output. However, in this case TW is sufficient since CPO is the main raw material in 
biodiesel production, while other additional materials are negligible. 
9 By processing 1 ton of CPO, 0.9 ton of biodiesel is produced (Andarani, Nugraha, & Wieddya, 2017) 
10 The CPO export tariff value was calculated by multiplying its export tariff with its Export Standard Price 
(ESP), where similar process was conducted for biodiesel. The ESP for both CPO and biodiesel were defined 
based on the CPO Free on Board (FOB) average price. Both CPO and biodiesel export tariffs refer to the CPO 
reference price which were based on Cost, Insurance, and Freight (CIF) Rotterdam CPO average price and 
Malaysian and/or Jakarta exchange CPO average price. The export tariff classification regulations were 
determined by the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia. Each is valid until the Ministry decides 
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Indonesian biodiesel, it can be concluded that the tariff wedge is mostly lower than 0 in the 
period of 2009-2013. This condition indicates that the export tariff escalation exists.  In 
addition to that, the figure only presents the condition before the EU AD duty imposition, 
which was started at the end of 2013. 
The export tariff imposition will create higher MC for the CPO producers overseas. 
Since the domestic CPO price is below the world CPO price due to the export tariff, the MC 
in exporting biodiesel by Indonesia (MCEX) becomes lower than that incurred by the EU 
(MCEU) (Figure 2. 6), which is also due to biodiesel low export tariff11. This difference 
moves the equilibrium along the demand curve (DEU); from point O to B. In response to this 
new price (PEX), the quantity produced by the EU is reduced from QEU1 to QEU2, where the 
EU also starts to import QEX-QEU2. This artificially low MCEX means this situation was 
previously counted as dumping, which was also supported by the dumping margin 
calculation by the EU. It is consistent with the previous statement by Lindsey and Ikenson, 
(2003) that even though the world price is higher than the domestic price, a country can still 
be accused of dumping. 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
Figure 2. 6 Indonesian Biodiesel Dumping Illustration 
2.2.2 Retaliation 
To tackle dumping, the EU imposed an AD. The case was initiated in August 2012. 
It was a follow up from the complaint the European Biodiesel Board’s (EBB) filed one 
month before. The EU biodiesel producer who filed the case represents more than 60% of 
the total EU biodiesel production (European Commission, 2013a). The evidence provided 
 
that the new regulation is required to be authorized. On the other hand, the CPO reference price and ESP 
were determined by the Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia on a monthly basis (Minister of Trade 
of the Republic of Indonesia, 2019; Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia, 2019). 
11 The low biodiesel export tariff creates the gap between export market MCEX and local MCDOM. 
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was deemed by the EU to be sufficient to initiate a proper investigation into a potential a 
dumping scenario. Then, the EU began an investigation into Indonesian exporting producers 
as well as EU producers, and both parties were required to provide data to be processed as 
part of the investigation. 
Further, dumping and injury margins were examined, and both were compared to 
determine the AD rates (Table 2. 1), which were imposed at the end of 2013 (European 
Commission, 2013a). These rates were adjusted to the level of the purity of the biodiesel 
imported. Additionally, according to Feenstra and Taylor (2014) there are three ways to 
determine the AD rate: by (1) comparing the import price to the exporter’s local price, (2) 
comparing this to that of a similar product in another country, and (3) comparing that to the 
exporter’s AC. 







PT Ciliandra Perkasa, Jakarta 8.8% 19.7% 
8.8% 
(EUR 76.94) 
PT Musim Mas, Medan 18.3% 16.9% 
16.9% 
(EUR 151.32) 
PT Pelita Agung Agrindustri, Medan 16.8% 20.5% 
16.8% 
(EUR 145.14) 
PT Wilmar Bioenergi Indonesia, Medan; PT 




Other cooperating commpanies 20.1% 18.9% 
18.9% 
(EUR 166.95) 
All other companies 23.3% 20.5% 
20.5% 
(EUR 178.85) 
Source: (European Commission, 2013a). 
In the same period, the EU imposed the biodiesel AD not only on Indonesia but also 
on Argentina, where the value of dumping and injury margins, as well as AD rates, are higher 
for Argentina than they are for Indonesia. The AD rates for Argentina were between 22.0-
25.7% (European Commission, 2013a). Additionally, the United States (US) has also 
imposed the AD on both Argentina and Indonesia since April 2018, when the International 
Trade Commission (ITC), an independent US federal trade regulations agency, affirmed that 
the industry in the US was negatively affected as a result of dumping (Smith, 2018). The 
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estimated weighted-average dumping margins are much higher than those implemented by 
the EU.  
In the EU, the AD causes an increase in import prices as illustrated in Figure 2. 7, 
where the price increases from Pw to Pw + duty. When trade is introduced, the Home 
Consumer Surplus (CS) expands excessively, while Home producers are worse off. 
However, there is an increase in the Home total surplus, where area AOB (No Trade) shifts 
into area ABCD (Free Trade). Under this condition, the import quantity becomes Q3-Q2, 
while home producers produce only Q2. If producers charge a price higher than Pw, the 
consumers will import the product.  
In a case where the government imposes an AD (Free Trade with AD), the price will 
increase to Pw + duty. Consequently, the import quantity will fall to Q5-Q4. The Home CS 
decreases, while there is surplus transfer from consumer to producer. Apart from that, the 
government will gain revenue from the duty not exceeding the area of EE1FF1. In this case, 
area CEE1+DFF1 is Dead Weight Loss, and is no longer part of the total surplus. Even 
though the total surplus decreases by issuing an AD, the government still considers that 
imposing this policy is beneficial for the reasons mentioned in the previous chapter (Reed, 
2001). In this situation, the EU seeks to protect its domestic biodiesel producers from 
dumping. 
 
Source: Own production based on Reed (2001) and Feenstra and Taylor (2014). 
Figure 2. 7  Home Equilibrium without Trade, with Trade and with AD in Trade 
 On the other hand, the possible effect that occurs in Indonesia is illustrated in Figure 
2. 8, which is derived from the Foreign Discriminating Monopoly curve. When the export 
price increases to PE + duty, the domestic price increases. Moreover, the quantity produced 
will be limited to QE2 where QD2 is sold domestically and QE2-QD2 is exported. Both the 
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quantity sold domestically and exported may be less than before, and are shown by QD and 
QE-QD, respectively. However, the effect of the biodiesel AD duty on the Indonesian CPO 
industry will be discussed further in the results section. 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
Figure 2. 8 The AD duty Illustration Effect in Indonesia 
2.3. Model Specification 
We aim to observe the effects of the EU biodiesel AD on Indonesian export prices 
and local prices by applying a VECM to time series data. To do so, we test for the existence 
of a structural break (SB) in the long-run relationship between two price time series. We 
analyze two relationships - the relationship between world CPO price and Indonesian CPO 
price, as well as the relationship between Indonesian CPO price and the local price of Fresh 
Fruit Bunches (FFB) of oil palm in Jambi Province. The existence of a structural break (SB) 
would indicate changes in long- or short-run relationship between prices caused by the duty 
imposition if a significant SB occurs around the duty imposition date. 
The first step is to ensure that all price variables are stationary on the first difference 
(I(1)) to avoid the problem of a spurious regression. Thus, we employed Augmented Dicky 
Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP), and Zivot-Andrews (ZA) unit root tests to examine the 
stationarity. ADF and PP test model are shown by equation 2 and 3 (Asteriou & Hall, 2016). 
Dickey-Fuller extended their test procedure by suggesting an augmented version of the test 
which includes lagged terms of the dependent variable to eliminate autocorrelation (Waheed, 
Alam, & Ghauri, 2007). the unit root presents itself, i.e. the variable is non-stationary, when 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Therefore, to obtain the I(1) variable, we expect to 
reject it on the first difference. Another stationarity test is ZA test (eq. 4) (Zivot & Andrews, 
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1992), which allows for the univariate existence of a SB. The purpose of the ZA test is to 
ensure the stationarity robustness and test the initial SB indication in each variable.  
∆𝑦𝑡 =  𝑎𝑜 +  𝛽𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝛾𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝛥𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
+  ℯ𝑡 (2) 
∆𝑦𝑡 =  𝑎𝑜 +  𝛽𝑦𝑡−1 +   ℯ𝑡 (3) 
∆𝑦𝑡 =  𝑎𝑜 +  𝛽𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝛾 𝑡 +  𝐷𝑈𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝛥𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
+  ℯ𝑡  (4) 
 
Next, we must test the cointegration of the two-pair time series to confirm that they 
hold a long-run relationship. They are cointegrated if both are integrated in the same order, 
in this case on I(1), and if there is a linear combination of both series on the level I(0) where 
in this case the 𝑒𝑡 in equation 5 or 6 is stationary. Initially, we conducted Johansen 
cointegration test to observe the cointegration. In a later step, we performed a Gregory-
Hansen (GH) cointegration test to analyze the cointegration allowing for a SB. These results 
will be compared to identify whether the SB genuinely exists or not, in the form of VECM.  
Before we proceed to the cointegration tests, we need to determine the optimum lag 
order necessary to reduce bias by using model selection criterions in the form of Akaike 
information criterion (AIC), Bayesian information criterion (BIC), and Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion (HQIC) (Mills & Prasad, 1992). We consider all criterions for 
robustness motivation. The difference between these criteria lie in how the number of 
estimated parameters and observations are penalized (Mills & Prasad, 1992). 
The Johansen cointegration test determines the rank of a time series relationship or 
the number of cointegrating vectors in a bivariate relationship study with only one possible 
cointegrating vector (eq. 5). The Johansen test is a maximum likelihood method based on 
specific correlations (Johansen, 1988). Trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics are also 
approaches to be observed (Asteriou & Hall, 2016; Johansen, 1988).  
𝑦1𝑡 =  𝑎1  +  𝛽𝑦2𝑡 +  𝑒𝑡 (5) 
Meanwhile, the GH cointegration test is based on ADF and Phillips (Zα and Zt) test 
statistic to examine the presence of cointegration allowing SB (Gregory & Hansen, 1996). 
There are three different possibilities of SB in the cointegration vector (equation 6); these 
are (1) a level shift (eq. 6a), (2) a level shift and trend (eq. 6b), and (3) a regime shift (eq. 
𝐷𝑈 = 1  if  𝑡 > 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒  and 0 if otherwise 
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6c). We determine the best of these a la Gregory and Hansen (1996). The best model is 
determined by model selection criteria and test statistics and is presented in the results 
section. However, in this study, we do not consider cointegration with SB in level and trend 
(eq. 6b) since there is no indication of trend present in the series and there is a common price 
volatility. Also, the breakpoint is suggested during this test. Nevertheless, we currently have 
2 possibilities left of equation 6 (eq. 6a and 6b), since equation 6b is neglected.  
𝑦1𝑡 =  𝑎1  +  𝑎2𝐷𝑈𝑡 +  𝛽𝑦2𝑡 +  𝑒𝑡 (6𝑎) 
𝑦1𝑡 =  𝑎1  +  𝑎2𝐷𝑈𝑡 +  𝑎3𝑇 +  𝛽𝑦2𝑡 +  𝑒𝑡 (6𝑏) 
𝑦1𝑡 =  𝑎1  +  𝑎2𝐷𝑈𝑡 + 𝑎3(𝐷𝑈𝑡 . 𝑦2𝑡)  +  𝛽𝑦2𝑡 +  𝑒𝑡 (6𝑐) 
𝐷𝑈 = 1  if  𝑡 > 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒   
 When the relationships are properly cointegrated, we proceed to estimate and 
interpret the long-run relationship by using VECM with log-likelihood function. Equations 
above (eq. 5, 6a, and 6c) capture the two long-run relationships between the two-pair time 
series which are distinctly presented below (eq. 7, 8a, 8b and 9, 10a, 10b). All price variables, 
namely world CPO price (𝑃𝑊), Indonesian CPO price (𝑃𝐼𝐷), and Jambi FFB price (𝑃𝐽𝐵), are in 
the natural logarithm form. However, we consider extra variables, namely export tariff 
values in USD/ton (𝐸𝑇) and tax levy (𝑇𝐿) in dummy form, in the relationship between 𝑃𝐼𝐷 
and 𝑃𝐽𝐵, since those extra variables are part of 𝑃𝐼𝐷. The coefficient 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛼3, 𝛽, 𝜉, and 𝜌 are 
the parameters to be estimated.   
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 =  𝛼11 + 𝛽1. 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊 + 𝑒𝑐𝑡 (7) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 =   𝛼12 + 𝛼21𝑆𝐵 + 𝛽2. 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊 + 𝑒𝑐𝑡 (8𝑎) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 =  𝛼13 + 𝛼22𝑆𝐵 + 𝛼31𝑆𝐵. 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊 + 𝛽3. 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊 + 𝑒𝑐𝑡 (8𝑐) 
and 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐽𝐵 =  𝛼14 + 𝛽4. 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 + 𝜉1. 𝐸𝑇 +  𝜌1. 𝑇𝐿 + 𝑒𝑐𝑡 (9) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐽𝐵 =   𝛼15 + 𝛼23𝑆𝐵 + 𝛽5. 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 +  𝜉2. 𝐸𝑇 + 𝜌2. 𝑇𝐿 + 𝑒𝑐𝑡 (10𝑎) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐽𝐵 =  𝛼16 + 𝛼24𝑆𝐵 + 𝛼32𝑆𝐵. 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 + 𝛽6. 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 + 𝜉3. 𝐸𝑇 + 𝜌3. 𝑇𝐿 + 𝑒𝑐𝑡 (10𝑐) 
 In addition to that, VECM can segregate the long-run equilibrium, represented by the 
error correction term (𝑒𝑐𝑡), from the short-run dynamics. Thus, any shock that occurs in a 
certain period lets both prices adjust to return to the equilibrium (Patterson, 2000). The short-
run equations are presented below. Equation 11a and 11b represent the short-run equilibrium 
of the relationship between 𝑃𝐼𝐷 and 𝑃𝑊, while equation 12a and 12b represent the relationship 
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between 𝑃𝐽𝐵 and 𝑃𝐼𝐷. Subscript 𝑡 represents time; 𝑛 describes the number of lags (0, …, 𝑘); 
and 𝛾, 𝛿, and 𝜃 are parameters to be estimated.  
∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛾1𝑛∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑡−𝑛
𝑘
𝑛=1
+ 𝛿1∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊𝑡−𝑛 + 𝜃1𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 (11𝑎) 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊 𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛾2𝑛∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑡−𝑛
𝑘
𝑛=1
+ 𝛿2∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊𝑡−𝑛 + 𝜃2𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 (11𝑏) 
and 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐽𝐵 𝑡 = ∑ 𝛾3𝑛∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐽𝐵𝑡−𝑛
𝑘
𝑛=1
+ 𝛿3∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑡−𝑛 + 𝜃3𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 (12𝑎) 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 𝑡 = ∑ 𝛾4𝑛∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐽𝐵𝑡−𝑛
𝑘
𝑛=1
+ 𝛿4∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑡−𝑛 + 𝜃4𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 (12𝑏) 
 Additionally, the VECM can be briefly presented in matrix notation, as presented 
below. Equations 19a and 19b represent the two-pair time series relationships without a SB, 
where the long-run equation is inserted as 𝑒𝑐𝑡 within the short-run equation. Matrices A and 
B denote the effects of prices in the previous periods. Matrix ε denotes normally distributed 
errors. Equations 20a and 20b define the two-pair time series relationships with SB, where 
there is a level shift in the model, while equations 21a and 21b define where there is a regime 
shift in the model. Those equations are differed into parts with a dummy 0 (before SB or t ≤ 
breakpoint) and dummy 1 (after SB or t > breakpoint). 
 First, one cointegration vector model allowing for a SB is chosen between two; thus, 
there is only one model left representing the SB (eq. 20a and 20b or 21a and 21b). Then, that 
model is compared to the model without the SB (eq. 19a and 19b) to confirm that the effect 
of SB is legitimate. Again, to do so, we compare the model-selection criteria value for both 
models: the lower the value, the better the model. Also, the higher the log-likelihood value, 
the better the model. Another criterion is that when all the GH cointegration test possibilities 
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] =    
  A + [
𝜃12𝑎
𝜃22𝑎
] [𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 − 𝛼12𝑎 − 𝛼21𝑎𝑆𝐵 − 𝛽2𝑎. 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊]  +  ε , SB = 0
  A + [
𝜃12𝑏
𝜃22𝑏



















] =    
  A +  [
𝜃13𝑎
𝜃23𝑎
] [𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 − 𝛼13𝑎 − 𝛼22𝑎𝑆𝐵 − 𝛼31𝑎𝑆𝐵. 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊 − 𝛽3𝑎 . 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊] +  ε , SB = 0
  A +  [
𝜃13𝑏
𝜃23𝑏





] =    
  B + [
𝜃33𝑎
𝜃43𝑎
] [𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐽𝐵 − 𝛼16𝑎 − 𝛼24𝑎𝑆𝐵 − 𝛼32𝑎𝑆𝐵. 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 − 𝛽6𝑎. 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 − 𝜉3𝑎 . 𝐸𝑇 − 𝜌3𝑎 . 𝑇𝐿 ]  +  ε , SB = 0
  B + [
𝜃33𝑏
𝜃43𝑏
] [𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐽𝐵 − 𝛼16𝑏 − 𝛼24𝑎𝑆𝐵 − 𝛼32𝑏𝑆𝐵. 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 − 𝛽6𝑏. 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 − 𝜉3𝑏 . 𝐸𝑇 − 𝜌3𝑏 . 𝑇𝐿 ]  +  ε , SB = 1
(21𝑏) 
 
  At last, if the SB effect is legitimate, we compare the full model (also called the 
restricted model) which allows for the presence of the SB (eq. 20 or eq. 21) to the unrestricted 
model (also called as separated model). The unrestricted model represents the separation of 
equation 19 into before and after the breakpoint, thus we will have two long-run relationships 
(two-unrestricted model). To do so, a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test is required, since the VECM 
model determination employs the log-likelihood function. The log-likelihood discrepancy 
between a full model and the two-unrestricted model determines the LR value (eq. 22), 
which is then compared with a chi-square (χ2) distribution (Wooldridge, 2013). The two-
unrestricted model is better than the full model if we can reject the null hypothesis.  









We use data on world CPO price (𝑃𝑊), Indonesian CPO price (𝑃𝐼𝐷), and Jambi FFB 
price (𝑃𝐽𝐵) at a weekly frequency. 𝑃𝑊 and 𝑃𝐼𝐷 are obtained from DataStream Navigator by 
Thomson Reuters (2019a, 2019b), while 𝑃𝐽𝐵 data are gathered from the Estate Crop Office 
of the Jambi Province (2019). The series starts in October 2011, when the data is most 
recently available, and ends in November 2018, when the EU biodiesel AD imposition 
ended. It is expected that within that time period, the effect of the duty imposition can be 
analyzed.  
We utilized CPO Cost, using Insurance and Freight (CIF) Rotterdam Price as a proxy 
for the 𝑃𝑊. Rotterdam is considered the main export entrance for the EU countries. Its price 
frequently influences the domestic price of exporting countries. Based on Figure 2. 9, the 
EU is the second largest Indonesian CPO importer, and EU countries absorbed around 25 % 
of total Indonesian CPO export quantity in between 2012-2017. Meanwhile, India remains 
the largest importing country, consuming more than 60% of the total Indonesian CPO export 
quantity in 2017. 
 
Source: Own production based on (Statistics Indonesia, 2018) 
Figure 2. 9 Share of Indonesian CPO Export Value based on Importing Countries 
We used CPO Free on Board (FOB) price in the Indonesian ports of Dumai and 
Belawan as a proxy for 𝑃𝐼𝐷, as these are the main ports for CPO export activities. They 
accommodate more than 50% of total Indonesian CPO export quantity in 2017 (Figure 2. 
10). Those ports are located in Sumatra island, where the majority of Indonesian CPO 






Source: Own production based on (Statistics Indonesia, 2018) 
Figure 2. 10 Share of Indonesian CPO Export Value based on Ports’ Location 
 We use Jambi province to represent local Indonesian areas. The province widely 
expanded the development of both oil palm land area and production from 2011-2017 
(Figure 2. 11), and the number of oil palm farmers in the province increased 20% during this 
period(Directorate General of Estate Crops, 2015, 2016a). Oil palm accounted for  nearly 
12% of Indonesian CPO export value in 2017 (Statistics Indonesia, 2018). The local 
price, 𝑃𝐽𝐵, is the price of oil palm FFBs, which are freshly harvested and delivered on the 
same day to prevent any deterioration in quality received by farmers at the factory level 
(Estate Crops Office, 2019)..      
 
Source: (Directorate General of Estate Crops, 2015, 2016a) 
Figure 2. 11 Area and Production of Oil Palm Plantation in the Jambi Province 
Summary statistics of these price variables in USD/kg are presented in Table 2. 2. 




of a data frequency12, which would have been preferable, since it is determined once per 
week13 by the Jambi Governmental Office of Plantations14.  
Table 2. 2 Summary Statistics of Price Variables (USD/kg) 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FFB - Jambi price (𝑃𝐽𝐵) 373 0.14 0.03 0.08 0.21 
CPO FOB - Indonesia price (𝑃𝐼𝐷) 373 0.72 0.15 0.43 1.15 
CPO CIF - World price (𝑃𝑊) 373 0.77 0.15 0.44 1.19 
Source: Own production based on (Estate Crops Office, 2019; Thomson Reuters, 2019a, 2019b). 
As expected, the mean price 𝑃𝑊 is higher than that of other prices. The large gap 
between Indonesian and World CPO prices and 𝑃𝐽𝐵 is due to CPO processing costs and the 
input-output ratio15. Similarly, the standard deviation of both 𝑃𝐼𝐷 and 𝑃𝑊 is higher than that 
of 𝑃𝐽𝐵, implying that both prices fluctuate more than 𝑃𝐽𝐵 does. The time series plot of 
variables can be seen in Figure 2. 12. 
 
Source: Own production based on (Estate Crops Office, 2019; Thomson Reuters, 2019a, 2019b). 
Figure 2. 12 Time Series Plot of Price Variables  
 Other additional data gathered are the value of export tariffs and levies imposed 
during the period of interest (Figure 2. 13). The regulation concerning the stipulation of CPO 
export tariffs was replaced on July 14, 2015 (Minister of Finance of the Republic of 
 
12 Other prices were adjusted to the frequency level of 𝑃𝐽𝐵 
13 We attended the weekly meeting where all palm oil stakeholders can come. 
14 𝑃𝐽𝐵 determination is based on CPO local, CPO export, and Kernel local price. 
15 An interview to the one of CPO factories mentioned that the processing cost can reach more than 50% of 
the CPO price. 
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Indonesia, 2011, 2015a). Another regulation imposing a CPO export levy of $50 USD/ton 
was instituted on July 16, 2015 (Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015b). 
The government claims that the goal of the export levy was to provide funds for the 
development of sustainable plantation businesses, encourage the development of 
downstream plantation industries, increase the optimization of the use of plantation products, 
and improve the welfare and sustainability of smallholder plantations (Directorate General 
of Customs and Excise, 2015). Another reason for the tariff was that the CPO price was 
below the threshold to be recognized by the export tariff for some time, causing losses in 
government revenue.  
 
Source: Own production based on data from Minister of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia (2019) and 
Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia (2019). 
Figure 2. 13 Value of Export Tariff and Levy (USD/ton) of Indonesian CPO 
 
2.5. Result and Discussion 
We employ a series of unit root tests (Appendix 2. 1). All test-statistic values are 
higher than their critical values and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, indicating that 
variables have unit root and are not stationary. Meanwhile, we can reject the null hypothesis 
at first difference indicating these have no unit root and are stationary on I (1). Additionally, 
the ZA test results support ADF and PP test results due to robustness motivation. Results 
show that SB exist in each variable, which may indicate that a SB also exist in the long-run 
relationships. 
We also perform a Johansen cointegration test.  As the trace statistic values are less 
than the critical values, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is a one or fewer 
cointegration equation (Appendix 2. 2 and 2. 3). We also compare the maximum statistics 
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test result and determine that values are less than their critical values here as well. This 
supports the result that we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Also, some model selection 
criteria suggest that there is a lag of price which may influence both two-pair long-run 
relationships.  
We then employ a GH cointegration test to consider the presence of a SB in the 
cointegration vector. Several suggestions appear on the result (Appendix 2. 4 and 2. 5). We 
evaluate two model possibilities to find the best estimated model. Models allowing for a 
change in regime suggest December 19, 2013 to be the breakpoint for both two-pair 
relationships (Figure 2. 14) and provide the lowest value of test statistics. Even though the 
model with a change in level in the relationship between 𝑃𝐽𝐵 and 𝑃𝐼𝐷 suggests a similar 
breakpoint date, the same model used to analyze the relationship between 𝑃𝐼𝐷 and 𝑃𝑊  does 
not suggest the same, making this model option less robust. Model selection criteria are also 
considered. All tests indicate lag 1 to be the optimal lag used in further estimations.  
 
Source: Own production based on (Estate Crops Office, 2019; Thomson Reuters, 2019a, 2019b). 
Figure 2. 14 Time Series Plot with Structural Break  
We currently have two two-pair models to be compared, i.e. models without a SB 
(Appendix 2. 10 and 2. 14) and models allowing for a SB (Appendix 2. 11 and 2. 15). As 
stated before, lower model selection criteria values (AIC, BIC, and HQIC) and higher log-
likelihood values indicate a better model. Thus, models allowing for the SB provide the best 
fit. Since SB models seem to be the best fit, we compare full/restricted models (Appendix 2. 
11 and 2. 15) with unrestricted models, separating by breakpoint (Appendix 2. 12-2. 13 and 
2. 16-2. 17). To do so, we employ the LR test (eq. 22). 
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Table 2. 3. Log-likelihood Values of Restricted and Unrestricted Models 
Model 
𝑃𝐼𝐷 and 𝑃𝑊 𝑃𝐽𝐵 and 𝑃𝐼𝐷 
Log-likelihood Value df Log-likelihood Value df 
Restricted  1811.8278 371 – 4 = 367 1761.7651 371 – 6 = 365 
Unrestricted  
583.80093 + 1415.2962 
= 1999.09713 
(114–2) + (255 – 2) 
= 365 
535.81993 + 1220.6718 
= 1756.49173 
(114–3) + (255–4) 
= 362 
Source = Own production based on Appendix 2. 11-2. 17 
 We calculate the computed and critical LR test16 according to the data in Table 2. 3. 
Since the computed LR1 test > the critical LR1 test, the null hypothesis can be rejected; thus, 
the unrestricted model fits best for long-run relationship between  𝑃𝐼𝐷 and 𝑃𝑊. In contrast, 
since the computed LR2 test < the critical LR2 test, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected; 
thus, the restricted model fits best for a long-run relationship between  𝑃𝐽𝐵 and 𝑃𝐼𝐷. The final 
estimations to be interpreted for both two-pair relationships are: 
a. VECM estimation between 𝑃𝐼𝐷 and 𝑃𝑊 before the breakpoint 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 = −0.06 + 1.17 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊 + 𝑒𝑐𝑡 (23𝑎) 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 𝑡 =  − 0.11 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑡−𝑛 +  0.16 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊𝑡−𝑛  +  0.08 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 (23𝑏) 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊 𝑡 =  0.07 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑡−𝑛  −  0.05 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊𝑡−𝑛  +  0.40
∗∗ 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 (23𝑐) 
b. VECM estimation between 𝑃𝐼𝐷 and 𝑃𝑊 after the breakpoint 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 =  −0.04 + 1.00 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊 + 𝑒𝑐𝑡 (24𝑎) 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 𝑡 =  0.06 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑡−𝑛 + 0.10 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊𝑡−𝑛 − 0.02 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 (24𝑏) 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊 𝑡 =  0.16 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑡−𝑛 −  0.02 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊𝑡−𝑛 + 0.37
∗∗∗ 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 (24𝑐) 
c. VECM estimation between 𝑃𝐽𝐵 and 𝑃𝐼𝐷 with SB 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐽𝐵 =  − 1.44 + 0.06 𝑆𝐵 − 0.10 𝑆𝐵. 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 + 1.44 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 − 1.48 𝐸𝑇 − 0.04 𝑇𝐿 + 𝑒𝑐𝑡 (25𝑎) 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐽𝐵 𝑡 =  0.19
∗∗∗ ∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐽𝐵𝑡−𝑛  +  0.38
∗∗∗ ∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑡−𝑛 − 0.22
∗∗∗ 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 (25𝑏) 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 𝑡 =  0.11
∗∗ ∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐽𝐵𝑡−𝑛  +  0.21
∗∗∗ ∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑡−𝑛  +  0.13
∗∗∗ 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 (25𝑐) 
The breakpoint identified in the econometric analysis occurs three weeks after the 
biodiesel EU AD imposition date on November 27, 2013 (European Commission, 2013a). 
Export trade agreements are generally made in advance; thus, the effect of the duty cannot 
be expected to be observed in the same week, but rather with a time lag. The period during 
which we find empirical effects provides a very plausible explanation for a causal 
interpretation. As previously mentioned, even though the policy was intended to impose a 
 
16 𝐿𝑅1 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑  =  2 (1999.09713 −  1811.8278) = 374,53866  ;  𝐿𝑅1 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙  =  χ2 (0.95, (367 − 365)) =
 χ2 (0.95, 2) = 5.991465  ;  𝐿𝑅2 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑  =  2 (1756.49173 −  1761,7651) = −10,54674  ;  𝐿𝑅2 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙  =




higher duty on biodiesel imported from Indonesia, Indonesian CPO prices may be affected, 
since CPO is the main raw material for biodiesel production in Indonesia. However, the 
effects on EU biodiesel import demand from Indonesia can be seen in Figure 2. 15; we see 
a clear decline in export value as Indonesia faces a challenge in replacing the EU as their 
most valuable biodiesel importer.  
 
Source: Own production based on Trade Map (2019) 
Figure 2. 15 Export Value of Biodiesel from Indonesia to the EU (USD thousand) 
 Our theoretical considerations yield ambiguous results as to whether decreasing 
demand for Indonesian biodiesel results in beneficial or detrimental effects on Indonesian 
domestic CPO demand. It benefits Indonesia when the EU domestic biodiesel companies 
require more raw materials in the production of biodiesel; therefore 𝑃𝐼𝐷 may increase. In 
contrast, it harms the Indonesian CPO demand when Indonesian biodiesel companies’ 
demand decreases, as illustrated in Figure 2. 8, which causes 𝑃𝐼𝐷 to decrease.  
Empirical results show that the duty results in a lower price of CPO received by 
Indonesia (eq. 23a and 24a). In previous periods, an increase in 𝑃𝑊 by 1 % was followed by 
an increase in 𝑃𝐼𝐷 of approximately 1.17 %, whereas after the breakpoint an increase in 𝑃𝑊  
by 1 % results in an increase in 𝑃𝐼𝐷  of approximately 1 %. Decreasing Indonesian CPO 
demand leads to a demand shift, resulting in a price reduction. This indicates that the 
detrimental effect has a stronger effect to the model. Thus, the duty imposition negatively 
affects the Indonesian CPO price.  
Furthermore, both VECM short-run estimations between 𝑃𝐼𝐷 and 𝑃𝑊 (eq. 23b-c and 
24b-c) show interesting and significant results as to how 𝑃𝑊 adjust to any disequilibrium-
causing, while the 𝑃𝐼𝐷 does not. Visualization of this phenomenon can be seen in Figure 2. 
2. 16, where 𝜃2>0 and 𝜃1=0 when there is a shock in t0. A high contribution of Indonesian 
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biodiesel to the world market causes 𝑃𝑊 to react more in periods following a shock. Indeed, 
𝑃𝑊 has a slower reaction to disequilibrium after the breakpoint, which indicates that 𝑃𝑊 
gains more power due to the imposition of duties. It reduces from a 40% to a 37% correction 
of any deviation from long-run equilibrium per period, in this case in another week. A lower 
biodiesel quantity imported by the EU makes it less dependent on Indonesia.   
 
Source: Own illustration 
Figure 2. 16 Visualization of VECM estimation between 𝑃𝐼𝐷 and 𝑃𝑊 
 The VECM estimation result of the relationship between 𝑃𝐽𝐵 and 𝑃𝐼𝐷 allows for a 
interpretation. We could separate the long-run VECM estimation into periods before and 
after the breakpoint. To do so, we include SB=0 when t ≤ breakpoint and SB=1 when t > 
breakpoint to Estimation 25a, which can be seen below: 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐽𝐵 =  − 1.44 + 1.44 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 − 1.48 𝐸𝑇 − 0.04 𝑇𝐿 + 𝑒𝑐𝑡   ,   𝑆𝐵 = 0 (25𝑎0) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐽𝐵 =  − 1.38 + 1.34 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 − 1.48 𝐸𝑇 − 0.04 𝑇𝐿 + 𝑒𝑐𝑡   ,   𝑆𝐵 = 1 (25𝑎1) 
Similarly, results show that the duty creates a lower FFB price received by oil palm 
farmers in Indonesia (eq. 25a0 and 1). Decreases in demand for Indonesian CPO lead to a 
decrease in demand for Jambi FFB among Indonesian CPO producers. Previously, an 
increase in 𝑃𝐼𝐷 by 1 % was followed by an increase in 𝑃𝐽𝐵 of approximately 1.44 %, whereas 
after the breakpoint, an increase in 𝑃𝐼𝐷  by 1 % is followed by an increase in 𝑃𝐽𝐵  of 
approximately 1,34 %. This demand shift causes a price reduction. Thus, the duty imposition 
also negatively affects the Jambi FFB price.  
However, in the short run, there is only one pair of estimations (eq. 25b and c) to 
interpret, where there is an adjustment from both 𝑃𝐽𝐵 and 𝑃𝐼𝐷 if any disequilibrium exists. 
Visualization of this phenomenon can be seen in Figure 2. 17, where 𝜃2>0 and 𝜃1<0 when 
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there is a shock in t0. Both adjustments are clearly visible and significant, where 𝑃𝐽𝐵 corrects 
22% per period from the long-run deviation to return to the equilibrium when any shocks 
appear, while 𝑃𝐼𝐷 corrects 13% per period. Since 𝑃𝐼𝐷 corrects slower than 𝑃𝐽𝐵 does, we 
assume that 𝑃𝐼𝐷 acts more as a leader, while 𝑃𝐽𝐵 acts more as a follower. In total, there will 
be around 35% correction when a shock occurs in the short-run. 
 
Source: Own illustration 
Figure 2. 17 Visualization of VECM estimation between 𝑃𝐼𝐷 and 𝑃𝑊 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
The imposition of the EU biodiesel AD generated a SB in the cointegration 
estimation between Indonesian and world CPO prices, and between Jambi FFB and 
Indonesian CPO prices. This could indicate that the duty had an effect on the price after the 
breakpoint. Results show that the duty negatively affected the Indonesian CPO and local 
Jambi FFB price, whereas the world CPO market gained more power after the duty 
implementation. Decreases in Indonesian CPO demand due to decreased demand for 
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Traders play a significant and often underestimated role in agricultural trading 
activities and can be decisive actors in agricultural marketing channels. In the agricultural 
sector, traders are often able to bridge the gap between factory and farmer by mediating 
issues with geographical distance and logistics, gaps in capital, and supply chain continuity, 
which can be difficult for farmers to remedy. Furthermore, Coughlan, Anderson, Stern, & 
El-Ansary (2006) explains that the right intermediaries must be considered in order for a 
product to be marketed and sold through the optimal channel. 
Having more traders in the market is favourable for competition, as farmers have 
better options for selling their products to the preferred trader of their choice. If there are 
only few traders available in the area, traders could gain more market power as a result (Mas-
Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995). However, existing market power structures within 
agricultural markets are not easily overcome. In Indonesian rubber value chains, there exist 
a significant amount of trader market power (Kopp & Brümmer, 2017), particularly in 
remote areas and in smaller markets. Nevertheless, the traders’ role remains considered. 
Additionally, agricultural products have specific handling requirements, in terms of 
shipping and distribution, which set them apart from other products, mainly due to their 
inherent perishability and bulkiness. Fluctuating prices, differences in capital requirements, 
and differences in post-harvest handling all may become significant obstacles for traders, 
and addressing these obstacles is necessary in understanding the trader’s behaviour in the 
market. In the presence of some influential economic divergence, for example a falling price 
in the traded product, traders’ behaviours will likely diverge as a result. Some may remain 
in the market and some may exit, which can in turn alter the market’s overarching structure. 
Understanding this situation is relevant for policy makers in predicting fluctuations in 
agricultural market structures. 
To study these issues further, we focus on the case of oil palm and rubber traders in 
the Jambi province, Indonesia. Indonesia has a strong agricultural sector which accounted 
for nearly 13% of total national Gross Domestic Product in 2018 (Statistics Indonesia, 2019),  
and the Indonesian oil palm and rubber  trade provide a significant contribution to the 
country's foreign exchange (Directorate General of Estate Crops, 2017a, 2017b).  
The Jambi province is located in Sumatra island in western Indonesia. Recently, oil 
palm and rubber plantations in the province have rapidly expanded, resulting in a number of 
indirect land use change issues (Directorate General of Estate Crops, 2015, 2016a, 2016b, 
2017a, 2017b),  and most relevant stakeholders are benefiting from higher incomes due to 
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the expansion of the sector (Bou Dib et al., 2018). The Indonesian palm oil and rubber 
industries have also created many new employment opportunities for the country, and there 
was an increase in labor usage in the Palm Oil and Rubber industries of about 36 % and 7 
%,  respectively, from 2013 to 2018 (Directorate General of Estate Crops, 2015, 2016a, 
2016b, 2017a, 2017b). This unique contrast makes studying the palm oil and rubber 
industries particularly appealing for researchers and national governments alike.  
 Oil palm and rubber traders in Jambi face different obstacles to survive. Palm oil 
and rubber prices have both fluctuated rather unexpectedly over the past few years (Figure 
3. 1); however, palm oil has seen more pronounced fluctuations than rubber, on average. 
Rubber prices have been constantly declining since 2012, whereas palm oil prices have more 
promising situation where there are times that prices go up momentarily.  
    
 
Source: Own Production based on Thomson Reuters (2019b, 2019a) 
Figure 3. 1 Price Volatility of Palm Oil and Rubber Price (2008-2019) 
Another issue to consider is the perishability of the products being traded. Oil palm 
fresh fruit bunches are more perishable than rubber, therefore prompt delivery is essential in 
preventing quality deterioration. Meanwhile, the lower the water content in rubber, the 
higher the rubber quality, so storing rubber will not be a problem. Differences in bulkiness 
between goods can also lead to different handling requirements when shipping products to 
the factory, and conveyances such as trucks, pickup trucks, or even motorbikes can all play 
a role in alleviating these issues. These challenges all have an impact on traders’ ability to 
survive in the market. 
Bearing in mind these considerations, this study focuses on trader’s decisions to 
remain in or exit the market, and the various factors influencing this decision. To analyse 
the probability of remaining in the market, we employ a binary logistic regression method 




Studies of traders’ adaptations to economic divergence have been limited in the 
literature. Some studies have focused on how financial market traders survive in the presence 
of market competition (Benos, 1998; Kogan, Ross, & Westerfield, 2006), but none have 
focused on agricultural product traders, thus the required approaches may be quite different. 
Those studies have pointed out that risk-taker traders are expected to have higher profits than 
risk-averse traders, and thus are more likely to remain in the market. However, numerous 
studies of similar behaviour among farmers have analysed which factors affect farmers’ 
decisions to remain in or exit the market (Bragg & Dalton, 2004; Ferjani, Zimmermann, & 
Roesch, 2015; Kimhi & Bollman, 1999; Nag et al., 2018; Stiglbauer & Weiss, 2000) 
These are the most relevant studies in the literature, since, to the best of our 
knowledge, trader- level studies of agricultural products have not been undertaken. 
Therefore, this study is intended to fill this gap and to further diversify the existing research 
on the topic.  
The study is structured as follows: the next few sections provide an overview of the 
role of local traders in Jambi. The model specification section describes the methodology 
implemented and is followed by a description of the data used in the study. We then discuss 
the results before summarizing our study in the conclusion section. 
  
3.2. Role of Local Traders in Jambi 
3.2.1 The Importance of Traders 
It is important to understand the crucial role traders play in several different 
marketing functions in agricultural markets.  Traders serve as intermediaries, performing 
many transactional and exchange-related activities, such as “buying, selling, and risk taking” 
(Kerin, Hartley, & Rudelius, 2013). In terms of physical/logistical functions, intermediaries 
may also undertake tasks such as “assorting, storing, sorting, and transporting” of 
agricultural products (Kerin et al., 2013). Additionally, intermediaries may partake in 
important “facilitating” functions, like “financing, grading, and marketing information and 
research” (Kerin et al., 2013). 
From a demand perspective, there are 2 important advantages to the existence of 
intermediaries: their ability to facilitate demand connections between producers and end-
users, and their ability to fulfill the demand requirement of end-buyers by sorting products 
(Coughlan et al., 2006). Moreover, Kerin, Hartley and Rudelius (2013) outlined 4 consumer 
benefits gained from the existence of intermediaries, namely time, place, form and 
possession utilities. On the supply-side, there are also two advantages provided by 
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intermediaries: reducing producers’ distribution costs by arranging frequent transactions, 
and  reducing transaction or contact costs incurred by producers (Coughlan et al., 2006). 
Indeed, intermediaries increase profits on both the demand-side and the supply-side. 
Zúñiga-Arias (2007) noted that traders have substantial knowledge of important 
marketing information not available to farmers (Kopp et al., 2014) like price, quality, 
quantity, and various purchasing requirements of end-buyers. Therefore, traders could help 
to bridge the information gap between farmers and end-buyers. 
Moreover, traders have superior access to transportation (Zúñiga-Arias, 2007). This 
is an important factor, especially in developing countries, where smallholder farmers are 
often located in remote areas like Jambi Province, where location and capital constraints can 
affect farmers’ choices of an appropriate channel destination for their products (Kopp et al., 
2014). Less capital-constrained, traders may have more ready access to vehicles, which can 
aid farmers in distributing products to end-buyers.  
Furthermore, if producers have difficulties in meeting market requirements, traders 
can help them find alternative channels (Zúñiga-Arias, 2007). Another important role played 
by the trader is in value-added generation through grading, packing, and in certain cases 
treating products. Also, with their relatively higher working capital, traders are better able 
to increase the value-added of agricultural products. In Jambi, traders may also act as 
informal financiers for producers or other intermediary traders. Indeed, traders may arguably 
be the best facilitators in bridging the gap between the production and marketing sides of the 
marketing chain (Zúñiga-Arias, 2007), and this is likely true in the case of Jambi province. 
3.2.2 Rubber and Oil Palm Fresh Fruit Bunch (OPFFB) Trading Activities in Jambi 
There was a decline in the number of rubber and oil palm fresh fruit bunch traders 
between 2012 and 2015 due to rubber and palm oil falling price. This decrease in rubber 
prices was due to an over-supply of rubber and a decline in crude oil price (Aidenvironment, 
2016), which led to lower prices of synthetic rubber, a common substitute for natural rubber. 
The same situation occurred in the oil palm market as well (Abd, Nambiappan, Palm, & 
Board, 2013). 
When we returned to Jambi to collect data for second round, we faced many 
rejections and a cynical attitude from locals, who initially thought we were debt collectors. 
Many would first hide from us and have another family member say that they were out of 
town, and only after we explained that we were from an educational institution would their 
views change, and they be willing to be interviewed. This fearful response illustrates the 
35 
 
challenging situation that many faced due to weak prices during that time period, in which 
trader populations declined by 19.7% in the survey area. These declines continued until 
round 3, where we observed losses of around 5% of the total trader population compared to 
round 2 (Table 3. 1).  
Table 3. 1 Number of All Active Traders in the Survey Area 
 
Year 
2012 2015 2018 
Rubber 309 197 185 
Rubber + OPFFB 15 19 26 
OPFFB 127 109 119 
Total 451 362 342 
Source: Own production 
In detail, we can see that the number of both rubber and palm oil traders decreased 
from 2012 to 2015. Meanwhile, there was an increase in the number of oil palm traders 
between 2015-2018, while the number of rubber traders decreased during that same period. 
A plausible explanation for this situation is that the palm oil sector may be more profitable 
and promising than the rubber industry.   
Table 3. 2 Transition Matrix of Traders in Period 1 (2012-2015) 
  2015 





 Rubber 213 4 2 90 
Rubber + OPFFB - 13 1 1 
OPFFB - - 74 53 
 Enter 28 2 35  
Source: Own production 
Table 3. 2 and 3. 3 present the transition matrix of products traded between a certain 
period, divided into two periods.  The first took place in between 2012-2015, where traders 
were interviewed first in 2012 and then recalled back in 2015 to observe whether they 
remained in or exited the market. The same procedure was performed for the second period, 
from 2015-2018. Both tables illustrate whether traders who remained in the market traded 
the same product or not, where in most cases, traders remained to trade the same product. 
Table 3. 3 Transition Matrix of Traders in Period 2 (2015-2018) 
  2018 





 Rubber 167 8 1 65 
Rubber + OPFFB 2 14 1 2 
OPFFB - 3 77 32 
 Enter 28 1 40  
Source: Own production 
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Table 3. 4 Average Income of Traders Existing both in 2012 and 2015 (million IDR) 
2012 
2015 
Oil Palm Rubber Both Unobserved 
Oil Palm  10.9 → 8.5 21.4 → 6.0 1.0 → 3.0 20.5 → 0.0 
Rubber  4.8 → 5.3 25.7 → 6.8 9.5 → 22.3 18.3 → 0.0 
Both 0 0 26.0 → 8.0 12.5 → 0.0 
Source: Own production 
 The dynamics of trader’s incomes are presented in aggregate in Table 4 and 5. The 
figures illustrate that traders generally earned less in 2015 compared to 2012 and earned 
more still in 2018 compared to 2015. These income increases may be due to more stable 
market conditions overall, or due to traders generally being more adaptable to the market 
situation than they were before. 
Table 3. 5 Average Income of Traders Existing both in 2015 and 2018 (million IDR) 
2015 
2018 
Oil Palm Rubber Both Unobserved 
Oil Palm  9.9 → 24.6 0 2.7 → 40.9 9.4 → 0.0 
Rubber  1.5 → 3.0 6.3 → 11.5 3.9 → 21.1 7.1 → 0.0 
Both 4.5 → 5.7 7.5 → 26.6 15.6 → 16.2 12.0 → 0.0 
Source: Own production 
 
3.4. Model Specification 
3.4.1 Determinants in Exiting the Market 
As mentioned in section 3.1, several studies have sought to determine which factors 
affect financial market traders’ decisions on whether to remain in or exit the market (Benos, 
1998; Kogan et al., 2006). One of the key findings was that risk-taker traders are more 
willing to remain in the market while anticipating higher future profits than their risk-averse 
counterparts. Even though this was observed only in the financial market, it can be adopted 
into our study. Another study was performed to investigate trader behavior in the off-farm 
labor market using panel data from Austrian farm households. A probability model was 
utilized, and it was found that an increase in wages increases the probability that a worker 
will change their status from full-timer to part-time worker (Weiss, 1997). 
Comparable studies (Bragg & Dalton, 2004; Ferjani et al., 2015; Kimhi & Bollman, 
1999; Nag et al., 2018; Stiglbauer & Weiss, 2000) have also been performed to observe 
which factors affect farmers’ decisions in remaining in or exit the agricultural sector. A study 
found that large farms tend to stay in the sector, since they have more assets. Also, younger 
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farmers in Canada and Israel were found to exit the market more than their older counterparts 
(Kimhi & Bollman, 1999).. This could also represent the determinants in exiting the market 
by traders. For this reason, a probit model is used.   
 




Dependent Variable  
𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛 Dummy variable: remain in (1) in or exit (0) from the market  
Independent Variables  
Factor 1: Human Capital  
𝑒𝑑𝑢 
Dummy variable of trader’s education: having at least primary school 
education (1) or not (0) 
- 
𝑒𝑥𝑝 Traders’ experience in trading (in number of year) + 
𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐 
Dummy variable of trader’s function in the village: having at least one 
village’s function (such as a village head) (1) or not (0) 
+ 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜 
Dummy variable of knowledge in price information: having the access 
to get the price information (1) or not (0) 
+ 
Factor 2: Trading Structure  
𝑡𝑝 
Dummy variable of traded product: only rubber or both rubber & 
OPFFB (1) or only OPFFB (0) 
- 
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 




Dummy variable of operational vehicle ownership: having operational 
vehicle (1) or not (0) 
+ 
𝑛𝑢𝑚 Number of workers + 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 Dummy variable of computer ownership: having computer (1) or not (0) + 
𝑠𝑚𝑝ℎ 




Dummy variable of credit provision by traders: credit provider (1) or not 
(0) 
- 
𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 Land area owned by traders (in ha) - 
Factor 3: Structural Environment  
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 Number of suppliers + 
𝑐𝑜𝑚 Number of competitors  - 
Factor 4: Socioeconomic  
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 
Dummy variable of transmigration’s status: part of the transmigration 
scheme (1) or not (0) 
+ 
𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑣 Trading revenue (in million IDR) + 
𝑙𝑜𝑐 
Distance measured by how long it takes to travel by vehicle from trader’s 
location to the closest factory (in minutes) 
- 
Source: Own production 
 
Bragg and Dalton (2004) sought to determine which factors affect farmers’ decisions 
to exit dairy farming markets, employing a binary logistic regression model. They found that 
older producers, higher off-farm income, lower variable cost, and greater diversification of 
farm income led to an increase in the probability of farmers exiting the market. Nag et al. 
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(2018) also employed a binary logit regression to observe the factors affecting Indian rural 
farm youths’ decision to remain in or exit the agricultural sector. 
Another study examines the determinants of farmer exit from farming markets in 
Western Europe (Breustedt & Glauben, 2007). They determined that farm characteristics 
and policy environment both affect the decisions of farmers to exit or remain in the industry. 
Ferjani, Zimmermann, and Roesch (2015), who analyzed determinants of farmer exit in 
agriculture markets in Switzerland, provide a better structure to be adjusted and utilized in 
our study. They employed a logit estimation and considered four factors influencing the farm 
exit decision, which we adapt to our study: human capital, trading structure, structural 
environment, and socioeconomic factors (Table 3. 6). Grouping and expected signs are based 
on the abovementioned studies and relevant assumptions according to the condition in the 
survey area.   
 
3.4.2 Binary Logistic Regression and Marginal Effect 
In order to analyse determinants affecting traders’ decisions to remain in or exit the 
market, a Binary Logistic Regression (logit) model is employed. The model is applied by 
determining and implementing relevant dummy dependent variables (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2005); in this case a binary variable equal to 1 for traders’ remaining in the market, and 0 
for traders’ exiting the market. Within this model we observe the probability, 𝑦𝑖, of those 
traders’ preferences. The following equation explains the probability, characterized by  
𝑦
𝑖
=  Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖 ) =
exp (𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖)
1 + exp (𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖)
= 𝐹(𝑥𝑖𝛽𝑖) (1) 
where 𝑥𝑖 is constructed by all explanatory variables considered in the model and 𝛽𝑖 
represents all parameters estimated.  
It is worth noting that marginal effects are used to obtain a straightforward 
interpretation in logistic models (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). In the case of a linear 
regression model, marginal effect can be directly implied from the coefficient (𝛽), where 
the marginal effect of  
 





= 𝛽 (3) 
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meanwhile, in the case of a logistic regression model, it can be illustrated that, 






exp (𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖)
1 + exp (𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖)
2
 𝛽𝑖 (4) 
Furthermore, a marginal effect estimation must be performed in logistic regression models 
in order to obtain 𝛽𝑖. To do so, we employ the Average Marginal Effect (AME) estimation 
directly after performing a logit model estimation. 
Using the statistical model illustrated above, the new form of statistical model is 
developed (Eq. 5) based on Equation 1. Aligned with this study, the linear predictors are 
customized by all explanatory variables (Table 3. 6). The new model formed is: 
𝑦𝑖 =  Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖  ) = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1 𝑒𝑑𝑢 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽3𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐 +  𝛽4𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜 +  𝛽5𝑡𝑝
+ 𝛽6𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐 + 𝛽8𝑛𝑢𝑚 + 𝛽9𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽10𝑠𝑚𝑝ℎ + 𝛽11𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑
+ 𝛽12𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽13𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽14𝑐𝑜𝑚 + 𝛽15𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽16𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑣 + 𝛽17𝑙𝑜𝑐 +  
(5) 
  
3.4.3 Goodness of Fit and Logit Postestimation 
The logit estimation examines whether all variables combination effect differ from 
zero, proved by its significant value (Prob>chi2) using log likelihood chi-square test 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2005; UCLA, 2020a). Unlike the OLS regression estimation, the logit 
model employs a Pseudo R2 measurement of McFadden (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005) to 
observe the goodness of fit of the model, which is 




where 𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 represents the log-likelihood of the model and 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 represents the log-
likelihood of the intercept-only model. The log-likelihood based Pseudo-R2 value provides 
the interpretation that higher values of Pseudo-R2 mean better improvements in the new 
model compared to the null model (Hemmert, Schons, Wieseke, & Schimmelpfennig, 2018; 
McFadden, 1973).  
 As part of the logit postestimation, we are required to verify the absence of 
multicollinearity among independent variables in the model. VIF and tolerance value of all 
variables are examined, where anything close to 1 indicates that the variable is uncorrelated 
to each other (UCLA, 2020a).  
 We employ another test observe the existence of specification error in the model. 
Specification error occurs either when the logit is not the proper function for the model, or 
when all relevant variables are not considered in the model. To test for this, the linktest 
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command in Stata is employed after the logit command. This command constructs the 
predicted value and predicted value squared from the model, where the predicted value must 
be significant, while the predicted value squared must not. If the significances turn to be the 
other way around, this is an indication of model specification error (UCLA, 2020a).  
3.4.4 Statistical Test 
We perform a statistical test to examine the difference between groups of existing 
traders and new traders using the round 3 (2018) dataset. Initially we observe the type of 
variables considered (Table), then we divide the variables into metric and nominal variables. 
We test the metric variables for normality using a Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test (Royston, 
1992)  to decide which test can be performed. Since none of the variables are normally 
distributed, we pursue the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test as non-parametric test for equality 
between groups based on their median values (Mann & Whitney, 1947; Wilcoxon, 1947). 
We then employ a Pearson's  Chi-square test to deal with nominal (dummy) variables by 
group (UCLA, 2020b). The tabulate command in Stata is used to examine the test statistics 
and p-values.  
 
3.5. Data 
Data collection was performed in 3 rounds, taking place at the end of 2012, 2015, 
and 2018. The data collection was part of the Collaborative Research Centre (CRC) project 
in Ecological and Socioeconomic Functions of Tropical Lowland Rainforest Transformation 
Systems in the Jambi province, Indonesia, a joint project between the University of 
Goettingen and 3 Indonesian Universities (IPB University, Jambi University, and Tadulako 
University).  
Five regencies - Sarolangun, Batanghari, Muaro Jambi, Tebo, and Bungo - were 
selected purposefully17 to determine the survey location (Figure 3. 2). Later, stratified 
random sampling was applied in selecting districts and villages. An advantage to using 
stratified random sampling is that it minimizes survey costs without compromising accuracy 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). Initially, 22 districts and 40 villages were chosen in 2012 
(Appendix 3. 1). However, due to time constraints and traders' unwillingness to be 
interviewed, the number of villages was reduced to 38 in the following rounds. 
 
 
17 Performed by Krishna and Euler, members of CRC’s team, and also stated on the EFForTS Discussion Paper 




Source: Village map-geoprocessed18 from BPS-Statistics of Jambi Province (2018) 
Figure 3. 2 Map of Jambi 
Data was obtained directly from respondents, using interview questionnaires19 to 
administered to active small traders of oil palm fresh fruit bunches and rubber within the 
survey area. All active traders were attempted to be contacted for interviews. Table 3. 7 
illustrates the final number of individuals reached in each survey round:  a final sample of 
295, 292, and 325 observations were obtained for further analysis from round 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. We were unable to obtain 100% of the population for our sample due to time 
constraints and traders' unwillingness to participate, as well as some irreplaceable missing 
values and outliers. Nevertheless, the number of observations is still suitable for a 
representative analysis.  
Table 3. 7 Number of All Active Traders in the Survey Area 
  2012 2015 2018 
 Population Sample Population Sample Population Sample 
Rubber 309 207 234 196 197 185 
Rubber + OPFFB 15 5 19 13 26 24 
OPFFB 127 83 109 83 119 116 
Total 451 295 362 292 342 325 
% of population  65%  81%  95% 
Source: Own production 
.  
We also employed data from 2018 to compare individual characteristics of existing 
traders and new traders. All available variables were examined to observe which factors 
specifically characterize new traders. In table 3. 3, we can see that 58% of new traders choose 
 
18 Supported by Purnama Dept. Forest Inventory and Remote Sensing – Univ. Goettingen 
19 Similar questionnaire with the one used by (Kopp and Brümmer (2017) 
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to trade OPFFB, indicating that this product may be currently more attractive and promising 
to traders.  
 
3.6. Result and Discussion 
3.6.1 Remainers versus Leavers 
A logit estimation is initially employed to determine which variables affect traders’ 
decisions to remain in or exit the market, with marginal effect estimations subsequently 
applied. Results are divided into two periods based on data observation round (Table 3. 8).  
The period 1 logit estimation converges to the log-likelihood of -173.537, while the period 
2 logit estimation converges to the log-likelihood of -157.614. The iteration process begins 
from iteration 0, represented by the intercept-only model. The iteration log performed by 
both estimations exhibits convergence in 4 iterations (Appendix 3. 5 and 3. 7); such a prompt 
convergence may indicate that both estimation models are less prone to multicollinearity 
issues (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010).  
The estimation examines whether the combined effect of all variables considered in 
the model differs from zero or not. This is supported by the significance values (Prob>chi2) 
of both estimations, which supports the expectation that the model has relevant explanatory 
power. As mentioned earlier, higher values of Pseudo-R2 indicate improvements in the new 
model compared to the null model (Hemmert et al., 2018; McFadden, 1973); thus, both 
estimations provide improvements over the intercept-only model of 15.1% and 11.8% for 
period 1 and 2, respectively.  
In order to verify the absence of multicollinearity among independent variables in 
the model, we examine the VIF and tolerance value of all variables subsequent to logit 
estimation (Appendix 3. 11 and 3. 12). Both the VIF and the tolerance values of each variable 
are close to 1, indicating that all variables are uncorrelated with each other. Another test, 
called a link test, is applied to examine the possible existence of specification error (Table 
3. 8). Both logit estimations provide variable _hat, representing the predicted value from the 
model, which is required to be statistically significant. Thus, it can be assumed that the 
considered predictors are meaningful. Additionally, the insignificant variable _hatsq 
represents the predicted value squared. This variable is not required to be significant or to 
have a high predictive power (UCLA, 2020a), as expected, hence we can assume that there 
is no indication of model specification error.  
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As mentioned previously, we employed AME estimation after logit estimation to 
obtain a more informative output. The coefficient value resulting from logit estimation 
cannot be interpreted directly. In the logit estimation, the marginal effect of the function was 
weighted by both the estimator and the regressors (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). However, the 
variables’ coefficient signs resulting from logit estimation remain consistent with those 
gained from the marginal effect estimation (Table 3. 8). Meanwhile, some variables are 
found to have different response in term of significance.  
Unexpectedly, even though rubber price drops worse than OPFFB price, we found 
that rubber traders tend to remain in the market more often than OPFFB traders. This 
interesting behavior occurs both in period 1 and in period 2, where we see 16.7% and 13.5% 
increases in the probability of remaining in the market among rubber traders in both periods, 
respectively. A plausible reason for this is that, technically, rubber traders are able to store 
their bokar20 as long as desired, much longer than OPFFB traders; some rubber traders 
reported having stored bokar for more than 6 months while anticipating a rubber price 
increase. Meanwhile, storage is not an option for OPFFB traders, as traders risk quality 
losses from storage which can affect the prices they receive or result in rejection from buyers. 
Thus, the effects of falling prices of rubber and palm oil are more visible in the OPFFB 
market than in rubber trading activities. 
Another variable which has a significant effect on the decision of traders to remain 
in or exit the market in both periods is education. We observe 21.5% and 12.8% decreases 
in the probability of remaining in the market, in periods 1 and 2, respectively, if traders have 
not completed their primary school education. Having no education leaves traders no other 
option in finding another job. Interestingly, the number of agricultural worker in Jambi 
province decreased by 16.9% between August 2017 and August 2018, while the number of 
non-agricultural worker increased by 19.5% during the same period (Statistics Jambi 
Province, 2019). 
More experienced traders tend to remain in the market, as shown in the period 2 
estimation, and we observe a 0.8% increase in the probability of remaining in the market for 
every one-year increase in trader experience. This probability increase is illustrated in Figure 
3. 3. It’s possible that traders’ experiences in period 1 make them more capable of facing 
difficult situations related to persistently weak prices in period 2. 62.3% of traders remaining 
 
20 bokar is a common thicker form of rubber slab produced by local farmers 
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in the market have 3 or more years of trading experience, which means that they have 
previously experienced price reduction in period 1. 
 
Table 3. 8 Result of Logit and Marginal Effect Estimation 
Remain 
Period 1 (2012-2015) Period 2 (2015-2018) 
Logit est. Marginal Effect est. Logit est. Marginal Effect est. 
Coef. SE dy/dx SE Coef. SE dy/dx  SE 
Variables 
tp 0.813 ** 0.314 0.167 *** 0.063 0.721 ** 0.337 0.135 ** 0.064 
edu -1.110 * 0.643 -0.215 * 0.112 -0.783 * 0.452 -0.128 ** 0.065 
exp -0.008  0.018 -0.002  0.004 0.043 * 0.024 0.008 * 0.004 
func -0.410  0.337 -0.083  0.068 0.540  0.434 0.092  0.068 
info -0.107  0.280 -0.022  0.057 0.092  0.307 0.017  0.055 
stat 0.603 * 0.338 0.121 * 0.066 0.439  0.363 0.077  0.061 
num 0.012  0.027 0.002  0.005 0.007  0.042 0.001  0.008 
cred -1.726 *** 0.328 -0.356 *** 0.057 0.752 ** 0.334 0.147 ** 0.068 
land 0.005  0.011 0.001  0.002 -0.040 *** 0.013 -0.007 *** 0.002 
vehic 0.071  0.366 0.014  0.074 0.797 ** 0.381 0.157 ** 0.079 
comp -0.367  0.301 -0.074  0.061 -0.633  0.489 -0.123  0.099 
smph 0.033  0.348 0.007  0.070 -0.150  0.394 -0.028  0.073 
supp 0.002  0.004 0.000  0.001 0.000  0.006 0.000  0.001 
com -0.000  0.026 -0.000  0.005 -0.048 * 0.028 -0.009 * 0.005 
trans 0.834 ** 0.357 0.168 ** 0.069 0.044  0.340 0.008  0.065 
trrev -0.012  0.005 -0.002  0.002 0.053 * 0.027 0.010 ** 0.005 
loc -0.000  0.005 -0.000  0.001 0.002  0.005 0.000  0.001 
_cons 1.394  0.909    -0.271  0.808    
Goodness of Fit Measures 
Obs. 295      292      
LL -173.537      -157.614      
LR 
chi2(17) 
61.720   
   
42.190   
   
Prob>chi2 0.000      0.001      
Pseudo R2 0.151      0.118      
Specification Error 
_hat 0.985 *** 0.146    1.246 *** 0.266    
_hatsq 0.187  0.123    -0.149  0.107    
_cons -0.149  0.163    -0.004  0.192    
Source: Own production (Appendix 3. 5 – 3. 10)  
Note: a) *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Smaller, village-level traders tend to exit the market more often, as shown in our 
period 1 estimation, and we observe a 12.1% higher probability of remaining in the market 
among larger traders. A plausible reason for this is that larger traders are often more effective 
in managing their trading costs to obtain higher profits. Also, they often have more assets 
(such as bigger storage, in the case of rubber traders), more savings, and other sources of 
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income; we found that larger traders gain significantly higher farming revenues than smaller, 
village-level traders  (Appendix 3. 13). Most traders, 88.81% of the sample, are also farmers.  
One of our most compelling results is the influence a trader’s credit provision has on 
their decision in remaining in or exit the market. This effect is found to be significant in both 
periods; however, the signs are different. Traders who provide credit to suppliers tend to exit 
the market more often in period 1, and we observe a 35.6% decrease in the probability of 
remaining in the market among credit-providers during this period. Meanwhile, these traders 
tend to remain in the market more often in period 2, and we observe a 14.7% increase in the 
probability of remaining in the market among this group. Traders in 2012 experienced higher 
rubber prices and OPFFB prices, and thus many of them do not hesitate to provide credit for 
suppliers, and in fact 71.53% of the sample were found to provide credit. However, a drastic 
decrease in prices after 2012 caused many traders and farmers to experience sudden losses, 
resulting in many bad loans. Thus, providing credit may ultimately lead to traders deciding 
to exit the market. During the 2015 survey round, in which traders from the first round were 
recalled, many initially refused to be interviewed because they thought we were debt 
collectors. Additionally, the traders in period 2 became more careful in providing credit, and 
we observed traders using their ability to provide credit as a way of maintaining a continuous 
supply from farmers. We employed a further study related to this matter in the next chapter 
and found that rubber traders providing credit offer higher price for bokar than those 
providing no credit (Table 4. 9). However, they tend to offer less amount of credit due to 
reduction in risk of loss. 
   
Source: Own production 
Figure 3. 3 Illustration of the Increase of Probability per Unit Variable  
Other variables significantly influencing the traders’ decision to remain in or exit the 
market during period 2 are land area and status and type of operational vehicle ownership 
among traders. The more land area owned by traders, the less likely traders are to remain in 
the market, and we observed a 0.7% decrease in the probability of traders remaining in the 
market for every hectare increase in land area. This increase in probability is illustrated in 
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Figure 3. 3. Traders have an option to focus on farming activities when they own more land, 
since trading activities are no longer profitable for them. They also have the option of renting 
the land as a profitable investment, while working in a different sector. On the other hand, 
traders who own an operational vehicle are 15.7% more likely to remain in the market. 
Owning an operational vehicle can allow traders to pick up of products from suppliers and/or 
deliver products to buyers, reducing traders’ transaction cost and making it is easier for them 
to adapt to falling prices.  
Having fewer competitors makes traders more likely to remain in the market, as 
shown in period 2 estimation; we see a 0.9% decrease in the probability of remaining in the 
market for every one-unit increase in traders’ competitors (see Figure 3.3). Having fewer 
competitors is associated with an increase in market power among traders, who are able to 
maximize their profit without fear of losing their potential suppliers. Suppliers, likewise, 
have an already limited choice of potential buyers (traders).  
The last significant effect observed in period 1 is that transmigrant traders have a 
16.8% higher likelihood of remaining in the market compared to their non-transmigrant 
peers. Since transmigrant traders are typically sponsored by their government (Leinbach & 
Smith, 1994), they tend to be more settled in their farming and trading activities. Agricultural 
extension programs and other supporting activities are routinely provided by the government 
and help them to overcome this challenging situation; therefore, they tend to remain in the 
market.   
Traders with higher trading revenues tend to remain in the market, as observed in 
period 2. There is a 1.0% increase in the probability of remaining in the market for everyone 
million IDR increase in trader revenue. Higher trading revenues are generally related to 
higher profits; therefore, it is understandable that traders with higher revenues would be 
more adaptable to difficult conditions than others. The mean trading revenue of traders who 
remain in the market are higher than those of traders who leave the market and were observed 
to be 6.83 million IDR and 4.61 million IDR, respectively (Appendix 3. 14)).  
We construct an interaction between trading revenues and the type of product traded 
and observe the resulting change in the probability of remaining in the market. Initially, we 
found that the interaction between trading revenue and rubber traded product increases the 
probability of remaining in the market. However, we identified that at a certain level of 
trading revenue, the type of product traded has no further influence, and the probability is 




Source: Own production 
Figure 3. 4 Illustration of the Increase of Probability per Unit Interacted Variable 
It is intriguing that some variables are only significant in particular periods but not 
in others. This is due to overall market situations and resulting trading behavior fluctuating 
over time. One example of this is in period 1, where the trading revenue variable turns 
insignificant. The mean trading revenue in 2015 was calculated to be much less than that in 
2012 (Appendix 3. 14), even adjusting for inflation. Therefore, it is most likely that the trader 
revenues from period 2 respondents are closer to the threshold of traders’ decision to remain 
in or exit the market. On the other hand, the price situation in period 1 is very profitable for 
traders. They may collectively have higher trading revenues; thus, variance in trading 
revenues does not affect their decision to remain in or exit the market. 
 
3.6.2 New versus Existing Traders 
In this section, characteristics between new and existing traders (Figure 3. 5) are 
compared. The results illustrate the differences in characteristics between both groups. As 
mentioned in the model specification section, we initially performed a Shapiro-Wilk 
normality test for our metric variables to decide on the appropriate test of differences 
between groups. However, we found that not all metric variables are normally distributed; 
therefore, a Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) non-parametric test is performed to test 
for equality between groups based on their median values (Table 3. 9) (Mann & Whitney, 
1947; Wilcoxon, 1947).  
Results imply that the number of workers, land area owned (ha) and trading revenues 
(million IDR) of the existing traders are significantly higher than those of new traders. This 
is very plausible, as new traders face challenges in adapting to their new trading competition. 
They usually start small, with limited resources; thus, they employ fewer workers and gain 




Table 3. 9 New and Existing Traders’ Characteristics in 2018 
Variables 
Existing Trader  New Trader 
Sign. 
actual rank sums actual rank sums 
Number of workers 44231.0 > 8744.0 < *** 
Land Area 44718.5 > 8256.5 < *** 
Number of suppliers 42455.0 > 10520.0 <  
Number of competitors 41840.0 < 11135.0 >  
Trading revenue 43588.0 > 9387.0 < ** 
Location 42112.0 > 10863.0 <  
expected rank sums 42054.0 10921.0  
number of obs. 258 67  
Source: Own production (Appendix 3. 16) 
Note: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
To test for independence between two nominal (dummy) variables, we employ a 
Pearson's chi-square test (Appendix 3. 17), which will determine whether each categorical 
value of variables within a two-way table are independent of one another. We found the 
combination of type of product traded and type of trader to be statistically significantly 
independent of each other. Interestingly, 58.2% of the new traders chose OPFFB as the 
traded product. Even though one of the determinants of remaining in the market is having 
rubber as the traded product, newcomers seem to choose OPFFB as their traded product of 
choice. A plausible explanation for this is that a higher stability of prices and the need for 
quick delivery of OPFFB may lead to a faster profit turnover among traders. 
 
 
Source: Own production 





 Many traders changed their activities due to falling oil palm and rubber prices during 
the period of study. These price fluctuations seem to raise uncertainty among traders, 
affecting their decisions to remain in or exit the market. In light of this evidence, it is clear 
that human capital (education and experience), trading structure (traded product, credit 
provision, land area, operational vehicle ownership, and trader status), structural 
environment (number of competitors), and socioeconomic (trading revenue) factors affect 
the decisions of traders to remain in or exit the market. It is also interesting that some 
variables are only significant in particular periods but not in others, due to different situations 
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Many smallholder farmers depend on loans,  not only for farming activities but also 
for their daily needs. Carranza and Niles (2019) found that food, agricultural and livestock 
inputs, and medical expenses are the main loan-dependent expenses among smallholder 
farmer households. Loans can be obtained from both formal and informal financial 
institutions; however the latter may be more desirable for smallholder farmers because of 
lower transaction costs and risk (Guirkinger, 2008). The source of the loan may be related 
to how the loan is spent. Informal loans are mostly spent on food, while formal loans are 
generally utilized for agricultural inputs (Carranza & Niles, 2019). Additionally, the level of 
a farmers education, income, and age are factors which may affect  a farmer’s decision to 
ask for a loan or not (Oni, Oladele, & Oyewole, 2005). 
These conditions are all very relevant to rubber farmers in Indonesia, the second 
largest rubber producer21 in the world (Jegede, 2019). The majority of rubber farmers in 
Indonesia are smallholder farmers (Figure 4. 1). With the largest rubber plantation area in 
Indonesia, Sumatera island accounts for 68% of the total number of Indonesian smallholder 
farmers (Directorate General of Estate Crops, 2018). Jambi province in Sumatra is currently 
experiencing a rapid development in its rubber production industry, which increased 20.41% 
from 2014 to 2018. The number of rubber farmers in the area increased by 7.10% during the 
same period (Directorate General of Estate Crops, 2018), and the majority of these new 
farmers are smallholder farmers. 
 
Source: Own production based on Directorate General of Estate Crops (2018) 
Figure 4. 1 Number of Farmers by Ownership 
 
21 Indonesia contributes to 27.3% of the total rubber production in the world (Jegede, 2019) 
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49.64% of Jambi rubber smallholder farmers require either formal or informal loans, 
and 32.95% of those requiring loans take a loan from rubber traders, considered to be 
informal financial institutions22. Obtaining an informal loan from a trader is quite different 
from obtaining a formal loan and can induce a reciprocal seller-buyer relationship; when a 
farmer is indebted to a trader, the farmer feels obligated to sell their rubber to the trader. 
Based on our initial survey in 2018, 82.38% of all rubber trader respondents provide credit 
for their suppliers, and 79.77% require their suppliers to sell their rubber to them. This is 
also proved by the study in the previous chapter that showed that credit is one of the main 
factors influencing the decision of rubber traders to remain in the market. This shows that 
credit can secure the constant supply of rubber for traders, giving traders leverage in their 
relationships with farmers. 
In Jambi rubber trading, there is a common local term called basi. This is defined as 
the percentage of impurities of a bokar - a common thicker form of rubber slab produced by 
local farmers - which will then be transferred as a percentage of price reduction from the 
current asking price. The basi value is determined solely by the trader, and thus many factors 
may affect its value other than simple impurities. A supporting study showed that 11.8% of 
respondents overestimated the basi value for indebted suppliers (Kopp & Brümmer, 2017). 
We also performed a serial study applying the unrelated question randomized response 
model to capture possible hidden responses due to a particularly sensitive question, where 
we assume that manipulating basi estimation is an improper action. As expected, it captures 
a higher proportion of respondents, showing that they give lower basi to debt-free farmers 
than to indebted farmers. It reaches 86.62% of the proportion. The high number of 
respondents demonstrates that there is another factor besides quality affecting basi, namely 
debt. Both studies will be explained in more detail in the next section. Additionally, the 
approaches cannot capture how much basi traders are willing to charge when a farmer has a 
certain amount of debt.  
Thus, due to the fact that the basi is influenced not only by rubber quality but also by 
farmer’s debt, further studies to understand how much they influence price reduction are 
particularly appealing. To investigate this further, we test whether price reduction, rubber 
quality, and farmers’ debt influence traders’ preferences in buying rubber, and estimate how 
much of a price reduction, traders are willing to charge to obtain higher quality or lower 
 
22 Based on survey collected by C07, as part of the CRC project in Jambi, Indonesia, in 2015. 
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debt. We also measure the impact of the respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics and 
the interaction variables between those characteristics and the main attributes.  
We implement a method called a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE), which is 
broadly used to asses consumer preference and willingness to pay for certain products with 
different attributes (Asante‐Addo & Weible, 2019; Gao & Schroeder, 2009; Hasselbach & 
Roosen, 2015). This method can disguise questions that are slightly sensitive and illicit a 
more candid response. DCE was initially performed in the literature on marketing and 
transport economics (Louviere & Hensher, 1982; Louviere & Woodworth, 1983). A random 
utility model (Manski, 1977), influenced by Lancaster’s characteristics theory of value 
(Lancaster, 1966), is the theoretical background for this method (Bennett & Birol, 2010). 
First, by comparing the conditional and mixed logit method as part of the estimation 
strategy, we will test for the existence of heterogeneity in the model, thus forming a model 
with the best fit (Asante‐Addo & Weible, 2019; Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Elshiewy, Guhl, 
& Boztug, 2017; Hensher, Rose, & Greene, 2005). In this step we capture how price 
reduction, rubber quality, and farmers’ debt affect the traders’ preference in rubber buying 
choice. Then, to observe how much price reduction traders are willing to charge (WTC) 
when a farmer offers a certain quality and has a certain amount of debt, we employ a 
willingness to pay (WTP) measurement approach (Elshiewy et al., 2017; Hensher et al., 
2005), which is derived from the result of the conditional and mixed logit model. To the best 
of our knowledge, there are no studies implementing DCE to capture agricultural traders’ or 
middlemen’s behavior in buying decisions and, no studies using price reduction (WTC) as a 
replacement for WTP; therefore, the methods applied in this study are a novel approach in 
the literature.  
The subsequent sections provide an overview of basi manipulation captured by Kopp 
and Brümmer (2017) and our supporting study, as well as the difference between basi and 
price reduction. The next section provides the theoretical background of the DCE and is 
followed by the estimation strategy and data sections. Results and a discussion will be 
provided in detail, before we summarize our findings in the conclusion section.  
 
4.2. Overview: Basi versus Price Reduction 
Rubber farmers tap rubber directly from rubber trees. The sap is collected and 
coagulated, and dries into a material called bokar, which is a common, thicker form of rubber 
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slab produced by local farmers. Bokar may contain contamination in three forms. First, it 
may contain impurities known known as tatal caused by a contamination of dirt from dust, 
tree bark, or tree branches during the process of making the bokar. A second possible form 
of contamination is an introduction of water content into the bakar; the higher the water 
content, the worse the bokar quality. The third possible form of contamination is the types 
of coagulant that are not in accordance with the standard23.  
However, even though it has been clearly suggested by the downstream rubber buyers 
that farmers should reduce the bokar contamination to obtain higher price, the farmers still 
do not want to follow these requirements. In fact, they further worsen the contamination. 
The price obtained by farmers is based on the bokar weight; they believe that by increasing 
contamination, they will increase the bokar weight to get more profit than they could receive 
by following the requirements. This becomes a loophole farmer can use to cheat to receive 
a higher price.  
In Jambi, this phenomenon led to the emergence of a term called basi, which is the 
percentage of contamination in bokar24. Basi is determined unilaterally by rubber traders, 
and is then transmitted to a price reduction, as a substitute for the risk of traders who will 
lose profits due to the selling of contaminated rubber to large traders or factories.  
To determine a basi value, the traders choose the bokar, suspected to have the 
greatest level of contamination, and rip it apart for inspection. The basi value determined 
does not have any standard reference; it will simply serve to generalize the overall quality 
of rubber held by farmers at that time. Additionally, the level of contamination is often 
simply an estimate made without any inspection, so the basi and price reduction evaluation 
tends to be unstable and can be influenced by other factors.  However, in the end, a trader’s 
utility will increase with the higher price reduction, meaning that a higher basi is anyway 
typically preferred. Also, it should be emphasized that the basi system is more familiar to 
rubber farmers than price reductions.  
Apart from that, as previously mentioned, Kopp and Brümmer (2017) performed a 
rubber trader market power study in 2012 in which 11.8% of respondents were shown to 
have manipulated the basi estimation for indebted suppliers. Results indicate that the 
 
23 Coagulants that are in accordance with factory demand standard contains acetic acid (trademark: Cuko 61 
or Gentong), so that the rubber can clot perfectly. However, farmers prefer cheaper coagulants (such as plant 
fertilizer and floor cleaner) to the suggested one, where its use can cause the rubber does not clot perfectly 
and damage the rubber quality. However, the difference cannot be seen in plain view. 
24 For example, 10% basi from 100 kg bokar means there is 10 kg contamination in bokar 
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determination of a basi can indeed be influenced by a farmer’s debt. However, data on the 
influence of debt on the basi was gathered by directly asking the question: “Is there an 
additional price reduction if farmers are in debt?”, which may cause the respondent to feel 
intimidated, or to otherwise feel that they have done something inappropriate. With that in 
mind, these results may not capture the true effect. Additionally, the survey mentioned that 
94.1% of all respondents provide credits to suppliers.  
To further explore how many respondents, perform basi manipulation, and to reduce 
the bias of respondents who do not want to answer sensitive questions, we conducted a serial 
study applying Randomized Response Technique (RRT) model in 2018. RRT aims to 
capture hidden response due to sensitive question (Blair, Imai, & Zhou, 2015; Warner, 
1965), where we assume that, for respondents, admitting to manipulating the basi estimation 
is admitting to an improper action. In the RRT model, the respondent is prompted to provide 
a” yes” or “no” answer to a question which appears based on random probability from two 
or more questions. The question selected is not revealed to the interviewer, and thus 
respondents feel secure and act more honestly in answering sensitive questions. There are 
several basic designs of RRT which develop with time, namely mirrored question, forced 
response, disguised response, and unrelated question design (Blair et al., 2015). The main 
difference among these is the probability design parameters.  
 
Source: Own illustration based on Greenberg et al. (1969) 
Figure 4. 2 Probability Design in Unrelated Response Randomized Response Technique 
We selected the unrelated question design, which was developed by Greenberg et al. 
(1969). Respondents were required to role a dice; if they rolled  an odd number, they were 
required to answer the more sensitive question: “Do you provide lower price reduction to 
debt-free farmers?”,  whereas if they rolled an even number, they were required to answer a 
less sensitive alternative question: “Did you consume fruits or vegetables last week?” Thus, 
the probability of respondent answering each question was 50% (ρ). Information about 
which alternative questions the respondents answered is only known by the respondent. 
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However, we should have prior knowledge about the probability of Yes/No answer for the 
alternative question. Therefore, we could have the diagram of probability answering the 
sensitive question (Figure 4. 2). This alternative question provides more comfort in 
answering questions compared to other designs; therefore, violations of instructions can be 
reduced (Blair et al., 2015). 
The equation derived from Figure 4. 2 can be seen in Equation 1, where ρ is the 
probability of a respondent answering question A, π is the probability of a respondent 
answering “yes” to question A, and θ is the probability of a respondent answering “yes” to 
question B. We have found that the value of θ is 100% based on a separated question asked 
at different time. Later, we discovered that the value of 𝝁 is 74.65%. At last, we calculated 
the value of π, representing an affirmative answer to the sensitive question, to be 86.62%. 
Additionally, 82.38% of all respondents provided credits to suppliers. 
𝜇 =  𝜌𝜋 + (1 − 𝜌)𝜃 (𝟏) 
This high number shows that debt indeed affects the basi estimation. However, this 
calculation cannot capture how much basi traders are willing to charge when a farmer has a 
certain amount of debt. We will explore this in further sections.   
 
4.3. Background: Random Utility Model (RUM) 
In daily life, individuals make decisions by comparing possible courses of action, 
and selecting the best possible outcome. However, understanding which determinants 
influence the choice outcomes in a population is challenging, because not all related 
information is always available, and each individual has his/her own preferences. Some of 
them may have the same level of utility (I) in different combinations, which can be seen by 
the location of different nodes in Figure 4. 3. 
The figure illustrates the assumption of rubber traders’ individual preferences, where 
there exist distinct differences in preferences, in various combinations, for rubber quality 
and debt value. The combination chosen represents each individual’s behavior in 
maximizing utility (Hensher et al., 2005). Instinctively, traders will choose better quality 
products and lower farmer debt value to receive higher income or maximize their utility. 
However, another additional attribute, such as rubber price, may provide another effect in 
the combination chosen. Within a population, variability in individual preferences leads to 
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heterogeneity (Hensher et al., 2005). Maximizing the amount of measured variability can 
reduce the number of unobserved heterogeneities.  
  
Source: Own illustration based on Hensher, Rose and Greene (2005) 
Figure 4. 3 Illustration of rubber trader individual preferences 
Equation 2 visualizes the RUM expression, representing the utility (𝑈) of individual 
𝑖 and alternative 𝑗, where 𝑉𝑖𝑗 represents the utility component of individual 𝑖 and alternative 
𝑗,  capturing all observed and measured regressors (Eq. 3).  refers to the unobserved 
heterogeneity or error. (Hensher et al., 2005). 
 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝑉𝑖𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗 (2) 
 𝑉𝑖𝑗 =  𝑥𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽 + 𝑧𝑖
′𝛾𝑗 (3) 
In this situation, regressors are divided into two types, namely case-specific and case-
varying (alternative-specific) regressors (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). Case-specific 
regressors, represented by vector 𝑧𝑖, are regressors which do not alter across alternatives, 
such as revenue, age, and gender. Meanwhile, alternative-specific regressors, represented by 
vector 𝑥𝑖, differ across alternatives (𝑗), such as price and debt. Also, we further consider 
interaction between both type of regressors. The RUM will be modified as follows (Eq. 4): 
 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝑥𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽 + 𝑧𝑖
′𝛾𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗 (4) 
The model above becomes the reference point for analyzing unordered multinomial 
outcomes resulting from individual choices, with Multinomial Logit (MNL) model 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Greene, 2012). There are three types of MNL models which can 
be employed through STATA commands (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Greene, 2012). First, 
the original MNL model is applied when all regressors considered are case-specific type of 
regressors. Second, the Conditional Logit (CL) model is applied when all regressors are 
alternative-specific type of regressors. Lastly, Alternative-specific Conditional Logit (ASC-
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L) model is applied when both type of regressors are considered. However, CL model can 
be applied as ASC-L to simplify the comprehension, in a way which is further explain in the 
model specification section (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Greene, 2012).    
However, these MNL models acknowledge fixed coefficient and maintain some 
simplifying assumptions, which become their weakness (Rigby & Burton, 2005). The first 
assumption is Independence of Choice, which assumes that each choice is independent from 
the others, as if each was made by a different person (Rigby & Burton, 2005). For the purpose 
of our study, we consider repeated choices of data where a respondent answers several choice 
sets. Answers chosen by one individual are likely to be correlated. The second assumption 
is that of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which assumes that the choice 
probability ratio for each alternative, within a random combination of attributes, is 
independent from other alternative(s) in the choice set (Hensher et al., 2005). Finally, the 
third assumption is Homogeneity of Preferences, which assumes that the heterogeneity of 
attribute preferences is limited only to individual attributes; meanwhile, there exist other 
attributes which are expected to influence the decision process as well (Rigby & Burton, 
2005).  
 𝑉𝑖𝑗 =  𝑥𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽𝑖 +  𝑧𝑖
′𝛾𝑗𝑖 (5) 
 𝛽𝑖 =  𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖 (6) 
 𝛾𝑖𝑗 =  𝛾𝑗 + 𝑤𝑖𝑗 (7) 
 𝑉𝑖𝑗 =  𝑥𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽 + 𝑥𝑖𝑗
′ 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑧𝑖
′𝛾𝑗 + 𝑧𝑖
′𝑤𝑖𝑗 (8) 
 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = (𝑥𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽 + 𝑧𝑖
′𝛾𝑗) +  (𝑥𝑖𝑗
′ 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑧𝑖
′𝑤𝑖𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗) (9)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Another approach, the Random Parameter Logit (RPL) model, relaxes these MNL 
assumptions. The RPL allows for parameter 𝛽 and 𝛾 to be random across individual 𝑖, and 
has stochastic elements that are plausibly heteroskedastic and correlated across alternatives 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Greene, 2012; Hensher et al., 2005). It will be defined by 𝛽’s 
and 𝛾’s mean, and standard deviation. Equations 5 through 9 outline the modification of the 
RUM components. Apart from that, even though 𝜺𝒊𝒋 itself has no correlation over 
alternatives, the current combination of 𝒙𝒊𝒋
′ 𝒗𝒊  +  𝒛𝒊
′𝒘𝒊𝒋 + 𝜺𝒊𝒋 as error is correlated over 
alternatives (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010).  
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4.4. Model Specification 
In this study, we consider three main attributes as the alternative-specific regressors, 
i.e. price reduction, rubber quality, and farmers’ debt. We also acknowledge six socio-
demographic regressors as the case-specific regressors, i.e. trading revenue, credit provision, 
number of suppliers, number of competitors, trader’s status (whether one is a village-level 
trader or a larger trader), and trans-migration’s status (whether one is part of the trans-
migration scheme or not). Moreover, the interaction of both type of regressors are also taken 
into account. It is important that no attributes or regressors to be correlated (Hensher et al., 
2005). Thus, we perform an initial correlation test for a nonparametric estimator for all 
regressors  (Croux & Dehon, 2010; Spearman, 1904).  
This statistical correlation test, even without a correlation between attributes, may 
not capture psychological aspect of decision makers, otherwise known as inter-attribute 
correlation (Hensher et al., 2005). For example, the decision maker may consider that a 
higher price is associated with a higher quality product. However, in our case, unlike palm 
oil, which has a clear quality grading system, there is no clear measurement of rubber quality 
in Jambi. The rubber quality is relatively similar across farmers and areas. Thus, the 
correlation between price reduction and rubber quality in our study is assumed to not be a 
major concern. However, considering interaction terms between case- and alternative- 
specific regressors will initiate another form of correlation in the estimation.  
 𝑈1𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽01 + 𝛽1 𝑝_𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗 (10) 
 𝑈2𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽02 + 𝛽4 𝑝_𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽6 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7 𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡_𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑣   
+𝛽8 𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡_𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑 +  𝛽9 𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡_𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽10 𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑚 + 𝛽11 𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 +  𝛽12 𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠  
+𝛽13 𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑣_𝑋_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽14 𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑣_𝑋_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 +  𝛽15 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑋_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽16 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑋_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
+𝛽17 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝_𝑋_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽18 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝_𝑋_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽19 𝑐𝑜𝑚_𝑋_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽20 𝑐𝑜𝑚_𝑋_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
+𝛽21 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡_𝑋_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽22 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡_𝑋_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽23 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑋_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽24 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑋_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗
(11) 
Initially, we illustrate our estimation strategy by transforming the RUM function (Eq. 
4) into Equation 10. Later, we introduce the additional socio-demographic regressors with 
the interaction regressors in Equation 11. All 𝛽0𝑛 (n = 1, …, 5, according to the estimated 
model) refer to 𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡 or the “none” option. In addition to that, 𝛽𝑛 (n = 1, …, 48) defines all 
parameters estimated. All variables code used in the equations are defined in Table 4. 1.  
Even though we consider both alternative- and case-specific type of regressors, we 
prefer to employ the CL model instead of the ASC-L model to obtain a simpler interpretation, 
as mentioned in the previous section.  To do so, we are required to interact the case specific 
regressors with dummies for 𝑚 − 1 alternatives, which in this case is the 𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖 variable 
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(Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). Nonetheless, we have three alternatives in total, consisting of 
two buying alternatives and an additional “none” option alternative, and we combine the two 
buying alternatives into one alternative, which we will describe further in the data section 
(Table 4. 2). 𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖 itself must be included in the estimation as well.  
Table 4. 1 Definition of Variables  
Variables Code Definition 
Alternative-specific Regressors 
𝑝_𝑟𝑒𝑑 Price reduction 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 Rubber quality purchased 
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 Farmer’s debt 
Constant 
𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡 
Dummy variable where 1 means that respondents choosing any of alternative, 
while 0 refers to choosing the “none” option alternative 
Case-specific Regressors 
𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡_𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑣 Trading Revenue 
𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡_𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑 
Dummy variable of credit provision by traders, whether they are credit provider 
(1) or not (0) 
𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡_𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 Number of suppliers 
𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑚 Number of competitors 
𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 
Dummy variable of trader’s status, whether one is a village-level trader (0) or a 
larger trader (1) 
𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠   
Dummy variable of trans-migration’s status, whether one is part of the trans-
migration scheme (1) or not (0) 
Interaction Regressors 
𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑣_𝑋_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 Interaction between trading revenue and rubber quality purchased 
𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑣_𝑋_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 Interaction between trading revenue and farmer’s debt 
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑋_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 Interaction between credit provision and rubber quality purchased 
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑋_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 Interaction between credit provision and farmer’s debt 
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝_𝑋_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 Interaction between number of suppliers and rubber quality purchased 
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝_𝑋_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 Interaction between number of suppliers and farmer’s debt 
𝑐𝑜𝑚_𝑋_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 Interaction between number of competitors and rubber quality purchased 
𝑐𝑜𝑚_𝑋_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 Interaction between number of competitors and farmer’s debt 
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡_𝑋_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 Interaction between trader’s status and rubber quality purchased 
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡_𝑋_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 Interaction between trader’s status and farmer’s debt 
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑋_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 Interaction between trans-migration’s status and rubber quality purchased 
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑋_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 Interaction between trans-migration’s status and farmer’s debt 
 
The CL model exercised in this study is introduced by McFadden (1973) and 
Cameron and Trivedi (2010). The general CL estimation is illustrated in Equation 12. When 
three main alternative-specific regressors are introduced into the equation, it is transformed 
into Equation 13 by considering the RUM in Equation 10, where the model estimation is 
later called CL_1. A similar transformation, considering the case-specific and interaction 








, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚 (12) 
 𝑃𝑖𝑗 = Pr[𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗] =  
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽01 +  𝛽1 𝑝_𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑗)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽01 +  𝛽1 𝑝_𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑗)
3
𝑙=1
, 𝑗 = 1, … , 3 (13) 
As a comparison, we exercised the ML model (Eq. 16) (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010) 
as part of the RPL, which is expressed in Equation 14 and 15. The difference is that we 
consider only rubber quality and farmer’s debt to be random across individual 𝑖. This 
model’s objective is to relax the assumptions of fixed coefficient in MNL model (Hensher 
et al., 2005; Rigby & Burton, 2005).  
 𝑈3𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽03 +  𝛽25 𝑝_𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽26𝑖  𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽27𝑖  𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗 (14) 
 𝑈4𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽04 + 𝛽28 𝑝_𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽29𝑖  𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽30𝑖  𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽31 𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡_𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑣   
+𝛽32 𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡_𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽33 𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡_𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽34 𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑚 + 𝛽35 𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 +  𝛽36 𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑡_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠  
+𝛽37 𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑣_𝑋_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽38 𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑣_𝑋_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽39 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑋_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽40 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑋_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
+𝛽41 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝_𝑋_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽42 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝_𝑋_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽43 𝑐𝑜𝑚_𝑋_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽44 𝑐𝑜𝑚_𝑋_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
+𝛽45 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡_𝑋_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽46 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡_𝑋_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 +  𝛽47 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑋_𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽48 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑋_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗
(15) 
Additionally, we do not consider 𝑝_𝑟𝑒𝑑 to be random, since it will become an obstacle 
in measuring WTP when its 𝛽 distribution is close to zero (Rigby & Burton, 2005). Also, 
other regressors are not considered to be random. These assumptions might lead to 
inconsistency in preference heterogeneity. However, model simplicity will be the main 
reason behind these assumptions (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Hasselbach & Roosen, 2015).  
 𝑃𝑖𝑗 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽 + 𝑥𝑖𝑗
′ 𝑣𝑖)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥𝑖𝑙




, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚 (16) 
 𝑃𝑖𝑗 = Pr[𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗] =  
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽03 + 𝛽19 𝑝_𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽20𝑖  𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽21𝑖  𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑗)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽03 +  𝛽19 𝑝_𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽20𝑖  𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽21𝑖  𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑗)
3
𝑙=1
, 𝑗 = 1, … , 3 (17) 
Similar regressors are introduced into the equation (Eq. 16), as in Equation 17, by 
considering the RPL in Equation 14: here the model estimation is called ML_1. A similar 
transformation considering the interaction regressors in Equation 15 is also employed, where 
ML_2 will be the model estimation. The last model estimation, called ML_3, introduces 
cross-correlation among random attribute parameters, in the form of a Cholesky matrix, to 
the ML_2 estimation. Thus, we would have the true standard deviation of the random 
parameters (Asante‐Addo & Weible, 2019; Hensher et al., 2005). 
The model chosen between CL and ML models will be based on Pseudo-R2 value, 
the model selection criteria (Akaike and Bayesian information criterion (AIC and BIC)), and 
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the log-likelihood values. The log-likelihood based Pseudo-R2 value (Equation 17)  provides 
the interpretation that higher values of Pseudo-R2 mean better improvements in the new 
model compared to the null model (Hemmert et al., 2018; McFadden, 1973). 




Typically, lower criterion values indicate a better model. The difference between 
criterions lies in how the number of estimated parameters and observations are penalized 
(Mills & Prasad, 1992). Meanwhile, even though the general rule is that higher log-
likelihood values indicate a better model, we could also apply the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test 
(Equation 18), wherein 𝑈𝑅 refers to unrestricted (new) model and 𝑅 defines otherwise, to be 
then compared with a chi-square (χ2) distribution (Hensher et al., 2005; Wooldridge, 2013). 
The new model fits best when we reject the null hypothesis, i.e. the computed LR > critical 
LR. To get the critical value of the chi-square (χ2) distribution, we have to define the degree 
of freedom of the particular model by subtracting the number of observations in a sample by 
the number of independent constraints or β-parameters estimated (Hensher et al., 2005). 
𝐿𝑅 =  2 (𝐿𝑈𝑅 −  𝐿𝑅) (19) 
At last, the main objective of this study is to observe how much price reduction 
traders are willing to charge (WTC) when a farmer with a certain amount of debt or quality 
offers a product. To do so, we employed a WTP measurement approach (Hensher et al., 
2005), derived from choosing the best result between all model estimations. It is based on 
the ratio of the two parameters involved, where 𝛽𝑝 refers to 𝑝_𝑟𝑒𝑑 parameter, while 𝑛 
represents parameter of other regressors. It is important to obtain significant regressors to 
measure the WTC, otherwise no valuable measurement can be determined (Hensher et al., 
2005). Additionally, a common supporting Krinsky Robb bootstrap method to measure WTP 
is employed (Hasselbach & Roosen, 2015; Hole, 2007a).   




Additional normality and non-parametric equality test are conducted to obtain 
supporting data based on the socio-demographic respondent characteristics. A Shapiro-Wilk 
Normality Test is employed to perform normality test for variables required (Royston, 1992), 
meanwhile Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) non-parametric test is exercised to obtain 






4.5.1 Data Source 
The data used in this study is part of the data collected from the Collaborative 
Research Centre (CRC) in Ecological and Socioeconomic Functions of Tropical Lowland 
Rainforest Transformation Systems in the Jambi province, Indonesia in 2018. Five 
regencies, namely Sarolangun, Batang Hari, Muaro Jambi, Tebo, and Bungo Regency, were 
selected purposefully25. Then, stratified random sampling was applied in order to select 
districts and villages. One advantage of using stratified random sampling is that it minimizes 
survey costs without compromising accuracy (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). Next, twenty-two 
districts and thirty-seven villages were chosen, and respondents were formed by selecting 
all active, small rubber traders in the selected villages, and excluding those who could not 
be reached due to absence or rejection. We conducted direct interviews with respondents to 
gather information about their socio-demographic characterises. Also, we performed an 
interactive experiment to obtain our DCE data as our main research objectives. 
4.5.2 Choice Experimental Design 
We decided to consider in the study three main attributes related to the core research 
question: price reduction, rubber quality, and farmer’s debt. All were included as alternative 
specific regressors. Each attribute is presented in different levels. Attributes and levels used 
in this study are described in Table 4. 2. Combinations of attributes, each with unique levels, 
are named alternative. There is no label identification for the alternative in this study, 
commonly called an unlabelled experiment, which is beneficial because there is less of a 
possibility of a correlation between alternatives and a reduced bias in considering attributes, 
since decision makers may hold initial assumption by reading the alternative’s label 
(Hensher et al., 2005). 
To have an efficient experimental design, all alternatives, attributes, attribute levels 
and attribute-level labels have to be well-identified and refined before a design is formed 
(Hensher et al., 2005). It is thought that the presence of too many choice sets may reduce the 
response reliability. Therefore, even though, theoretically, more information is gained by 
having more levels of attributes, reducing the number of attribute levels is preferred. Another 
way is to reduce the size of the experimental design while still considering the concept of 
 
25 Performed by Krishna and Euler, members of CRC’s team, and also stated on the EFForTS Discussion Paper 
by Faust et al. (2013) 
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orthogonality, where all attributes are statistically independent of one another (Hensher et 
al., 2005).  
Table 4. 2 Attributes, Levels and Descriptions                                                
Attribute Level Description 
Quality Bad (0), good (1) 
illustrating the rubber quality whether 
it is in bad or good quality. 
Debt 0 IDR, 350,000 IDR, 750,000 IDR 
illustrating the loan amount borrowed 
by the indebted suppliers. 
Basi 5%, 10%, 15% 
referring the price reduction in 
percentage determined by traders. 
 
In this study, the design of the choice experiment was automatically generated by 
JMP Statistical Discover from SAS. It will automatically consider the number of 
alternatives, attributes, attribute levels, and choice sets desired, by still considering the 
orthogonality concept, called the orthogonal fractional factorial design. We consider a 
combination of three attributes within a choice set containing two alternatives and a “none” 
option for each set (Table 4. 3). Also, we include 10 choice sets per survey, from three 
surveys and over 180 expected respondents. These considerations were then input into the 
software to randomly generate a design.  
Table 4. 3 An example of a Choice Set (simplification) 
Set 1 Choice A Choice B Choice C 
Quality Bad Quality Good Quality 
Neither Debt 750,000 IDR 0 IDR 
Basi 5% 15% 
Note: A sample of choice set is presented in Appendix 4. 1. 
 
A preliminary pilot study was performed where we interviewed actual rubber traders 
outside the survey area as well as experts who understand the behaviour of traders. Their 
choice outcomes and feedbacks provided improvement for the final choice design. It is 
necessary to detect potentially relevant attributes, so that all combination used in the survey 
are realistic for the respondents. the type of choice data employed in this study is known as 
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Revealed Preference (RP)26 data, where the choice is based on actual market condition 
(Hensher et al., 2005).   
At the end of survey, we interviewed 210 respondents who were then randomly and 
evenly divided into three groups to perform different surveys. Each respondent was 
confronted with choice sets shown in sequence. They were asked to choose one of the 
alternatives presented in the choice set.  The choice concerned 100 kg of “bokar” and 8,000 
IDR/kg and was mentioned in the beginning of survey.  
To provide a sense of realism, we prefer to use term basi rather than “price reduction” 
in the choice set, since it is better known by both rubber farmers and traders. Also, it is in 
the common form of price reduction (in percentage) used on the field. It is then transformed 
into Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) which must be in accordance with our assumption. Keep in 
mind that, in the end, we are looking for WTC basi instead of WTP. Additionally, we divide 
debt by one million to adjust for the many zeros when dealing with IDR currency.  
4.5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Socio-Demographic Characteristic Data 
Descriptive statistics for key socio-demographic variables relating to the respondents 
are described in Appendix 4. 2. Key variables include the size, number of competitors, socio-
human capital, and credit provision of rubber traders. In an initial assessment of trading 
activities, of the majority of rubber traders dealt in rubber alone, whereas 12.38% of 
respondents reported also trading in oil palm. 
Table 4. 4 Village and Larger Traders’ Characteristics 
Variables 
Village Trader Larger Trader 
Sign. 
actual rank sums actual rank sums 
Trading revenue 13041.0 < 9114.0 > *** 
Quantity purchased 12479.5 < 9675.5 > *** 
Number of workers 13083.5 < 9071.5 > *** 
Number of suppliers 12459.5 < 9695.5 > *** 
Number of competitors 15792.5 > 6362.5 < *** 
expected rank sums 14559.0 7596.0  
number of obs. 138 72  
Source: Own production (Appendix 4. 4) 
Note: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 
26 Another type of choice data is Stated Preference (SP) data, where a choice is based on hypothetical 
condition.    
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To capture the relative “size” of traders, we divide traders into village and larger 
traders, finding that 65.71% of respondents are village traders. To compare characteristics 
between village and larger traders, we performed the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) 
non-parametric test of both groups in total trading revenue, quantity of rubber purchased, 
number of workers, number of suppliers and number of competitors (Table 4. 4 and 
Appendix 4. 4). We initially conducted Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test for the variables 
compared (Appendix 4. 3), however those are not normally distributed thus we considered 
the rank-sum test to compare variables medians of both groups. Results show that the median 
of trading revenue, quantity purchased, number of workers, and number of suppliers 
variables of larger traders are significantly higher than those of village traders, but otherwise 
for the number of competitors variable. This is very plausible, because when there is a larger 
trader in an area, the challenge to become a competitor in that region will be greater due to 
capital required.  
In terms of measuring traders’ competition, 54.75% of respondents reported having 
10-16 competitors in their village. Furthermore, when analysing socio-human capital 
characteristics of traders, we determined that 7.14% of respondents reported having a 
leadership title within the village, like village official, teenage leader, or religious leader; 
14.76% of respondents reported being transmigrant27, and 84.26% of respondents attained a 
basic education, and were at least primary or secondary school graduates. 
Table 4. 5 Credit Providers and Traders not Providing Credit Characteristics 
Variables 
Provide no Credit Provide Credit 
Sign. 
actual rank sums actual rank sums 
Trading revenue 3612.5 < 18542.5 >  
Quantity purchased 3501.0 < 18654.0 >  
Number of workers 3391.0 < 18764.0 >  
Number of suppliers 2845.0 < 19310.0 > *** 
Number of competitors 4164.5 > 17990.5 <  
expected rank sums 3903.5 18251.5  
number of obs. 37 173  
Source: Own production (Appendix 4. 4) 
Note: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
At last, we observed the traders’ credit provision, where 82.38 % of respondents 
provided credits to suppliers, and 79.77% of them felt that indebted suppliers had the 
 
27  Those have followed a transmigration program from Indonesian government, with the aim of equal 
distribution of Indonesian population. The program is fully subsidized by the government.  
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obligation to sell their rubber to them. We also divide the respondents into two groups based 
on credit availability (Table 4. 5 and Appendix 4. 4). To compare both groups, we also 
performed the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) non-parametric test for median 
difference of the same variables as in Table 4. 4. Results show that the “median number of 
supplier” variable is significantly higher among credit providers than those traders not 
providing credit. One plausible reason for this is that more suppliers depend on credits 
offered by traders.  
 
4.6. Result and Discussion 
We analysed the choice experiment data using conditional and mixed logit model in 
STATA 14.2. Three main alternative-specific attributes and six additional socio-
demographic regressors are considered, as well as their interaction. A separate initial 
Spearman’s rank correlation test (Appendix 4. 5) was carried out for all variables in all 
estimations where there is no correlation among three main attributes found; meanwhile, 
some interaction variables indicate otherwise. These are understandable since main attributes 
are counted in the interaction variables. However, we also considered cross-correlation 
among random attribute parameters in the last model estimation to anticipate different 
responses once random characteristics are introduced for some main attributes. 
There are five models we considered in obtaining the best fitted model (Appendix 4. 
6). The most general model represented by CL_1 introduced fixed coefficients for the main 
attributes, which do not vary across respondents, while CL_2 introduced additional socio-
demographic characteristics and their interaction regressors to CL_1. Both models were 
estimated using conditional logit estimation. The last three models were estimated using a 
mixed logit model, allowing for variation in the main attribute’s coefficients, except for the 
price reduction and “none” option. ML_1 considers only main attributes in the estimation, 
while ML_2 considers main attributes as well as additional socio-demographic 
characteristics and their interaction regressors.  We then introduced cross-correlation to 
ML_3 to ensure that the random attributes are still random after allowing for correlation 
among them. The cross-correlation information is captured as Cholesky Matrix (Hole, 
2007b) which is represented by the lower-triangular matrix in ML_3. The matrix is part of 
the covariance matrix in Appendix 4. 13. Additionally, all mixed logit models are estimated 
using 500 Halton draws to find better result accuracy (Hole, 2007b).  
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We compare the goodness of fit measures in order to find the best model. Estimation 
statistics of all model estimations are shown in Table 4. 6. The first measure is the log-
likelihood measure, where, generally, a higher log-likelihood value indicates a better model, 
shown by ML_3. However, it is also necessary to prove this with a log-likelihood ratio test, 
which determines the ML_2 model to be the best fit (Table 4. 7). The second measure utilized 
is the pseudo-R2 by McFadden (1973), wherein a higher value of Pseudo-R2 indicates a better 
improvement of the new model compared with the null modeln (Hemmert et al., 2018; 
McFadden, 1973). It can be seen that the ML_2 and ML_3 have similar and high Pseudo-R2 
values. The last measures considered are the AIC and BIC value, where a lower value 
indicates a better model. ML models provide lower criterion values than those of CL models. 
It was determined that the ML_2 model fit best based on AIC while ML_1 fit best based on 
BIC. Overall, ML models improve the model estimation, especially the model ML_2.  
Table 4. 6 Estimation Statistics of All Model Estimations 
Model Obs 
Log-likelihood Value 
df AIC BIC Pseudo R2 b) 
ll-null a) ll-model 
CL_1 6300 -2307.09 -1450.42 4 2908.84 2935.83 0.37 
CL_2 6300 -2307.09 -1396.03 22 2836.07 2984.53 0.39 
ML_1 6300 -1450.42 -1179.90 6 2371.81 2412.29 0.49 
ML_2 6300 -1396.03 -1154.40 24 2356.81 2518.77 0.50 
ML_3 6300 -1396.03 -1153.59 25 2357.18 2525.88 0.50 
Source: Own production (Appendix 4. 7-4. 11) 
Note: a) The ll-null values for ML estimations equal to ll-model values for CL estimations, thus we replace the 
ll-null values for ML estimations with ll-null values for CL estimations to calculate the true Pseudo R2.                 
b) Calculation is based on Equation 17. 
 
Even though model ML_3 is not the best model, the estimation result appears similar, 
which can reflect a quite robust result. All models provide consistent result in term of 
parameter signs, although number of significant regressors are reduced (Appendix 4. 6). 
However, the main three attributes are all significant and specify persistent parameter signs. 
Based on the ML_2 model estimation, as expected, respondents tend to obtain higher 
price reductions to increase their utility (Table 4. 8). Theoretically, price attributes should 
be statistically significant and negative (Elshiewy et al., 2017; Hensher et al., 2005), while 
in our study, we replace the price attribute with the price reduction attribute which should 
respond in the opposite direction. Having a higher price reduction allows rubber traders to 
increase their profit per unit.  
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Table 4. 7 Log-likelihood Ratio Test 
Models 
Compared 
Computed Value b) Critical Value 
Model 
Chosen c) 
ML_3 vs ML_2 2 (-1153.59 - (-1154.40)) =  1.64 χ2 (0.95,1) =  3.84 ML_2 
ML_3 vs ML_1 2 (-1153.59 - (-1179.90)) =  52.62 χ2 (0.95,37) =  52.19 ML_3 
ML_3 vs CL_2 2 (-1153.59 - (-1396.03)) =  484.88 χ2 (0.95,25) =  37.65 ML_3 
ML_3 vs CL_1 2 (-1153.59 - (-1450.42)) =  593.66 χ2 (0.95,43) =  59.30 ML_3 
ML_2 vs ML_1 2 (-1154.40 - (-1179.90)) =  51.00 χ2 (0.95,36) =  50.99 ML_2 
ML_2 vs CL_2 2 (-1154.40 - (-1396.03)) =  483.24 χ2 (0.95,24) =  36.42 ML_2 
ML_2 vs CL_1 2 (-1154.40 - (-1450.42)) =  592.02 χ2 (0.95,42) =  58.12 ML_2 
ML_1 vs CL_2 a)  2 (-1179.90 - (-1396.03)) =  432.26 -  ML_1 
ML_1 vs CL_1 2 (-1179.90 - (-1450.42)) =  541.04 χ2 (0.95,6) =  12.59 ML_1 
CL_2 vs CL_1 2 (-1396.12 - (-1450.42)) =  108.60 χ2 (0.95,18) =  28.87 CL_2 
Source: Own production (Appendix 4. 8-4. 12) 
Note: a) Degree of freedom (df) of ML_1 is less than that of CL_2, thus critical value is unmeasured. However, 
we consider both models are not better than ML_2 and ML_3 based on other calculations. b) Based on Equation 
18. c) The new model fits best when we reject the null hypothesis, i.e. the computed value > critical value. 
 
Further, the results indicate that respondents tend to choose higher rubber quality 
to increase their utility. Having a higher quality product surely increases the probability to 
obtain higher selling price. Also, it shows that respondents tend to select lower farmer’s debt 
to minimize the risk of losing money to suppliers who default on their debt. Based on ML_2 
model, farmer’s debt has the highest marginal utility among main attributes. On the other 
hand, “none” option parameter turns to be not significant, since it is currently interacted with 
the socio-demographic regressors, unlike in the model ML_1. 
Evidently, traders having higher trading revenue, credit provision, less suppliers 
and transmigrant traders prefer to choose any alternative option to the “none” option. It 
implies that attributes presented in alternatives matter for those criteria. Regarding the 
interaction regressors, good quality is preferred over bad quality for larger traders and traders 
having higher number of competitors. 
Additionally, Table 4. 8 presents the significance outcomes for random parameters. 
It implies that there exits heterogeneity among traders for the related attributes, since their 
estimates are significantly different from zero. Each trader preference differs from others as 
well as their WTC. Table 4. 9 shows the ML_2 WTC value which influences the 
respondents’ utility. It can be deduced that there is no WTC for any non-significant 
regressors. WTC value comparisons among all models are presented in Appendix 4. 14. We 
70 
 
assumed a prevailing rubber price of 8,000 IDR/kg and divided the debt value by one million 
to provide a more intuitive interpretation. 
Table 4. 8 Parameter Estimates from the ML_2 Model Estimation 
Attributes Coefficient a) SE 
Mean Estimates 
p_red 0.0007 *** (0.0001) 
qual 1.6480 * (0.9059) 
debt -1.9086 ** (0.9488) 
dalt b) -0.1110  (0.4054) 
dalt_trrev 0.0094 * (0.0050) 
dalt_cred 0.8596 *** (0.2840) 
dalt_supp -0.0085 *** (0.0032) 
dalt_com 0.0215  (0.0253) 
dalt_stat -0.3790  (0.2636) 
dalt_trans 0.6552 * (0.3402) 
trrev_x_qual -0.0124  (0.0109) 
trrev_ x _debt 0.0052  (0.0105) 
cred_ x _qual -0.0272  (0.6658) 
cred_ x _debt 1.0145  (0.6876) 
supp_ x _qual 0.0126  (0.0077) 
supp_ x _debt -0.0036  (0.0071) 
com_ x_qual 0.1018 * (0.0550) 
com_ x _debt 0.0294  (0.0555) 
stat_ x _qual 1.9702 *** (0.6022) 
stat_ x _debt -0.0283  (0.5876) 
trans_ x _qual -1.0488  (0.7122) 
trans_ x _debt -0.3422  (0.7190) 
Standard Deviation of Random Parameter Distributions 
qual 2.8441 *** (0.2936) 
debt 2.6058 *** (0.2755) 
Goodness of Fit Measures  
Log-likelihood -1154.4063   
Pseudo-R2 0.4996   
AIC 2356.8130   
BIC 2518.7720   
Number of observations 6300   
Number of respondents 210   
Source: Own production (Appendix 4. 10) 
Note: a) *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 ; b) Dummy variable for choosing any alternative (1) or “none” opt (0) 
An increase in quality from bad to good, is followed by a decrease in price reduction 
by 2,397.48 IDR/kg, ceteris paribus, which is 29.97% of the assumed price. This is in 
accordance with our expectation, because the price of bokar of very poor quality can reach 
40% of the prevailing price. Meanwhile, bokar with prices of up to 10% of the prevailing 
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price are considered to be of good quality28. Furthermore, an increase in farmer’s debt by 1 
million IDR leads to an increase in price reduction by 2,776.54 IDR/kg, ceteris paribus, 
which is 34.71 % of the assumed price. The most common farmer’s debt values are below 1 
million IDR, with an average of 0.5 million IDR29, and these loans are often used for daily 
needs. In other words, mostly price reduction due to farmer’s debt value is below 2,776.54 
IDR/kg. Also, the farmer’s reason for having the debt is in accordance with a study finding 
that informal loans are mostly spent on food (Carranza & Niles, 2019).    
Table 4. 9 Rubber Traders’ Willingness to Charge Price Reduction for Rubber Attributes 
Attributes WTC a)  Min. Max. 
Alternative-specific regressors   
qual -2,397.48 * -5,763.19 -149.19 
debt 2,776.54 ** -84.55 6,285.63 
Socio-demographic regressors  
dalt_trrev -13.64 * -32.62 0.73 
dalt_cred -1,250.49 *** -2,538.36 -410.00 
dalt_supp 12.42 *** 3.33 25.88 
dalt_com -31.24  -115.25 40.39 
dalt_stat 551.36  -200.98 1,514.28 
dalt_trans -953.11 * -2,222.23 25.99 
Interaction regressors    
trrev_x_qual 18.03  -13.82 55.70 
trrev_ x _debt -7.62  -41.76 23.84 
cred_ x _qual 39.51  -2,007.59 2,146.49 
cred_ x _debt -1,475.85  3,992.40 510.05 
supp_ x _qual -18.38  -46.99 4.15 
supp_ x _debt 5.23  -16.11 28.13 
com_ x_qual -148.05 * -356.51 7.32 
com_ x _debt -42.83  -221.74 126.85 
stat_ x _qual -2,866.18 *** -5,620.40 -1,106.14 
stat_ x _debt 41.19  -1,757.88 1,860.62 
trans_ x _qual 1,525.72  -473.64 4,118.37 
trans_ x _debt 497.85  -1,622.50 2,812.17 
Source: Own production (Appendix 4. 18), with Confidence Interval 95% 
Note: a) *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
As the second part of the WTC result, from the socio-demographic characteristic 
perspective, we observe a positive WTC for the “number of suppliers” regressor as well as 
 
28 Based on interview with one of the rubber factories in Jambi. 
29 Based on interview with rubber traders in Jambi. 
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negative WTC for the “trader revenue”, “credit provision”, and “transmigrant status” 
regressors. The average buyer respondent is willing to increase his/her price reduction by 
12.42 IDR/kg for an increase of one unit of suppliers, ceteris paribus, which is 0.16% of the 
assumed price. A plausible reason for this phenomenon is that traders with more suppliers 
feel less at risk of supply shortages resulting from increasing price reduction. 
The average buyer respondent is willing to reduce his price reduction by 13.64 
IDR/kg for an increase of a million-trading revenue, ceteris paribus, which is 0.17% of the 
assumed price. With higher trading revenue, the trader can loosen his desire to take 
advantage of price reduction, which makes perfect sense. Further, a buyer respondent with 
credit provision has his WTC unexpectedly decrease by 1,250.49 IDR/kg, ceteris paribus, 
which is 15.63% from the assumed price. This means that traders providing credit offer 
higher prices for their rubber than traders providing no credit. The plausible reason is that 
they would like to provide credit to maintain supply continuity from farmers. That is also 
one of the factors influencing the trader to remain in the market, based on the previous 
chapter. Meanwhile, transmigrant trader’s WTC decreases by 953.11 IDR/kg, which is 
11.91% of the assumed price, ceteris paribus. We found that transmigrant traders purchase 
more rubber than non-transmigrant traders in term of quantity (Appendix 4. 20). This can 
explain that the transmigrant traders may focus more in purchasing rubber rather than 
pursuing higher margin gained from price reduction.  
At last, there are two interaction regressors providing significant effects on the 
respondent’s utility. An initial interpretation for this is that having one additional competitor 
leads to a respondent’s WTC for quality decreasing by 148.05 IDR/kg, which is 1.85% of 
the assumed price. A trader with more competitors seeks to achieve higher quality by 
reducing price reduction, to attract suppliers selling their better-quality rubber to them 
instead of their competitors. Secondly, a larger trader’s WTC decreases by 2,866.18 IDR/kg 
for good quality, which is 35.83% of the assumed price, ceteris paribus. The plausible reason 
is that they may be more efficient in trading activity than the village traders and thus are able 






The Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) method has successfully helped us to 
answer the research questions of this study. We found that a mixed logit model, which 
considers heterogeneity of the random parameters, provides the best fitted model with the 
highest value of log-likelihood and the lowest value of AIC.  
There are significant results showing that price reduction, rubber quality and 
farmer’s debt influence traders’ preference in buying rubber, where increased price 
reduction, higher rubber quality, and lower farmer’s debt will increase the trader’s utility. 
Some interaction variables between those main attributes and some respondents’ socio-
demographic characteristics also influence the traders’ preference. These include the 
interaction between number of competitors and rubber quality, and whether a trader is a 
larger trader or village trader and rubber quality. Afterwards, we employ a WTP 
measurement approach and find a WTC by traders for all significant regressors. An increase 
in quality from bad to good is associated with a 29.97% price reduction from the assumed 
price. Further, an increase in farmer’s debt of 1 million IDR is followed by an increase in 

















Based on results of all chapters regarding the initial research objectives, we can 
conclude that there are effects of an importing country trade policy to price in a targeted 
exporting country, which in this case the EU AD duty affects the Indonesian CPO and local 
Jambi FFB price. Also, we found that there are factors affecting OPFFB and rubber local 
traders to remain in or exit the market. Those are human capital, trading structure, structural 
environment, and socioeconomic factors. Lastly, we found that rubber farmer’s debt 
influences the rubber traders’ preference in buying rubber. The summary of each chapter’s 
conclusion is presented as follows. 
The first paper explains that the imposition of the EU biodiesel AD generated a SB 
in the cointegration estimation between Indonesian and world CPO prices, and between 
Jambi FFB and Indonesian CPO prices. This could indicate that the duty had an effect on 
the price after the breakpoint. Results show that the duty negatively affected the Indonesian 
CPO and local Jambi FFB price, whereas the world CPO market gained more power after 
the duty implementation. Decreases in Indonesian CPO demand due to decreased demand 
for imported biodiesel by the EU lead to a price reduction caused by a shifting of demand. 
From the second paper we could summarize that many traders leave their activities 
due to falling oil palm and rubber prices in the period of study. This price fluctuation raise 
uncertainty to traders to remain in the market. In light of this evidence, it is clear that human 
capital, trading structure, structural environment, and socioeconomic factors affect the 
decision of traders in remaining in or exiting the market. It is also interesting that some 
variables are only significant in particular period but not significant in the other, due to 
different situation and behavior, formed over time. 
Lastly, the third paper concludes that there are significant results showing that price 
reduction, rubber quality and farmer’s debt influence traders’ preference in buying rubber, 
where increased price reduction, higher rubber quality, and lower farmer’s debt will increase 
the trader’s utility. Some interaction variables between those main attributes and some 
respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics also influence the traders’ preference. These 
include the interaction between number of competitors and rubber quality, and whether a 
trader is a larger trader or village trader and rubber quality. Afterwards, we employ a WTP 
measurement approach and find a WTC by traders for all significant regressors. An increase 
in quality from bad to good is associated with a decrease of 29.97% price reduction of the 
assumed price. Further, an increase of farmer’s debt by 1 million IDR, is followed by an 
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7.1. Appendices of Chapter 2 
Appendix 2. 1 Unit Root Tests 
Price 
Variables 
ADF test PP test ZA test 
Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff 
Level 1st Diff 
Break Min t-stat Break Min t-stat 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑊 -0.910 -19.744*** -0.812 -19.767*** 21Jan16 -4.206 3Sep15 -20.145*** 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐷 -0.499 -16.992*** -0.836 -17.090*** 28Jan16 -4.051 3Sep15 -17.560*** 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐽𝐵 -0.201 -12.300*** -1.195 -12.383*** 4Feb16 -3.574 10Sep15 -9.339*** 
Note: ADF dan PP (Z(t)) test Critical Values: 1%: -3.450, 5%: -2.875, 10%: -2.570; ZA test Critical Values: 
1%: -5.34, 5%: -4.80, 10%: 4.58 via TTest 
 
 
Appendix 2. 2 Johansen Cointegration Test between Indonesian and World CPO Prices 




5% 1% 5% 1% 
0 . 66.344** 15.410 20.040 66.086 14.070 18.630 
1 0.163 0.258** 3.760 6.65 0.258 3.760 6.650 




Appendix 2. 3 Johansen Cointegration Test between Jambi FFB and Indonesian CPO Prices  




5% 1% 5% 1% 
0 . 32.379** 15.410 20.040 31.765 14.070 18.630 
1 0.082 0.614** 3.760 6.65 0.614 3.760 6.650 
2 0.002       






Appendix 2. 4 Gregory-Hansen Cointegration Test between Indonesian and World CPO 
Prices 
GH Test Test Statistics Breakpoint 
Asymptotic Critical Value 
1% 5% 10% 
Model: Change in Level (lags = 1, AIC & BIC)   
ADF -7.57*** Feb 20, 2014 -5.13 -4.61 -4.34 
Zt -9.30*** Jan 02, 2014 -5.13 -4.61 -4.34 
Za -147.38*** Jan 02, 2014 -50.07 -40.48 -36.19 
Model: Change in Regime (lags = 1, AIC)   
ADF -7.94*** Jan 16, 2014 -5.47 -4.95 -4.68 
Zt -9.72*** Dec 19, 1013 -5.47 -4.95 -4.68 
Za -157.73*** Dec 19, 1013 -57.17 -47.04 -41.85 
 
 
Appendix 2. 5 Gregory-Hansen Cointegration Test between Jambi FFB and Indonesian CPO 
Prices 
GH Test Test Statistics Breakpoint 
Asymptotic Critical Value 
1% 5% 10% 
Model: Change in Level (lags = 1, BIC)   
ADF -5.93*** Oct 21, 2013 -5.13 -4.61 -4.34 
Zt -6.56*** Dec 19, 1013 -5.13 -4.61 -4.34 
Za -83.18*** Dec 19, 1013 -50.07 -40.48 -36.19 
Model: Change in Regime (lags = 1, BIC)   
ADF -6.51*** Dec 26, 1013 -5.47 -4.95 -4.68 
Zt -7.30*** Dec 19, 1013 -5.47 -4.95 -4.68 












Appendix 2. 6 Johansen Cointegration Test between Indonesian and World CPO Prices 
before the Breakpoint 




5% 1% 5% 1% 
0 . 66.697** 15.410 20.040 66.214 14.070 18.630 
1 0.228 0.484** 3.760 6.65 0.484 3.760 6.650 
2 0.002       
Note: lags=1 
Appendix 2. 7 Johansen Cointegration Test between Indonesian and World CPO Prices after 
the Breakpoint 




5% 1% 5% 1% 
0 . 31.456** 15.410 20.040 30.205 14.070 18.630 
1 0.146 1.251** 3.760 6.65 1.251 3.760 6.650 
2 0.005       
Note: lags=1 
Appendix 2. 8 Johansen Cointegration Test between Jambi FFB and Indonesian CPO Prices 
before the Breakpoint 




5% 1% 5% 1% 
0 . 75.732** 15.410 20.040 74.730 14.070 18.630 
1 0.082 1.002** 3.760 6.65 1.002 3.760 6.650 
2 0.002       
Note: Lags = 1 
Appendix 2. 9 Johansen Cointegration Test between Jambi FFB and Indonesian CPO Prices 
after the Breakpoint 




5% 1% 5% 1% 
0 . 17.954** 15.410 20.040 16.940 14.070 18.630 
1 0.082 1.015** 3.760 6.65 1.015 3.760 6.650 
2 0.002       




Appendix 2. 10. VECM Estimation between Indonesian and World CPO Prices 
VECM system, lag order 2 
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 2011-11-02-2018-12-05 (T = 371) 
Cointegration rank = 1 
Case 2: Restricted constant 
beta (cointegrating vectors, standard errors in parentheses) 
 
lnP_ID  1.0000  
  (0.00000) 
lnP_W  -1.0179  
  (0.019549) 
const  0.058648  
  (0.0066206) 
 
alpha (adjustment vectors) 
 
lnP_ID -0.062430  
lnP_W 0.18768  
 
Log-likelihood = 1768.6987 
Determinant of covariance matrix = 2.4783124e-007 
AIC = -9.4916 
BIC = -9.4072 
HQC = -9.4581 
 
Equation 1: d_lnP_ID 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
d_lnP_ID_1 0.0678890 0.0877177 0.7739 0.4395  
d_lnP_W_1 0.0682527 0.0789647 0.8643 0.3880  
EC1 −0.0624297 0.0611156 −1.022 0.3077  
 
Mean dependent var −0.002030  S.D. dependent var  0.027859 
Sum squared resid  0.281688  S.E. of regression  0.027705 
R-squared  0.024262  Adjusted R-squared  0.016286 
rho −0.007055  Durbin-Watson  2.010929 
 
Equation 2: d_lnP_W 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
d_lnP_ID_1 0.230024 0.0995170 2.311 0.0214 ** 
d_lnP_W_1 −0.150547 0.0895866 −1.680 0.0937 * 
EC1 0.187677 0.0693365 2.707 0.0071 *** 
 
Mean dependent var −0.001994  S.D. dependent var  0.032059 
Sum squared resid  0.362567  S.E. of regression  0.031431 
R-squared  0.050246  Adjusted R-squared  0.042482 
rho −0.013784  Durbin-Watson  2.019377 
Cross-equation covariance matrix: 
  lnP_ID lnP_W 
lnP_ID 0.00075927 0.00070298 
lnP_W 0.00070298 0.00097727 
 







Appendix 2. 11 VECM Estimation between Indonesian and World CPO Prices allowing 
Structural Break 
VECM system, lag order 2 
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 2011-11-02-2018-12-05 (T = 371) 
Cointegration rank = 1 
Case 2: Restricted constant 
beta (cointegrating vectors, standard errors in parentheses) 
 
lnP_ID  1.0000  
  (0.00000) 
lnP_W  -1.3667  
  (0.032649) 
const  0.045589  
  (0.0048494) 
SB  0.011194  
  (0.0090282) 
SBxlnP_W 0.36334  
  (0.036856) 
 
alpha (adjustment vectors) 
 
lnP_ID 0.23468  
lnP_W 0.53378  
 
Log-likelihood = 1811.8278 
Determinant of covariance matrix = 1.9641815e-007 
AIC = -9.7241 
BIC = -9.6397 
HQC = -9.6906 
 
Equation 1: d_lnP_ID 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
d_lnP_ID_1 −0.0947447 0.0850806 −1.114 0.2662  
d_lnP_W_1 0.242923 0.0764682 3.177 0.0016 *** 
EC1 0.234683 0.0496388 4.728 <0.0001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var −0.002030  S.D. dependent var  0.027859 
Sum squared resid  0.266230  S.E. of regression  0.026970 
R-squared  0.077807  Adjusted R-squared  0.067728 
rho  0.033346  Durbin-Watson  1.931993 
 
Equation 2: d_lnP_W 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
d_lnP_ID_1 0.0203581 0.0881360 0.2310 0.8175  
d_lnP_W_1 0.0746029 0.0792143 0.9418 0.3469  
EC1 0.533776 0.0514214 10.38 <0.0001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var −0.001994  S.D. dependent var  0.032059 
Sum squared resid  0.285694  S.E. of regression  0.027939 
R-squared  0.251615  Adjusted R-squared  0.243436 
rho  0.131929  Durbin-Watson  1.730852 
Cross-equation covariance matrix: 
  lnP_ID lnP_W 
lnP_ID 0.00071760 0.00059681 
lnP_W 0.00059681 0.00077007 
 




Appendix 2. 12 VECM Estimation between Indonesian and World CPO Prices before the 
Breakpoint 
VECM system, lag order 2 
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 2011-11-02-2014-01-01 (T = 114) 
Cointegration rank = 1 
Case 2: Restricted constant 
beta (cointegrating vectors, standard errors in parentheses) 
 
lnP_ID  1.0000  
  (0.00000) 
lnP_W  -1.1660  
  (0.029409) 
const  0.060600  
  (0.0041074) 
 
alpha (adjustment vectors) 
 
lnP_ID 0.082717  
lnP_W 0.39578  
 
Log-likelihood = 583.80093 
Determinant of covariance matrix = 1.2216715e-007 
AIC = -10.1018 
BIC = -9.9098 
HQC = -10.0238 
 
Equation 1: d_lnP_ID 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
d_lnP_ID_1 −0.108847 0.218097 −0.4991 0.6187  
d_lnP_W_1 0.161486 0.228673 0.7062 0.4816  
EC1 0.0827171 0.189608 0.4363 0.6635  
 
Mean dependent var −0.001045  S.D. dependent var  0.029274 
Sum squared resid  0.096425  S.E. of regression  0.029607 
R-squared  0.005509  Adjusted R-squared -0.021614 
rho  0.004652  Durbin-Watson  1.982445 
 
Equation 2: d_lnP_W 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
d_lnP_ID_1 0.0724771 0.209683 0.3457 0.7303  
d_lnP_W_1 −0.0464685 0.219851 −0.2114 0.8330  
EC1 0.395777 0.182293 2.171 0.0321 ** 
 
Mean dependent var −0.001089  S.D. dependent var  0.028930 
Sum squared resid  0.089128  S.E. of regression  0.028465 
R-squared  0.058918  Adjusted R-squared  0.033253 
rho −0.006070  Durbin-Watson  1.991635 
Cross-equation covariance matrix: 
  lnP_ID lnP_W 
lnP_ID 0.00084583 0.00073425 
lnP_W 0.00073425 0.00078183 
 







Appendix 2. 13 VECM Estimation between Indonesian and World CPO Prices after the 
Breakpoint 
 
VECM system, lag order 2 
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 2014-01-22-2018-12-05 (T = 255) 
Cointegration rank = 1 
Case 2: Restricted constant 
beta (cointegrating vectors, standard errors in parentheses) 
 
P_ID  1.0000  
  (0.00000) 
P_W  -0.99705  
  (0.021038) 
const  0.037280  
  (0.014820) 
 
alpha (adjustment vectors) 
 
P_ID -0.018372  
P_W 0.37791  
 
Log-likelihood = 1415.2962 
Determinant of covariance matrix = 5.1787548e-008 
AIC = -11.0376 
BIC = -10.9265 
HQC = -10.9929 
 
Equation 1: d_P_ID 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
d_P_ID_1 0.0597548 0.0995838 0.6000 0.5490  
d_P_W_1 0.0996565 0.0817413 1.219 0.2239  
EC1 −0.0183715 0.0769050 −0.2389 0.8114  
 
Mean dependent var −0.001564  S.D. dependent var  0.017447 
Sum squared resid  0.075347  S.E. of regression  0.017326 
R-squared  0.033224  Adjusted R-squared  0.021669 
rho −0.006639  Durbin-Watson  2.002533 
 
Equation 2: d_P_W 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
d_P_ID_1 0.160427 0.125197 1.281 0.2012  
d_P_W_1 −0.0170034 0.102765 −0.1655 0.8687  
EC1 0.377912 0.0966851 3.909 0.0001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var −0.001647  S.D. dependent var  0.022589 
Sum squared resid  0.119091  S.E. of regression  0.021782 
R-squared  0.086014  Adjusted R-squared  0.075090 
rho −0.004889  Durbin-Watson  1.997934 
Cross-equation covariance matrix: 
  P_ID P_W 
P_ID 0.00029548 0.00029361 
P_W 0.00029361 0.00046702 
 









Appendix 2. 14 VECM Estimation between Jambi FFB and Indonesian CPO prices 
VECM system, lag order 2 
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 2011-11-02-2018-12-05 (T = 371) 
Cointegration rank = 1 
Case 2: Restricted constant 
beta (cointegrating vectors, standard errors in parentheses) 
 
lnP_JB  1.0000  
  (0.00000) 
lnP_ID  -1.3558  
  (0.063101) 
const  1.4346  
  (0.032321) 
ET  1.7910  
  (0.22217) 
TL  0.022204  
  (0.016798) 
 
alpha (adjustment vectors) 
 
lnP_JB -0.15886  
lnP_ID 0.020219  
 
Log-likelihood = 1745.9297 
Determinant of covariance matrix = 2.8019667e-007 
AIC = -9.3689 
BIC = -9.2844 
HQC = -9.3354 
 
Equation 1: d_lnP_JB 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
d_lnP_JB_1 0.177914 0.0408673 4.353 <0.0001 *** 
d_lnP_ID_1 0.440617 0.0526689 8.366 <0.0001 *** 
EC1 −0.158856 0.0285240 −5.569 <0.0001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var −0.001851  S.D. dependent var  0.029854 
Sum squared resid  0.169197  S.E. of regression  0.021501 
R-squared  0.488879  Adjusted R-squared  0.483293 
rho −0.142773  Durbin-Watson  2.283819 
 
Equation 2: d_lnP_ID 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
d_lnP_JB_1 0.110650 0.0526172 2.103 0.0362 ** 
d_lnP_ID_1 0.102648 0.0678119 1.514 0.1310  
EC1 0.0202186 0.0367250 0.5505 0.5823  
 
Mean dependent var −0.002030  S.D. dependent var  0.027859 
Sum squared resid  0.280476  S.E. of regression  0.027683 
R-squared  0.028458  Adjusted R-squared  0.017840 
rho −0.008245  Durbin-Watson  2.014206 
Cross-equation covariance matrix: 
  lnP_JB lnP_ID 
lnP_JB 0.00045606 0.00025413 
lnP_ID 0.00025413 0.00075600 
 





Appendix 2. 15 VECM Estimation between Jambi FFB and Indonesian CPO allowing 
Structural Break 
VECM system, lag order 2 
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 2011-11-02-2018-12-05 (T = 371) 
Cointegration rank = 1 
Case 2: Restricted constant 
beta (cointegrating vectors, standard errors in parentheses) 
 
lnP_JB  1.0000  
  (0.00000) 
lnP_ID  -1.4356  
  (0.062597) 
const  1.4839  
  (0.025909) 
ET  1.4846  
  (0.15469) 
TL  0.042258  
  (0.010304) 
SB  -0.065405  
  (0.018591) 
SBx lnP_ID 0.090191  
  (0.056691) 
 
alpha (adjustment vectors) 
 
lnP_JB -0.22305  
lnP_ID 0.12994  
 
Log-likelihood = 1761.7651 
Determinant of covariance matrix = 2.5726986e-007 
AIC = -9.4543 
BIC = -9.3698 
HQC = -9.4207 
 
Equation 1: d_lnP_JB 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
d_lnP_JB_1 0.187357 0.0405341 4.622 <0.0001 *** 
d_lnP_ID_1 0.382961 0.0567833 6.744 <0.0001 *** 
EC1 −0.223049 0.0368110 −6.059 <0.0001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var −0.001851  S.D. dependent var  0.029854 
Sum squared resid  0.166761  S.E. of regression  0.021375 
R-squared  0.496237  Adjusted R-squared  0.489337 
rho −0.125469  Durbin-Watson  2.249512 
 
Equation 2: d_lnP_ID 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
d_lnP_JB_1 0.112848 0.0520537 2.168 0.0308 ** 
d_lnP_ID_1 0.211365 0.0729209 2.899 0.0040 *** 
EC1 0.129943 0.0472726 2.749 0.0063 *** 
 
Mean dependent var −0.002030  S.D. dependent var  0.027859 
Sum squared resid  0.275015  S.E. of regression  0.027449 
R-squared  0.047374  Adjusted R-squared  0.034324 
rho −0.014566  Durbin-Watson  2.027326 
Cross-equation covariance matrix: 
  lnP_JB lnP_ID 
lnP_JB 0.00044949 0.00027555 
lnP_ID 0.00027555 0.00074128 
 




Appendix 2. 16 VECM Estimation between Jambi FFB and Indonesian CPO before the 
Breakpoint 
VECM system, lag order 2 
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 2011-11-02-2014-01-01 (T = 114) 
Cointegration rank = 1 
Case 2: Restricted constant 
beta (cointegrating vectors, standard errors in parentheses) 
 
lnP_JB  1.0000  
  (0.00000) 
lnP_ID  -1.3186  
  (0.11053) 
const  1.5235  
  (0.051871) 
ET  1.2885  
  (0.31794) 
 
alpha (adjustment vectors) 
 
lnP_JB -0.21157  
lnP_ID 0.15544  
 
Log-likelihood = 535.81993 
Determinant of covariance matrix = 2.8348578e-007 
AIC = -9.2600 
BIC = -9.0680 
HQC = -9.1821 
 
Equation 1: d_lnP_JB 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
d_lnP_JB_1 0.191262 0.0789317 2.423 0.0170 ** 
d_lnP_ID_1 0.263705 0.0962188 2.741 0.0072 *** 
EC1 −0.211573 0.0679147 −3.115 0.0023 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  0.000367  S.D. dependent var  0.027960 
Sum squared resid  0.055390  S.E. of regression  0.022440 
R-squared  0.373086  Adjusted R-squared  0.355988 
rho −0.069435  Durbin-Watson  2.133894 
 
Equation 2: d_lnP_ID 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
d_lnP_JB_1 0.214220 0.100875 2.124 0.0359 ** 
d_lnP_ID_1 0.0813139 0.122968 0.6613 0.5098  
EC1 0.155437 0.0867956 1.791 0.0761 * 
 
Mean dependent var −0.001045  S.D. dependent var  0.029274 
Sum squared resid  0.090469  S.E. of regression  0.028678 
R-squared  0.066935  Adjusted R-squared  0.041487 
rho −0.009036  Durbin-Watson  2.002806 
Cross-equation covariance matrix: 
  lnP_JB lnP_ID 
lnP_JB 0.00048588 0.00031953 
lnP_ID 0.00031953 0.00079359 
 




Appendix 2. 17 VECM Estimation between Jambi FFB and Indonesian CPO after the 
Breakpoint 
VECM system, lag order 2 
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 2014-01-22-2018-12-05 (T = 255) 
Cointegration rank = 1 
Case 2: Restricted constant 
beta (cointegrating vectors, standard errors in parentheses) 
 
lnP_JB  1.0000  
  (0.00000) 
lnP_ID  -1.3512  
  (0.037368) 
const  1.4216  
  (0.019997) 
ET  1.3963  
  (0.18839) 
TL  0.036912  
  (0.010764) 
 
alpha (adjustment vectors) 
 
lnP_JB -0.26788  
lnP_ID 0.038235  
 
Log-likelihood = 1220.6718 
Determinant of covariance matrix = 2.3832027e-007 
AIC = -9.5112 
BIC = -9.4001 
HQC = -9.4665 
 
Equation 1: d_lnP_JB 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
d_lnP_JB_1 0.184076 0.0457755 4.021 <0.0001 *** 
d_lnP_ID_1 0.410339 0.0689450 5.952 <0.0001 *** 
EC1 −0.267875 0.0438832 −6.104 <0.0001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var −0.002869  S.D. dependent var  0.030774 
Sum squared resid  0.103071  S.E. of regression  0.020305 
R-squared  0.575223  Adjusted R-squared  0.568426 
rho −0.138180  Durbin-Watson  2.275964 
 
Equation 2: d_lnP_ID 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
d_lnP_JB_1 0.0622092 0.0612367 1.016 0.3107  
d_lnP_ID_1 0.191260 0.0922318 2.074 0.0391 ** 
EC1 0.0382349 0.0587052 0.6513 0.5154  
 
Mean dependent var −0.002551  S.D. dependent var  0.027345 
Sum squared resid  0.184455  S.E. of regression  0.027163 
R-squared  0.037259  Adjusted R-squared  0.021855 
rho −0.010216  Durbin-Watson  2.011778 
Cross-equation covariance matrix: 
  lnP_JB lnP_ID 
lnP_JB 0.00040420 0.00023250 
lnP_ID 0.00023250 0.00072335 
 





Appendix 3. 1 Name of Regencies, Districts and Villages of Survey Location 
Regencies Districts Villages 
1. SAROLANGUN 1. Pelawan 1. Pematang Kolim 
2. Batu Putih 
 2. Singkut 1. Bukit Murau 
2. Payo Lebar 
 3. Pauh 1. Pauh 
2. Semaran 
3. Danau Serdang 
 4. Air Hitam 1. Baru 
2. Pematang Kabau 
2. BATANGHARI 1. Bathin XXIV 1. Simpang Karmeo 
2. Jangga  
 2. Muara Bulian 1. Sridadi 
2. Simpang Terusan 
 3. Bajubang 1. Bungku 
4. Maro Sebo Ilir 1. Bulian Jaya 
2. Bukit Sari 
5. Pemayung 1. Pulau Raman 
3. MUARO JAMBI 1. Sungai Bahar 1. Mulya Jaya 
 2. Kumpeh Ulu 1. Tarikan 
 3. Sungai Gelam 1. Ladang Panjang 
2. Parit 
 4. Maro Sebo 1. Tanjung Katung 
4. TEBO 1. Sumay 1. Teriti 
2. Muara Sekalo 
 2. Rimbo Ilir 1. Giriwinangun 
2. Sepakat Bersatu 
 3. Tebo Ulu 1. Pulau Panjang 
2. Rantau Langkap 
 4. VII Koto 1. Aur Cino 
 5. Rimbo Ulu  1. Sumber Sari 
5. BUNGO 1. Pelepat Ilir 1. Muara Kuamang 
2. Maju Jaya 
 2. Bathin III Ulu 1. Lubuk Beringin 
2. Laman Panjang 
 3. Muko Muko Bathin VII 1. Tebing Tinggi 
2. Tanjung Agung 
 4. Tanah Sepenggal 1. Teluk Pandak 
2. Tenam 
 










Appendix 3. 3 Stata Output of Variable Descriptive Statistics Year 2015 
 
         loc          295    64.67458    29.39114          4        155
       trrev          295    12.38375    20.25782         .3        150
                                                                       
       trans          295    .1728814    .3787872          0          1
         com          295    11.68814    5.289352          0         21
        supp          295    34.09492    34.48846          2        250
        smph          295    .1864407    .3901237          0          1
        comp          295    .2983051    .4582915          0          1
                                                                       
       vehic          295    .8237288    .3816982          0          1
        land          295    11.28534    15.00797          0         95
        cred          295    .7152542    .4520601          0          1
         num          295    6.027119    6.064221          0         35
        stat          295    .7762712    .4174505          0          1
                                                                       
        info          295    .6169492    .4869566          0          1
        func          295          .2    .4006797          0          1
         exp          295    8.872881    8.054551          1         47
         edu          295    .9457627    .2268702          0          1
          tp          295    .7186441    .4504248          0          1
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. sum tp edu exp func info stat num cred land vehic comp smph supp com trans trrev loc
         loc          292    67.13014    27.65305          4        155
       trrev          292    6.159683    9.220843        .15         80
                                                                       
       trans          292    .1986301    .3996539          0          1
         com          292    10.57534    5.184348          0         21
        supp          292    30.65753    31.15033          3        250
        smph          292    .1575342    .3649291          0          1
        comp          292    .0787671    .2698374          0          1
                                                                       
       vehic          292    .8458904    .3616736          0          1
        land          293    10.33993    12.51335          0        100
        cred          292    .7842466    .4120502          0          1
         num          293    4.003413    4.068336          0         32
        stat          292     .260274    .4395373          0          1
                                                                       
        info          292    .3287671    .4705716          0          1
        func          292    .1472603    .3549735          0          1
         exp          292    10.22432    7.139397          1         39
         edu          292    .8561644    .3515254          0          1
          tp          293    .7167235    .4513604          0          1
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. sum tp edu exp func info stat num cred land vehic comp smph supp com trans trrev loc
97 
 





         loc          325    66.28923    25.67898          4        155
       trrev          325     12.0911    19.48656         .2        160
                                                                       
       trans          325    .1384615    .3459163          0          1
         com          325       11.72    5.606302          0         25
        supp          325    38.60308    45.32468          3        325
        smph          325    .4523077    .4984877          0          1
        comp          325         .16    .3671714          0          1
                                                                       
       vehic          325    .8738462    .3325347          0          1
        land          325    9.771415     10.7516          0         70
        cred          325    .8369231    .3700055          0          1
         num          325    4.901538      4.8096          0         34
        stat          325    .3261538    .4695273          0          1
                                                                       
        info          325    .6215385    .4857514          0          1
        func          325         .08    .2717115          0          1
         exp          325    10.52154    6.797977          1         38
         edu          325    .9107692    .2855161          0          1
          tp          325    .6430769    .4798306          0          1
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. sum tp edu exp func info stat num cred land vehic comp smph supp com trans trrev loc
98 
 
Appendix 3. 5 Stata Output of Logit Estimation Year 2012 
 
  
                                                                              
       _cons     1.394381   .9084701     1.53   0.125    -.3861874     3.17495
         loc    -.0002076   .0047592    -0.04   0.965    -.0095355    .0091204
       trrev    -.0117783    .007595    -1.55   0.121    -.0266642    .0031077
     1.trans     .8341763   .3574204     2.33   0.020     .1336452    1.534707
         com    -.0000885   .0260642    -0.00   0.997    -.0511734    .0509964
        supp     .0017558   .0039365     0.45   0.656    -.0059595    .0094711
      1.smph     .0327894   .3476114     0.09   0.925    -.6485165    .7140953
      1.comp    -.3666151   .3013363    -1.22   0.224    -.9572234    .2239931
     1.vehic     .0714405   .3663748     0.19   0.845    -.6466409    .7895219
        land     .0046163   .0105949     0.44   0.663    -.0161492    .0253819
      1.cred    -1.726172   .3279802    -5.26   0.000    -2.369001   -1.083343
         num     .0122727   .0268905     0.46   0.648    -.0404318    .0649771
      1.stat     .6028337   .3381714     1.78   0.075      -.05997    1.265637
      1.info    -.1065286   .2804224    -0.38   0.704    -.6561464    .4430892
      1.func    -.4094667   .3370509    -1.21   0.224    -1.070074    .2511409
         exp    -.0080335   .0181582    -0.44   0.658     -.043623    .0275559
       1.edu    -1.110443   .6432386    -1.73   0.084    -2.371168    .1502812
        1.tp     .8131209   .3137939     2.59   0.010     .1980962    1.428146
                                                                              
      remain        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -173.53656                     Pseudo R2         =     0.1510
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(17)       =      61.72
Logistic regression                             Number of obs     =        295
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -173.53656  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -173.53656  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -173.53673  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -173.67216  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -204.39536  
>  i.smph supp com i.trans trrev loc
. logit remain i.tp i.edu exp i.func i.info i.stat num i.cred land i.vehic i.comp
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Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
                                                                              
         loc    -.0000418   .0009589    -0.04   0.965    -.0019213    .0018377
       trrev    -.0023732   .0015101    -1.57   0.116    -.0053329    .0005864
     1.trans     .1676354   .0688033     2.44   0.015     .0327835    .3024873
         com    -.0000178   .0052517    -0.00   0.997     -.010311    .0102754
        supp     .0003538   .0007923     0.45   0.655     -.001199    .0019066
      1.smph     .0066041   .0699823     0.09   0.925    -.1305586    .1437668
      1.comp    -.0744092   .0610855    -1.22   0.223    -.1941346    .0453163
     1.vehic     .0143873   .0737221     0.20   0.845    -.1301054    .1588799
        land     .0009302   .0021323     0.44   0.663     -.003249    .0051093
      1.cred    -.3564509   .0573524    -6.22   0.000    -.4688595   -.2440422
         num     .0024728   .0054124     0.46   0.648    -.0081352    .0130809
      1.stat     .1212588   .0664524     1.82   0.068    -.0089854    .2515031
      1.info    -.0215217   .0567604    -0.38   0.705      -.13277    .0897265
      1.func    -.0826901   .0675675    -1.22   0.221    -.2151199    .0497398
         exp    -.0016187   .0036545    -0.44   0.658    -.0087814     .005544
       1.edu    -.2150113   .1119647    -1.92   0.055     -.434458    .0044354
        1.tp     .1667961   .0629113     2.65   0.008     .0434922    .2900999
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               1.comp 1.smph supp com 1.trans trrev loc
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.tp 1.edu exp 1.func 1.info 1.stat num 1.cred land 1.vehic
Expression   : Pr(remain), predict()
Model VCE    : OIM








                                                                              
       _cons    -.2708329   .8076663    -0.34   0.737     -1.85383    1.312164
         loc     .0018053   .0052247     0.35   0.730    -.0084349    .0120455
       trrev      .053066    .027339     1.94   0.052    -.0005175    .1066494
     1.trans     .0440653   .3595999     0.12   0.902    -.6607377    .7488682
         com    -.0482794   .0281207    -1.72   0.086     -.103395    .0068362
        supp     .0001396    .005962     0.02   0.981    -.0115456    .0118249
      1.smph    -.1504273   .3943546    -0.38   0.703    -.9233481    .6224935
      1.comp    -.6330536   .4886475    -1.30   0.195    -1.590785    .3246779
     1.vehic     .7971226   .3807064     2.09   0.036     .0509518    1.543293
        land    -.0394647   .0128783    -3.06   0.002    -.0647057   -.0142237
      1.cred     .7516832   .3335158     2.25   0.024     .0980043    1.405362
         num       .00742   .0415288     0.18   0.858    -.0739748    .0888149
      1.stat     .4390833   .3627313     1.21   0.226     -.271857    1.150024
      1.info     .0920677   .3064726     0.30   0.764    -.5086077     .692743
      1.func     .5399779   .4343338     1.24   0.214    -.3113007    1.391257
         exp      .043068   .0237277     1.82   0.070    -.0034374    .0895733
       1.edu    -.7833169     .45212    -1.73   0.083    -1.669456    .1028221
        1.tp     .7210577   .3368864     2.14   0.032     .0607724    1.381343
                                                                              
      remain        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  -157.6143                     Pseudo R2         =     0.1180
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0006
                                                LR chi2(17)       =      42.19
Logistic regression                             Number of obs     =        292
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -157.6143  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -157.61431  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -157.6246  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -158.60336  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -178.70999  
>  i.smph supp com i.trans trrev loc
. logit remain i.tp i.edu exp i.func i.info i.stat num i.cred land i.vehic i.comp
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Appendix 3. 8 Stata Output of Marginal Effect Estimation Year 2015 
 
  
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
                                                                              
         loc     .0003268   .0009453     0.35   0.730    -.0015259    .0021796
       trrev     .0096075   .0048551     1.98   0.048     .0000917    .0191233
     1.trans     .0079459   .0645757     0.12   0.902    -.1186202     .134512
         com    -.0087409   .0050068    -1.75   0.081    -.0185541    .0010722
        supp     .0000253   .0010794     0.02   0.981    -.0020903    .0021409
      1.smph    -.0276224   .0733514    -0.38   0.706    -.1713885    .1161437
      1.comp    -.1228838   .0993739    -1.24   0.216     -.317653    .0718853
     1.vehic     .1572627   .0787475     2.00   0.046     .0029205    .3116049
        land     -.007145   .0021976    -3.25   0.001    -.0114522   -.0028379
      1.cred     .1468276   .0678224     2.16   0.030     .0138981    .2797572
         num     .0013434   .0075172     0.18   0.858    -.0133901    .0160769
      1.stat      .077089   .0610766     1.26   0.207    -.0426189     .196797
      1.info     .0165978   .0549871     0.30   0.763    -.0911748    .1243705
      1.func     .0918167   .0682762     1.34   0.179    -.0420021    .2256355
         exp     .0077974   .0042191     1.85   0.065    -.0004718    .0160666
       1.edu    -.1282899   .0648282    -1.98   0.048    -.2553508    -.001229
        1.tp     .1351579   .0635813     2.13   0.034     .0105408    .2597749
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               1.comp 1.smph supp com 1.trans trrev loc
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.tp 1.edu exp 1.func 1.info 1.stat num 1.cred land 1.vehic
Expression   : Pr(remain), predict()
Model VCE    : OIM













                                                                              
       _cons    -.1491667   .1627824    -0.92   0.359    -.4682144     .169881
      _hatsq     .1870438   .1225771     1.53   0.127     -.053203    .4272906
        _hat     .9852397   .1461047     6.74   0.000     .6988797      1.2716
                                                                              
      remain        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -172.38062                     Pseudo R2         =     0.1566
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(2)        =      64.03
Logistic regression                             Number of obs     =        295
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -172.38062  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -172.38062  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -172.3811  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -172.81972  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -204.39536  
. linktest
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0035206   .1915014    -0.02   0.985    -.3788564    .3718152
      _hatsq    -.1493225   .1069492    -1.40   0.163    -.3589391    .0602941
        _hat      1.24622    .265599     4.69   0.000     .7256556    1.766785
                                                                              
      remain        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  -156.8169                     Pseudo R2         =     0.1225
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(2)        =      43.79
Logistic regression                             Number of obs     =        292
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -156.8169  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -156.8169  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -156.82042  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -157.20941  




Appendix 3. 11 Stata Output of Collinearity Diagnostics Year 2012 
 
  
 Det(correlation matrix)    0.2394
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
 Condition Number        24.1701 
---------------------------------
    18     0.0184         24.1701
    17     0.0657         12.7930
    16     0.1296          9.1099
    15     0.1660          8.0506
    14     0.1733          7.8776
    13     0.1978          7.3748
    12     0.2821          6.1747
    11     0.2923          6.0666
    10     0.3248          5.7551
    9     0.3606          5.4616
    8     0.4563          4.8555
    7     0.5975          4.2429
    6     0.6305          4.1305
    5     0.7099          3.8925
    4     0.7236          3.8554
    3     0.9862          3.3026
    2     1.1291          3.0865
    1    10.7564          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
  Mean VIF      1.18
----------------------------------------------------
       loc      1.12    1.06    0.8939      0.1061
     trrev      1.11    1.06    0.8969      0.1031
     trans      1.12    1.06    0.8903      0.1097
       com      1.11    1.05    0.9024      0.0976
      supp      1.16    1.08    0.8620      0.1380
      smph      1.13    1.06    0.8873      0.1127
      comp      1.12    1.06    0.8931      0.1069
     vehic      1.15    1.07    0.8720      0.1280
      land      1.58    1.26    0.6343      0.3657
      cred      1.14    1.07    0.8766      0.1234
       num      1.49    1.22    0.6712      0.3288
      stat      1.12    1.06    0.8966      0.1034
      info      1.11    1.05    0.9012      0.0988
      func      1.08    1.04    0.9302      0.0698
       exp      1.34    1.16    0.7488      0.2512
       edu      1.05    1.03    0.9504      0.0496
        tp      1.14    1.07    0.8741      0.1259
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Collinearity Diagnostics
(obs=295)
. collin tp edu exp func info stat num cred land vehic comp smph supp com trans trrev loc
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 Det(correlation matrix)    0.2273
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
 Condition Number        20.2788 
---------------------------------
    18     0.0242         20.2788
    17     0.1250          8.9222
    16     0.1417          8.3803
    15     0.1553          8.0073
    14     0.1662          7.7401
    13     0.1995          7.0635
    12     0.2814          5.9479
    11     0.2940          5.8188
    10     0.3635          5.2330
    9     0.5116          4.4110
    8     0.5846          4.1265
    7     0.6648          3.8697
    6     0.7894          3.5510
    5     0.8431          3.4362
    4     0.8715          3.3797
    3     0.9483          3.2399
    2     1.0816          3.0338
    1     9.9544          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
  Mean VIF      1.18
----------------------------------------------------
       loc      1.06    1.03    0.9439      0.0561
     trrev      1.34    1.16    0.7481      0.2519
     trans      1.09    1.04    0.9165      0.0835
       com      1.14    1.07    0.8743      0.1257
      supp      1.38    1.17    0.7251      0.2749
      smph      1.09    1.04    0.9169      0.0831
      comp      1.06    1.03    0.9460      0.0540
     vehic      1.14    1.07    0.8782      0.1218
      land      1.32    1.15    0.7579      0.2421
      cred      1.10    1.05    0.9090      0.0910
       num      1.38    1.17    0.7265      0.2735
      stat      1.16    1.08    0.8625      0.1375
      info      1.12    1.06    0.8930      0.1070
      func      1.08    1.04    0.9245      0.0755
       exp      1.31    1.14    0.7631      0.2369
       edu      1.12    1.06    0.8904      0.1096
        tp      1.20    1.10    0.8305      0.1695
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Collinearity Diagnostics
(obs=292)
. collin tp edu exp func info stat num cred land vehic comp smph supp com trans trrev loc
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Appendix 3. 13 Stata Output of Wilcoxon Rank-sum (Mann-Whitney Test of Farming 




                                 0        .3         2         8        18
           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
              std. dev:   7.81865
                  mean:   5.52121
         unique values:  28                       missing .:  0/66
                 range:  [0,30]                       units:  .1
                  type:  numeric (float)
                                                                             
frrev                                                             (unlabeled)
                                                                             
. codebook frrev if stat==0
. 
                               .65         2       3.6         7        16
           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
              std. dev:   55.6266
                  mean:   12.4404
         unique values:  63                       missing .:  0/229
                 range:  [0,700]                      units:  .01
                  type:  numeric (float)
                                                                             
frrev                                                             (unlabeled)
                                                                             
. codebook frrev if stat==1
. 
    Prob > |z| =   0.0162
             z =  -2.405
Ho: frrev(stat==0) = frrev(stat==1)
adjusted variance     371415.18
                               
adjustment for ties    -1396.82
unadjusted variance   372812.00
    combined        295       43660       43660
                                               
           1        229     35357.5       33892
           0         66      8302.5        9768
                                               
        stat        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
. ranksum frrev , by (stat)
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       trrev           88    4.613665    5.228212        .28         30
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. sum trrev if remain==0
       trrev          204    6.826593    10.42516        .15         80
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. sum trrev if remain==1
       trrev          295    12.38375    20.25782         .3        150
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. sum trrev
. *2012
       trrev          292    6.159683    9.220843        .15         80
                                                                       













    Prob > |z| =   0.5575
             z =   0.587
Ho: supp(nt==0) = supp(nt==1)
adjusted variance     467433.30
                               
adjustment for ties    -2169.70
unadjusted variance   469603.00
    combined        325       52975       52975
                                               
           1         67       10520       10921
           0        258       42455       42054
                                               
          nt        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
. ranksum supp, by (nt)
    Prob > |z| =   0.0001
             z =   3.893
Ho: land(nt==0) = land(nt==1)
adjusted variance     468343.08
                               
adjustment for ties    -1259.92
unadjusted variance   469603.00
    combined        325       52975       52975
                                               
           1         67      8256.5       10921
           0        258     44718.5       42054
                                               
          nt        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
. ranksum land, by (nt)
    Prob > |z| =   0.0014
             z =   3.194
Ho: num(nt==0) = num(nt==1)
adjusted variance     464504.12
                               
adjustment for ties    -5098.88
unadjusted variance   469603.00
    combined        325       52975       52975
                                               
           1         67        8744       10921
           0        258       44231       42054
                                               
          nt        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
. ranksum num, by (nt)
. 
    Prob > |z| =   0.9325
             z =   0.085
Ho: loc(nt==0) = loc(nt==1)
adjusted variance     468447.89
                               
adjustment for ties    -1155.11
unadjusted variance   469603.00
    combined        325       52975       52975
                                               
           1         67       10863       10921
           0        258       42112       42054
                                               
          nt        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
. ranksum loc, by (nt)
    Prob > |z| =   0.0251
             z =   2.240
Ho: trrev(nt==0) = trrev(nt==1)
adjusted variance     468901.30
                               
adjustment for ties     -701.70
unadjusted variance   469603.00
    combined        325       52975       52975
                                               
           1         67        9387       10921
           0        258       43588       42054
                                               
          nt        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
. ranksum trrev, by (nt)
    Prob > |z| =   0.7535
             z =  -0.314
Ho: com(nt==0) = com(nt==1)
adjusted variance     464212.41
                               
adjustment for ties    -5390.59
unadjusted variance   469603.00
    combined        325       52975       52975
                                               
           1         67       11135       10921
           0        258       41840       42054
                                               
          nt        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
. ranksum com, by (nt)
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Appendix 3. 17 Pearson Chi2 test 




. tab cred nt, chi2
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.2935   Pr = 0.588
     Total         258         67         325 
                                             
         1          86         20         106 
         0         172         47         219 
                                             
      stat           0          1       Total
                      nt
. tab stat nt, chi2
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.2158   Pr = 0.642
     Total         258         67         325 
                                             
         1         162         40         202 
         0          96         27         123 
                                             
      info           0          1       Total
                      nt
. tab info nt, chi2
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.0331   Pr = 0.856
     Total         258         67         325 
                                             
         1          21          5          26 
         0         237         62         299 
                                             
         b           0          1       Total
_fungsi_ja            nt
a_memiliki  
apakah_and  
. tab func nt, chi2
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.2215   Pr = 0.638
     Total         258         67         325 
                                             
         1         234         62         296 
         0          24          5          29 
                                             
       edu           0          1       Total
                      nt
. tab edu nt, chi2
          Pearson chi2(1) =  18.6427   Pr = 0.000
     Total         258         67         325 
                                             
         1         181         28         209 
         0          77         39         116 
                                             
        tp           0          1       Total
                      nt
. tab tp nt, chi2
          Pearson chi2(1) =   1.6925   Pr = 0.193
     Total         258         67         325 
                                             
         1          39          6          45 
         0         219         61         280 
                                             
      rasi           0          1       Total
a_transmig            nt
apakah_and  
. tab trans nt, chi2
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.5514   Pr = 0.458
     Total         258         67         325 
                                             
         1         114         33         147 
         0         144         34         178 
                                             
        in           0          1       Total
_telepon_p            nt
a_memiliki  
apakah_and  
. tab smph nt, chi2
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.4139   Pr = 0.520
     Total         258         67         325 
                                             
         1          43          9          52 
         0         215         58         273 
                                             
      comp           0          1       Total
                      nt
. tab comp nt, chi2
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.4085   Pr = 0.523
     Total         258         67         325 
                                             
         1         227         57         284 
         0          31         10          41 
                                             
     vehic           0          1       Total
                      nt
. tab vehic nt, chi2
          Pearson chi2(1) =   1.3016   Pr = 0.254
     Total         258         67         325 
                                             
         1         219         53         272 
         0          39         14          53 
                                             
        _k           0          1       Total
kan_kredit            nt
a_menyedia  
apakah_and  
. tab cred nt, chi2
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Appendix 4. 2 Descriptive Statistics of Respondents (n=210) 
No Variable Mean SD Min Max Type Unit 
1 traded_products 1.1238  0.3302  1 2 Categoric 
1= rubber 
2=rubber & palm oil 
2 age 45.1762  10.5632  23 75 Cont. years 




4 experience 12.2119  7.0327  1 38 Cont. years 
5 transmigrant 0.1442  0.3521  0                          1 Categoric yes/no 
6 family_number 4.1190  1.1197  1 9 Cont. person 
7 village_function 0.0714  0.2582  0    1 Categoric yes/no 
8 trader_status 0.3429  0.4758  0  1 Categoric yes/no 
9 ownership 1.0238  0.1528  1  2 Cont. person 
10 worker_number 4.9190  5.0564  0 34 Cont. person 
11 credit_availability 0.8238  0.3819  0 1  Categoric yes/no 
12 obligation_to_sell 0.6571  0.4758  0 1 Categoric yes/no 
13 price_information 0.6286  0.4843  0 1  Categoric yes/no 
14 suppliers_number 39.8381  51.6029  3  500  Cont. person 
15 competitors_number 11.2905  4.6839  0 25 Cont. person 
16 product_source 0.8761  0.3302  0 1  Categoric yes/no 
17 land_ownership 10.4690  11.0861  0 70.0000  Cont. ha 
18 operational_vehicle 0.8333  0.3736  0 1 Categoric yes/no 
19 computer_ownership 0.1667  0.3736  0 1  Categoric yes/no 
20 smartphone_ownership    0.4333 0.4967  0 1  Categoric yes/no 
21 total_revenue 24.7000 63.0000 1.00 782.00  Cont. million IDR 
22 total_trade_revenue 12.3000  32.1000 1.00 400.00 Cont. million IDR 














         com          210    0.96838      4.922     3.676    0.00012
                                                                    
    Variable          Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
. swilk com 
        supp          210    0.55182     69.767     9.792    0.00000
                                                                    
    Variable          Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
. swilk supp 
         num          210    0.84788     23.680     7.299    0.00000
                                                                    
    Variable          Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
. swilk num 
        quan          210    0.42277     89.856    10.375    0.00000
                                                                    
    Variable          Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
. swilk quan 
       trrev          210    0.30198    108.659    10.813    0.00000
                                                                    
    Variable          Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
. swilk trrev 
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Appendix 4. 4 Stata Output of Wilcoxon Rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) Test by Traders’ Status 
(left) and Credit Provision Status (right) 
          Prob > |z| =   0.0028
             z =   2.985
Ho: com(stat==0) = com(stat==1)
adjusted variance     170725.56
                               
adjustment for ties    -3982.44
unadjusted variance   174708.00
    combined        210       22155       22155
                                               
           1         72      6362.5        7596
           0        138     15792.5       14559
                                               
        stat        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
. ranksum com , by(stat)
    Prob > |z| =   0.0000
             z =  -5.035
Ho: supp(stat==0) = supp(stat==1)
adjusted variance     173896.64
                               
adjustment for ties     -811.36
unadjusted variance   174708.00
    combined        210       22155       22155
                                               
           1         72      9695.5        7596
           0        138     12459.5       14559
                                               
        stat        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
. ranksum supp , by(stat)
    Prob > |z| =   0.0004
             z =  -3.551
Ho: num(stat==0) = num(stat==1)
adjusted variance     172696.24
                               
adjustment for ties    -2011.76
unadjusted variance   174708.00
    combined        210       22155       22155
                                               
           1         72      9071.5        7596
           0        138     13083.5       14559
                                               
        stat        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
. ranksum num , by(stat)
    Prob > |z| =   0.0000
             z =  -4.984
Ho: quan(stat==0) = quan(stat==1)
adjusted variance     174051.71
                               
adjustment for ties     -656.29
unadjusted variance   174708.00
    combined        210       22155       22155
                                               
           1         72      9675.5        7596
           0        138     12479.5       14559
                                               
        stat        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
. ranksum quan , by(stat)
    Prob > |z| =   0.0003
             z =  -3.635
Ho: trrev(stat==0) = trrev(stat==1)
adjusted variance     174355.41
                               
adjustment for ties     -352.59
unadjusted variance   174708.00
    combined        210       22155       22155
                                               
           1         72        9114        7596
           0        138       13041       14559
                                               
        stat        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
. ranksum trrev , by(stat)
    Prob > |z| =   0.4313
             z =   0.787
Ho: com(cred==0) = com(cred==1)
adjusted variance     109985.34
                               
adjustment for ties    -2565.58
unadjusted variance   112550.92
    combined        210       22155       22155
                                               
           1        173     17990.5     18251.5
           0         37      4164.5      3903.5
                                               
        cred        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
. ranksum com , by(cred)
    Prob > |z| =   0.0016
             z =  -3.162
Ho: supp(cred==0) = supp(cred==1)
adjusted variance     112028.22
                               
adjustment for ties     -522.70
unadjusted variance   112550.92
    combined        210       22155       22155
                                               
           1        173       19310     18251.5
           0         37        2845      3903.5
                                               
        cred        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
. ranksum supp , by(cred)
    Prob > |z| =   0.1244
             z =  -1.537
Ho: num(cred==0) = num(cred==1)
adjusted variance     111254.89
                               
adjustment for ties    -1296.02
unadjusted variance   112550.92
    combined        210       22155       22155
                                               
           1        173       18764     18251.5
           0         37        3391      3903.5
                                               
        cred        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
. ranksum num , by(cred)
    Prob > |z| =   0.2294
             z =  -1.202
Ho: quan(cred==0) = quan(cred==1)
adjusted variance     112128.12
                               
adjustment for ties     -422.80
unadjusted variance   112550.92
    combined        210       22155       22155
                                               
           1        173       18654     18251.5
           0         37        3501      3903.5
                                               
        cred        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
. ranksum quan , by(cred)
    Prob > |z| =   0.3852
             z =  -0.868
Ho: trrev(cred==0) = trrev(cred==1)
adjusted variance     112323.77
                               
adjustment for ties     -227.15
unadjusted variance   112550.92
    combined        210       22155       22155
                                               
           1        173     18542.5     18251.5
           0         37      3612.5      3903.5
                                               
        cred        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
. ranksum trrev , by(cred)
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trans_X_debt     0.1548   0.0838   0.2945  -0.1843   0.1388   0.1680   0.2178   0.2100   0.0763   0.7887   0.0794   0.2796   0.0882   0.2809   0.0980   0.3297   0.0959   0.3238   0.0430   0.1512   0.5137   1.0000 
trans_X_qual     0.1321   0.3274   0.0847  -0.1548   0.1160   0.1403   0.1839   0.1771   0.0655   0.6625   0.3138   0.0833   0.3096   0.0900   0.3516   0.1077   0.3467   0.1025   0.1769   0.0433   1.0000 
 stat_X_debt     0.2487   0.1241   0.4716  -0.2923   0.3400   0.2238   0.3710   0.1673   0.7593   0.0753   0.1470   0.5213   0.0958   0.4025   0.1514   0.5436   0.1046   0.4195   0.4596   1.0000 
 stat_X_qual     0.2098   0.5143   0.1223  -0.2431   0.2819   0.1911   0.3105   0.1376   0.6316   0.0632   0.5483   0.1617   0.4530   0.0933   0.5641   0.1680   0.4669   0.1038   1.0000 
  com_X_debt     0.4928   0.2412   0.9662  -0.5794   0.4597   0.4365   0.4627   0.5966   0.1872   0.1676   0.2303   0.9076   0.2053   0.8160   0.2302   0.9162   0.2685   1.0000 
  com_X_qual     0.3948   0.9749   0.2351  -0.4609   0.3677   0.3482   0.3699   0.4686   0.1512   0.1278   0.9467   0.2374   0.8425   0.2022   0.9478   0.2357   1.0000 
 supp_X_debt     0.4974   0.2392   0.9460  -0.5814   0.5277   0.4749   0.6036   0.4798   0.2953   0.1731   0.2455   0.9466   0.2202   0.8388   0.2631   1.0000 
 supp_X_qual     0.3986   0.9779   0.2258  -0.4623   0.4112   0.3735   0.4598   0.3791   0.2218   0.1309   0.9731   0.2473   0.8728   0.2066   1.0000 
 cred_X_debt     0.4336   0.2043   0.8464  -0.5084   0.4298   0.6514   0.4618   0.4193   0.1939   0.1445   0.2009   0.8128   0.3096   1.0000 
 cred_X_qual     0.3588   0.8705   0.2012  -0.4115   0.3501   0.5273   0.3780   0.3349   0.1614   0.1142   0.8574   0.2133   1.0000 
trrev_X_debt     0.4964   0.2422   0.9381  -0.5814   0.6095   0.4542   0.5280   0.4731   0.2769   0.1323   0.2689   1.0000 
trrev_X_qual     0.3987   0.9778   0.2270  -0.4622   0.4596   0.3600   0.4116   0.3757   0.2102   0.1044   1.0000 
  dalt_trans     0.1948   0.1113   0.1415  -0.2336   0.1738   0.2136   0.2757   0.2661   0.0993   1.0000 
   dalt_stat     0.3254   0.1810   0.2257  -0.3849   0.4490   0.3108   0.4985   0.2166   1.0000 
    dalt_com     0.6980   0.3959   0.4994  -0.8315   0.6492   0.6296   0.6629   1.0000 
   dalt_supp     0.7089   0.3897   0.4813  -0.8326   0.8128   0.7256   1.0000 
   dalt_cred     0.6629   0.3627   0.4484  -0.7805   0.6704   1.0000 
  dalt_trrev     0.7075   0.3892   0.4816  -0.8323   1.0000 
        none    -0.8470  -0.4727  -0.5890   1.0000 
        debt     0.5027   0.2345   1.0000 
        qual     0.4060   1.0000 
       p_red     1.0000 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                  p_red     qual     debt     none dalt_t~v dalt_c~d dalt_s~p dalt_com dalt_s~t dalt_t~s trrev_~l trrev_~t cred_X~l cred_X~t supp_X~l supp_X~t com_X_~l com_X_~t stat_X~l stat_X~t trans_~l trans_~t
(obs=6300)
> rans_X_qual trans_X_debt
. spearman p_red qual debt none dalt_trrev dalt_cred dalt_supp dalt_com dalt_stat dalt_trans  trrev_X_qual trrev_X_debt cred_X_qual cred_X_debt supp_X_qual supp_X_debt com_X_qual com_X_debt stat_X_qual stat_X_debt t
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Appendix 4. 6 Results across Different Model Estimations 
Attributes 
CL_1 CL_2 ML_1 ML_2 ML_3 
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Mean                
p_red 0.0003 *** (0.0001) 0.0003 *** (0.0001) 0.0007 *** (0.0001) 0.0007 *** (0.0001) 0.0007 *** (0.0001) 
qual 1.7486 *** (0.0675) 0.8894 *** (0.2573) 3.5872 *** (0.3143) 1.6480 * (0.9059) 1.6750 * (0.9003) 
debt -0.2605 ** (0.1134) -0.7371 * (0.4259) -0.9105 *** (0.2609) -1.9086 ** (0.9488) -1.9484 ** (0.9621) 
dalt (opt-out) 0.6771 *** (0.1290) -0.1508  (0.3598) 0.5837 *** (0.1549) -0.1110  (0.4054) -0.1559  (0.4059) 
dalt_trrev    0.0075 * (0.0040)    0.0094 * (0.0050) 0.0094 * (0.0050) 
dalt_cred    0.9987 *** (0.2484)    0.8596 *** (0.2840) 0.8623 *** (0.2828) 
dalt_supp    -0.0070 ** (0.0027)    -0.0085 *** (0.0032) -0.0085 *** (0.0032) 
dalt_com    0.0213  (0.0230)    0.0215  (0.0253) 0.0228  (0.0253) 
dalt_stat    -0.3030  (0.2371)    -0.3790  (0.2636) -0.3650  (0.2631) 
dalt_trans    0.5529 * (0.3037)    0.6552 * (0.3402) 0.6495 * (0.3381) 
trrev_X_qual    -0.0064 ** (0.0029)    -0.0124  (0.0109) -0.0118  (0.0110) 
trrev_X_debt    -0.0015  (0.0051)    0.0052  (0.0105) 0.0054  (0.0107) 
cred_X_qual    -0.1140  (0.1857)    -0.0272  (0.6658) -0.0438  (0.6723) 
cred_X_debt    0.2847  (0.3070)    1.0145  (0.6876) 1.0095  (0.7012) 
supp_X_qual    0.0058 *** (0.0021)    0.0126  (0.0077) 0.0134 * (0.0080) 
supp_X_debt    -0.0003  (0.0036)    -0.0036  (0.0071) -0.0037  (0.0072) 
com_X_qual    0.0543 *** (0.0156)    0.1018 * (0.0550) 0.0989 * (0.0540) 
com_X_debt    0.0324  (0.0255)    0.0294  (0.0555) 0.0269  (0.0561) 
stat_X_qual    1.0452 *** (0.1766)    1.9702 *** (0.6022) 1.9841 *** (0.6056) 
stat_X_debt    -0.1418  (0.2832)    -0.0283  (0.5876) -0.0391  (0.5915) 
trans_X_qual    -0.3663 * (0.1908)    -1.0488  (0.7122) -1.0172  (0.7219) 
trans_X_debt    -0.4365  (0.3231)    -0.3422  (0.7190) -0.3400  (0.7202) 
Standard Deviation of Random Parameters Distribution          
qual       3.0088 *** (0.3101) 2.8441 *** (0.2936) 2.8724 *** (0.2976) 
debt       2.6674 *** (0.2717) 2.6058 *** (0.2755) 2.6344 *** (0.2786) 
Cholesky Matrix                
/111             2.8728 *** (0.2967) 
/121             -0.3835  (0.3014) 
/122             2.6063 *** (0.2746) 
Goodness of fit Measures             
Log-likelihood -1450.4206 -1396.0336 -1179.9023 -1154.4063 -1153.5881 
Pseudo-R2 0.3713 0.3949 0.4886 0.4996 0.5000 
AIC 2908.8410 2836.0670 2371.8050 2356.8130 2357.1760 
BIC 2935.8340 2984.5300 2412.2940 2518.7720 2525.8840 
Number of obs. 6300 6300 6300 6300 6300 
Number of resp: 210 210 210 210 210 
Note: Based on model estimations result on Appendix 8-12 ; *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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               Note: N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note.
                                                                             
           .        6,300 -2307.086  -1450.421       4    2908.841   2935.834
                                                                             
       Model          Obs  ll(null)  ll(model)      df         AIC        BIC
                                                                             
Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion
. estimate stats
                                                                              
        dalt     .6771401   .1290243     5.25   0.000     .4242571    .9300232
        debt    -.2604909   .1133757    -2.30   0.022    -.4827031   -.0382787
        qual     1.748577   .0674592    25.92   0.000     1.616359    1.880794
       p_red     .0003025   .0001026     2.95   0.003     .0001014    .0005037
                                                                              
      choice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -1450.4206                     Pseudo R2         =     0.3713
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(4)        =    1713.33
                                                Number of obs     =      6,300
Conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1450.4206  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1450.4206  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1450.4495  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1470.0796  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1533.6217  
. clogit choice p_red qual debt dalt, group (obs)
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Appendix 4. 8 Stata Output of CL_2 Model Estimation 
                Note: N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note.
                                                                             
           .        6,300 -2307.086  -1396.034      22    2836.067    2984.53
                                                                             
       Model          Obs  ll(null)  ll(model)      df         AIC        BIC
                                                                             
Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion
. estimate stats
                                                                              
trans_X_debt    -.4365248   .3231352    -1.35   0.177    -1.069858    .1968086
trans_X_qual    -.3662978   .1908374    -1.92   0.055    -.7403323    .0077367
 stat_X_debt    -.1417844   .2832108    -0.50   0.617    -.6968673    .4132984
 stat_X_qual     1.045158   .1766074     5.92   0.000      .699014    1.391302
  com_X_debt     .0323736    .025548     1.27   0.205    -.0176996    .0824469
  com_X_qual     .0543091   .0155613     3.49   0.000     .0238094    .0848088
 supp_X_debt    -.0002788   .0035751    -0.08   0.938    -.0072859    .0067282
 supp_X_qual     .0058436   .0021168     2.76   0.006     .0016947    .0099924
 cred_X_debt      .284663    .307034     0.93   0.354    -.3171127    .8864387
 cred_X_qual    -.1139548   .1856843    -0.61   0.539    -.4778894    .2499798
trrev_X_debt    -.0015306   .0050574    -0.30   0.762     -.011443    .0083818
trrev_X_qual    -.0064198   .0029041    -2.21   0.027    -.0121117   -.0007279
  dalt_trans     .5528894   .3036693     1.82   0.069    -.0422915     1.14807
   dalt_stat    -.3029766   .2370865    -1.28   0.201    -.7676577    .1617045
    dalt_com     .0212922   .0230138     0.93   0.355     -.023814    .0663983
   dalt_supp    -.0069533      .0027    -2.58   0.010    -.0122452   -.0016614
   dalt_cred      .998677   .2483933     4.02   0.000     .5118351    1.485519
  dalt_trrev     .0075275   .0040298     1.87   0.062    -.0003708    .0154258
        dalt    -.1508277    .359752    -0.42   0.675    -.8559286    .5542732
        debt    -.7371133   .4259414    -1.73   0.084    -1.571943    .0977164
        qual     .8894306   .2573292     3.46   0.001     .3850748    1.393787
       p_red     .0003099   .0001041     2.98   0.003     .0001059    .0005139
                                                                              
      choice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -1396.0336                     Pseudo R2         =     0.3949
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(22)       =    1822.10
                                                Number of obs     =      6,300
Conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -1396.0336  
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1396.0336  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1396.0344  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1396.4945  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1442.7173  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1481.5575  
> _X_debt, group (obs)
> l supp_X_debt com_X_qual com_X_debt stat_X_qual stat_X_debt trans_X_qual trans
> t_stat dalt_trans trrev_X_qual trrev_X_debt cred_X_qual cred_X_debt supp_X_qua














               Note: N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note.
                                                                             
           .        6,300 -1450.421  -1179.902       6    2371.805   2412.294
                                                                             
       Model          Obs  ll(null)  ll(model)      df         AIC        BIC
                                                                             
Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion
. estimate stats
being positive
The sign of the estimated standard deviations is irrelevant: interpret them as
                                                                              
        debt      2.66735   .2717045     9.82   0.000     2.134819    3.199881
        qual     3.008825   .3101383     9.70   0.000     2.400965    3.616684
SD            
                                                                              
        debt    -.9105175   .2609395    -3.49   0.000     -1.42195   -.3990855
        qual     3.587235   .3142988    11.41   0.000      2.97122    4.203249
        dalt     .5837059   .1548747     3.77   0.000     .2801571    .8872547
       p_red     .0006768    .000138     4.91   0.000     .0004064    .0009473
Mean          
                                                                              
      choice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -1179.9023                     Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(2)        =     541.04
Mixed logit model                               Number of obs     =      6,300
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -1179.9023  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -1179.9023  
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1179.9032  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1180.1933  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1188.9008  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1209.0481  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1445.6391  (not concave)
. mixlogit choice p_red dalt, group( obs ) rand( qual debt) id( id ) nrep(500)
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Appendix 4. 10 Stata Output of ML_2 Model Estimation 
                Note: N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note.
                                                                             
           .        6,300 -1396.034  -1154.406      24    2356.813   2518.772
                                                                             
       Model          Obs  ll(null)  ll(model)      df         AIC        BIC
                                                                             
Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion
. estimate stats
being positive
The sign of the estimated standard deviations is irrelevant: interpret them as
                                                                              
        debt     2.605781   .2754901     9.46   0.000     2.065831    3.145732
        qual     2.844126   .2936468     9.69   0.000     2.268589    3.419663
SD            
                                                                              
        debt    -1.908593   .9488355    -2.01   0.044    -3.768277   -.0489099
        qual     1.648026   .9058799     1.82   0.069    -.1274661    3.423518
trans_X_debt    -.3422247   .7189553    -0.48   0.634    -1.751351    1.066902
trans_X_qual    -1.048777   .7121806    -1.47   0.141    -2.444625    .3470715
 stat_X_debt    -.0283131   .5876455    -0.05   0.962    -1.180077    1.123451
 stat_X_qual     1.970207   .6021886     3.27   0.001      .789939    3.150475
  com_X_debt     .0294384   .0554837     0.53   0.596    -.0793077    .1381845
  com_X_qual     .1017665   .0549536     1.85   0.064    -.0059407    .2094736
 supp_X_debt    -.0035955   .0071231    -0.50   0.614    -.0175566    .0103656
 supp_X_qual     .0126331   .0077494     1.63   0.103    -.0025555    .0278217
 cred_X_debt       1.0145    .687557     1.48   0.140    -.3330873    2.362087
 cred_X_qual    -.0271561   .6658068    -0.04   0.967    -1.332113    1.277801
trrev_X_debt     .0052378   .0104514     0.50   0.616    -.0152467    .0257223
trrev_X_qual    -.0123972   .0109305    -1.13   0.257    -.0338207    .0090263
  dalt_trans     .6551674   .3402414     1.93   0.054    -.0116935    1.322028
   dalt_stat    -.3790035   .2635615    -1.44   0.150    -.8955745    .1375676
    dalt_com     .0214721   .0252976     0.85   0.396    -.0281103    .0710546
   dalt_supp    -.0085387     .00317    -2.69   0.007    -.0147518   -.0023256
   dalt_cred     .8595852   .2839714     3.03   0.002     .3030114    1.416159
  dalt_trrev     .0093766   .0050174     1.87   0.062    -.0004573    .0192105
        dalt    -.1110411   .4053591    -0.27   0.784    -.9055303     .683448
       p_red     .0006874   .0001381     4.98   0.000     .0004167    .0009581
Mean          
                                                                              
      choice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -1154.4063                     Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(2)        =     483.25
Mixed logit model                               Number of obs     =      6,300
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -1154.4063  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -1154.4063  
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =   -1154.41  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1154.9686  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1165.6366  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1183.1023  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1391.7069  (not concave)
> , group( obs ) rand( qual debt) id( id ) nrep(500)
> _debt com_X_qual com_X_debt stat_X_qual stat_X_debt trans_X_qual trans_X_debt 
> alt_trans trrev_X_qual trrev_X_debt cred_X_qual cred_X_debt supp_X_qual supp_X
. mixlogit choice p_red dalt dalt_trrev dalt_cred dalt_supp dalt_com dalt_stat d
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Appendix 4. 11 Stata Output of ML_3 Model Estimation 
                Note: N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note.
                                                                             
           .        6,300 -1396.034  -1153.588      25    2357.176   2525.884
                                                                             
       Model          Obs  ll(null)  ll(model)      df         AIC        BIC
                                                                             
Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion
. estimate stats
                                                                              
        debt     2.634364    .278576     9.46   0.000     2.088365    3.180363
        qual     2.872426   .2966539     9.68   0.000     2.290995    3.453857
                                                                              
      choice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
> ])
        debt:  sqrt([l21]_b[_cons]*[l21]_b[_cons] + [l22]_b[_cons]*[l22]_b[_cons
        qual:  sqrt([l11]_b[_cons]*[l11]_b[_cons])
. mixlcov, sd
                                                                              
        /l22     2.606308   .2746322     9.49   0.000     2.068039    3.144577
        /l21    -.3834505   .3014198    -1.27   0.203    -.9742226    .2073215
        /l11     2.872426   .2966539     9.68   0.000     2.290995    3.453857
                                                                              
        debt    -1.948405   .9621451    -2.03   0.043    -3.834175   -.0626355
        qual     1.674987   .9003226     1.86   0.063    -.0896131    3.439587
trans_X_debt    -.3400208   .7201954    -0.47   0.637    -1.751578    1.071536
trans_X_qual    -1.017195   .7219418    -1.41   0.159    -2.432175     .397785
 stat_X_debt    -.0390676   .5915439    -0.07   0.947    -1.198472    1.120337
 stat_X_qual     1.984133    .605622     3.28   0.001     .7971358     3.17113
  com_X_debt     .0269374   .0561479     0.48   0.631    -.0831104    .1369852
  com_X_qual     .0988924   .0539771     1.83   0.067    -.0069007    .2046855
 supp_X_debt    -.0036986   .0071631    -0.52   0.606    -.0177381    .0103409
 supp_X_qual     .0133936   .0080232     1.67   0.095    -.0023317    .0291188
 cred_X_debt     1.009514   .7011863     1.44   0.150    -.3647861    2.383814
 cred_X_qual    -.0437669   .6722502    -0.07   0.948    -1.361353    1.273819
trrev_X_debt     .0053506   .0106809     0.50   0.616    -.0155836    .0262847
trrev_X_qual    -.0118474    .010979    -1.08   0.281    -.0333658     .009671
  dalt_trans     .6494959   .3381495     1.92   0.055    -.0132649    1.312257
   dalt_stat     -.364986   .2631487    -1.39   0.165    -.8807479     .150776
    dalt_com     .0227997    .025283     0.90   0.367    -.0267541    .0723535
   dalt_supp    -.0085206   .0031565    -2.70   0.007    -.0147072   -.0023339
   dalt_cred     .8623129   .2828246     3.05   0.002     .3079869    1.416639
  dalt_trrev     .0093595   .0050024     1.87   0.061     -.000445     .019164
        dalt    -.1559398   .4059133    -0.38   0.701    -.9515152    .6396357
       p_red     .0006992   .0001388     5.04   0.000     .0004272    .0009712
                                                                              
      choice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -1153.5881                     Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(3)        =     484.89
Mixed logit model                               Number of obs     =      6,300
Iteration 8:   log likelihood = -1153.5881  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood = -1153.5881  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -1153.5884  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -1153.6664  
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1159.8604  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1185.6029  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1251.2342  (not concave)
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1301.8695  (not concave)
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1390.2818  (not concave)
> , group( obs ) rand( qual debt ) id( id ) corr nrep(500)
> _debt com_X_qual com_X_debt stat_X_qual stat_X_debt trans_X_qual trans_X_debt 
> alt_trans trrev_X_qual trrev_X_debt cred_X_qual cred_X_debt supp_X_qual supp_X




Appendix 4. 12 The Cholesky Factorization of the Covariance Matrix 
 qual debt 
qual 2.8724  



















                                                                              
         v22     6.939874   1.467741     4.73   0.000     4.063154    9.816595
         v21    -1.101433   .8887921    -1.24   0.215    -2.843434    .6405674
         v11     8.250829   1.704232     4.84   0.000     4.910595    11.59106
                                                                              
      choice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
         v22:  [l21]_b[_cons]*[l21]_b[_cons] + [l22]_b[_cons]*[l22]_b[_cons]
         v21:  [l21]_b[_cons]*[l11]_b[_cons]




Appendix 4. 14 Summary of Rubber Traders’ WTC Price Reduction for All Attributes across Different Model Estimations 
Attributes 
CL_1 CL_2 ML_1 ML_2 ML_3 
WTC Min. Max. WTC Min. Max. WTC Min. Max. WTC Min. Max. WTC Min. Max. 
qual -5,779.57  *** -16,427.93 -3,428.13 -2,869.82   *** -8,510.64 -1,115.09 -5,300.05 *** -8,813.71 -3,660.01 -2,397.48 * -5,763.19 -149.19 -2,395.48 * -5,680.84 92.77 
debt 861.00  *** 116.26 2,768.26 2,378.36   * -360.18 8,300.65 1,345.27 *** 583.77 2,546.99 2,776.54 ** -84.55 6,285.63 2,786.50 ** 86.98 6,278.60 
dalt_trrev     -24.29   * -82.86 1.71     -13.64 * -32.62 0.73 -13.39 * -31.79 0.71 
dalt_cred     -3,222.32   *** -9,667.04 -1,376.92     -1,250.49 *** -2,538.36 -410.00 -1,233.23 *** -2,485.45 -410.02 
dalt_supp     22.44   ** 4.91 71.06     12.42 *** 3.33 25.88 12.19 *** 3.29 25.22 
dalt_com     -68.70    -317.72 86.40     -31.24  -115.25 40.39 -32.61  -115.26 37.52 
dalt_stat     977.58  -548.43 3,913.49     551.36  -200.98 1,514.28 521.98  -217.66 1,450.35 
dalt_trans     -1,783.94   * -6,059.25 176.80     -953.11 * -2,222.23 25.99 -928.87 * -2,159.26 26.57 
trrev_x_qual     20.71   ** 1.54 68.23     18.03  -13.82 55.70 16.94  -14.45 53.86 
trrev_x_debt     4.94  -35.51 51.64     -7.62  -41.76 23.84 -7.65  -42.03 24.00 
cred_x_qual     367,68  -1,000.33 2,181.72     39.51  -2,007.59 2,146.49 62.59  -1,961.10 2,150.77 
cred_x_debt     -918.49  -4,319.78 1,223.27     -1,475.85  3,992.40 510.05 -1,443.75  -3,930.93 532.89 
supp_x_qual     -18.85   *** -58.02 -4.68     -18.38  -46.99 4.15 -19.15 * -48.13 3.56 
supp_x_debt     0.90  -26.93 31.70     5.23  -16.11 28.13 5.29  -15.99 27.48 
com_x_qual     -175.23   *** -514.08 -66.40     -148.05 * -356.51 7.32 -141.43 * -340.45 9.05 
com_x_debt     -104.46  -401.73 69.98     -42.83  -221.74 126.85 -38.52  -218.01 129.49 
stat_x_qual     -3,372.29   *** -9,538.08 -1,748.31     -2,866.18 *** -5,620.40 -1,106.14 -2,837.60 *** -5,555.25 -1,088.06 
stat_x_debt     457,48  -1,707.48 3,124.85     41.19  -1,757.88 1,860.62 55.87  -1,734.02 1,853.19 
trans_x_qual     1,181.89   * -21.80 3,944.20     1,525.72  -473.64 4,118.37 1,454.74  -544.34 4,005.18 
trans_x_debt     1,408.48  -692.10 5,383.38     497.85  -1,622.50 2,812.17 486.28  -1,586.82 2,737.23 
Note: Based on WTC result on Appendix 16-20 ; *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Appendix 4. 17 WTC Stata Output of ML_1 Model Estimation 
 
 
 ul  -3428.1263   2768.2577
 ll  -16427.933   116.25767
wtp  -5779.5708   861.00059
           qual        debt
. wtp p_red qual debt , krinsky reps (10000)
 ul     69.977112    -1748.3108     3124.8454     3944.1984     5383.3834
 ll    -401.73025    -9538.0835    -1707.4845    -21.804664    -692.09677
wtp    -104.45625    -3372.2912     457.47951     1181.8909     1408.4842
       com_X_debt   stat_X_qual   stat_X_debt  trans_X_qual  trans_X_debt
 ul      2181.724     1223.2717    -4.6809837     31.696756    -66.400511
 ll     -1000.326    -4319.7761    -58.022752    -26.931238    -514.07808
wtp     367.68494     -918.4893    -18.854795     .89967518    -175.23297
      cred_X_qual   cred_X_debt   supp_X_qual   supp_X_debt    com_X_qual
 ul     86.401528     3913.4891     176.79724     68.234635     51.642945
 ll    -317.72482    -548.43268    -6059.2511     1.5383881    -35.506952
wtp    -68.700965     977.57962    -1783.9445     20.713999     4.9386766
         dalt_com     dalt_stat    dalt_trans  trrev_X_qual  trrev_X_debt
 ul     -1115.089     8300.6505     1.7093009    -1376.9215     71.064892
 ll    -8510.6425    -360.18141    -82.857362    -9667.0423     4.9081522
wtp    -2869.8234     2378.3586    -24.288141    -3222.3161     22.435346
             qual          debt    dalt_trrev     dalt_cred     dalt_supp
> y reps (10000)
> om_X_qual com_X_debt stat_X_qual stat_X_debt trans_X_qual trans_X_debt, krinsk
> ns trrev_X_qual trrev_X_debt cred_X_qual cred_X_debt supp_X_qual supp_X_debt c
. wtp p_red qual debt dalt_trrev dalt_cred dalt_supp dalt_com dalt_stat dalt_tra
 ul   -3660.015   2546.9928
 ll  -8813.7074   583.76868
wtp  -5300.0507   1345.2672
           qual        debt
. wtp p_red qual debt , krinsky reps (10000)
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Appendix 4. 18 WTC Stata Output of ML_2 Model Estimation 
 
 




 ul      126.8477    -1106.1434     1860.6154     4118.3659     2812.1698
 ll    -221.74057    -5620.3983    -1757.8764    -473.63704    -1622.4994
wtp    -42.825819    -2866.1764     41.188672     1525.7175     497.85445
       com_X_debt   stat_X_qual   stat_X_debt  trans_X_qual  trans_X_debt
 ul     2146.4934      510.0531     4.1493358     28.132794     7.3163255
 ll    -2007.5935    -3992.3978     -46.98688    -16.108645    -356.50866
wtp     39.505521    -1475.8527    -18.378116     5.2305822    -148.04567
      cred_X_qual   cred_X_debt   supp_X_qual   supp_X_debt    com_X_qual
 ul     40.387888     1514.2768     25.987509     55.703638     23.839381
 ll    -115.24758    -200.98047    -2222.2301    -13.823633    -41.757385
wtp      -31.2368     551.35877    -953.11081     18.034944    -7.6197354
         dalt_com     dalt_stat    dalt_trans  trrev_X_qual  trrev_X_debt
 ul     149.19242     6285.6279     .73449223    -409.99973     25.884108
 ll      -5763.19     84.548628     -32.61855    -2538.3588     3.3340584
wtp    -2397.4807     2776.5436    -13.640672    -1250.4893     12.421798
             qual          debt    dalt_trrev     dalt_cred     dalt_supp
> y reps (10000)
> om_X_qual com_X_debt stat_X_qual stat_X_debt trans_X_qual trans_X_debt, krinsk
> ns trrev_X_qual trrev_X_debt cred_X_qual cred_X_debt supp_X_qual supp_X_debt c
. wtp p_red qual debt dalt_trrev dalt_cred dalt_supp dalt_com dalt_stat dalt_tra
 ul     129.49391    -1088.0583     1853.1851     4005.1761     2737.2305
 ll    -218.00867    -5555.2467     -1734.018    -544.33697    -1586.8164
wtp    -38.524436     -2837.601     55.872366     1454.7377     486.27953
       com_X_debt   stat_X_qual   stat_X_debt  trans_X_qual  trans_X_debt
 ul     2150.7686     532.89306     3.5649008     27.477563     9.0451465
 ll    -1961.1018    -3930.9332    -48.130365    -15.986124    -340.44811
wtp     62.593025    -1443.7526    -19.154765     5.2895524    -141.43059
      cred_X_qual   cred_X_debt   supp_X_qual   supp_X_debt    com_X_qual
 ul     37.520813      1450.353     26.572476     53.863794     24.000661
 ll    -115.26274    -217.66204    -2159.2577    -14.445075    -42.026748
wtp    -32.606901     521.98338    -928.87434     16.943526    -7.6521076
         dalt_com     dalt_stat    dalt_trans  trrev_X_qual  trrev_X_debt
 ul     92.774808     6278.5978     .70640345    -410.01716     25.216756
 ll    -5680.8444     86.976805    -31.794771    -2485.4526      3.287972
wtp    -2395.4765     2786.5049    -13.385411    -1233.2338     12.185643
             qual          debt    dalt_trrev     dalt_cred     dalt_supp
> y reps (10000)
> om_X_qual com_X_debt stat_X_qual stat_X_debt trans_X_qual trans_X_debt, krinsk
> ns trrev_X_qual trrev_X_debt cred_X_qual cred_X_debt supp_X_qual supp_X_debt c
. wtp p_red qual debt dalt_trrev dalt_cred dalt_supp dalt_com dalt_stat dalt_tra
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Appendix 4. 20 Stata Output of Wilcoxon Rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) Test of Rubber 
Quantity Purchased Variable by Transmigrant Status 
 
  
                                 1         2         4        10        30
           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
              std. dev:   34.4793
                  mean:   14.6547
         unique values:  46                       missing .:  0/179
                 range:  [.2,300]                     units:  .1
                  type:  numeric (float)
                                                                            
quan                                                             (unlabeled)
                                                                            
. codebook quan if trans==0
                                .8         5       9.5        24        35
           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
              std. dev:   29.0579
                  mean:   19.6065
         unique values:  25                       missing .:  0/31
                 range:  [.6,120]                     units:  .1
                  type:  numeric (float)
                                                                            
quan                                                             (unlabeled)
                                                                            
. codebook quan if trans==1
    Prob > |z| =   0.0177
             z =  -2.372
Ho: quan(trans==0) = quan(trans==1)
adjusted variance      97203.40
                               
adjustment for ties     -366.52
unadjusted variance    97569.92
    combined        210       22155       22155
                                               
           1         31        4010      3270.5
           0        179       18145     18884.5
                                               
       trans        obs    rank sum    expected
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
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